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Communication from the Commission 
1. THE EURO AREA ECONOMY IN 2009 
In the wake of the shockwaves of the worst crisis since the 30s, signs of economic stabilisation are 
emerging. Throughout the world, important policy interventions have succeeded in achieving a degree of 
stability in the financial system. Financial conditions have improved over the summer, with several 
financial indicators returning to pre-crisis levels. Business and consumer confidence indicators also have 
improved in recent months. World trade has stabilised, and there are indications that the destocking cycle 
is bottoming out. The relative resilience of consumption has proved to be a stabilising factor during the 
recession, as disinflation and relief measures included in fiscal stimulus packages have supported 
household incomes. 
According to the latest interim forecast published by the Commission services in September 2009, growth 
in the euro area is set to fall by 4% in 2009, unchanged from the Spring 2009 forecast. The stronger than 
expected contraction in activity in the first quarter was compensated for by a faster than projected 
stabilisation in the second quarter, especially in Germany and France. 
However, the strength and resilience of the recovery has yet to be fully tested. While banks are in the 
process of strengthening their solvency ratios, helped by the accommodative stance of monetary policy 
and rescue packages, the stabilisation in financial markets has yet to yield concrete outcomes for credit 
distribution to the economy, which has decelerated considerably throughout the first half of 2009. 
Deteriorating employment prospects are another source of uncertainty and concern. On the positive side, 
the considerable amount of policy-induced stimulus that is still in the pipeline should not be overlooked. 
Overall, the sustainability of the recovery is yet to be tested. 
The euro has acted as a valuable shield in the crisis. The euro has efficiently shielded the euro area from 
the exchange rate and interest rate turbulence that had proved so damaging for Member States in episodes 
of financial market stress in the past. It has also played a valuable role as an anchor of sound 
macroeconomic policies for Member States actively pursuing the adoption of the euro, or whose 
currencies are linked to the euro. Finally, the capability of the euro area to act swiftly in co-ordination 
with other central banks has contributed to the stability of the entire international monetary system. 
The financial crisis has increased the attractiveness of the euro for non-euro area Member States. In 
particular, two potential benefits of euro membership have come to the forefront: first, it would eliminate 
the risk of sudden and disruptive exchange rate movements; and, second, it would grant domestic 
institutions access to euro central bank liquidity. At the same time, however, the crisis has shown that the 
euro does not solve all economic challenges - in particular challenges related to internal and external 
imbalances, as demonstrated by the fact that some euro area countries with imbalances have been hard 
hit. This experience confirms the rationale for achieving a high level of sustainable convergence prior to 
euro adoption, as required by the Treaty. Euro-candidate countries should equip their respective 
economies for life in the euro by means of policies to strengthen fiscal discipline, prevent macro-financial 
imbalances, and foster productivity, competitiveness and ultimately their adjustment capacity within 
EMU. 
But the crisis is amplifying some challenges in the euro area. The crisis is weighing on the sustainability 
of public finances and potential growth. Furthermore, while the adjustment induced by the crisis is 
helping to reduce some imbalances within the euro area, there is a risk that divergences in 
competitiveness positions will increase again if policy action is not appropriately co-ordinated. 
As a consequence of the steep fall in revenues, fiscal stimulus measures under the European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP) and the operation of automatic stabilisers, government balances have 
deteriorated sharply. Thanks to effective policy action since autumn 2008, coordinated in the context of 
the EERP, a financial meltdown and a generalised loss of confidence has been avoided. Fiscal 
policymaking has been successfully targeted to the need and urgency of pulling the economy out of the 
recession. Discretionary fiscal stimulus and unfettered automatic stabilisers have provided a cushion to 
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economic activity and contributed to the recent signs of improvement, but have led to a substantial 
deterioration in government accounts. Rising budget deficits and low or negative growth, as well as the 
support being given to the banking sector, are feeding into significantly higher public debt levels. The 
average euro area budget deficit is now expected to increase from 2% of GDP in 2008 to over 5% of GDP 
in 2009. On the basis of current plans and projections, the euro area deficit will further increase to 6½% 
of GDP in 2010, while public debt could reach 84% of GDP by 2010, i.e. an increase of 18 percentage 
points from 2007. In 2009, with the possible exceptions of Cyprus and Luxembourg, almost all euro area 
Member States will post budget deficit ratios above the 3%-of-GDP threshold, with some countries 
exceeding the benchmark by a large margin. In the first half of 2009 and on the initiative of the 
Commission, the Council opened Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDPs) for Greece, Ireland, France, Malta 
and Spain on the basis of a breach of the reference value in 2008 (2007 for EL)1. The Commission 
proposes today that the Council open EDPs for countries which are expected to breach the reference value 
in 2009. The flexible application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure permitted under the Pact provides 
important support and direction for Member States in these difficult circumstances. As a result, budgetary 
consolidation paths recommended under the EDPs have been largely set in a medium-term perspective 
and, depending on circumstances of individual countries, longer deadlines have been recommended for 
correction of the excessive deficits. 
The crisis may accelerate downward pressures on trend growth. The Commission had projected that 
potential GDP growth in the euro area would fall in the long run due to the ageing population. A number 
of crisis-related factors may amplify this phenomenon. First, unemployment, if protracted, would entail a 
prolonged, perhaps permanent, loss of valuable skills. Second, the stock of equipment and infrastructure 
will decrease and may become obsolete due to lower investment and sectoral change. Third, innovation 
may well be hampered as research and development spending are usually among the first outlays that 
businesses cut during a recession. Higher risk premia may make the financing of R&D more expensive in 
the future. The loss in potential growth is expected to be higher in countries experiencing deep recessions. 
The reduction of divergences within the euro area in the immediate aftermath of the crisis is welcome.
In the immediate wake of the financial crisis, growth took a dive in all euro area countries, but to 
differentiated extent. The Commission services interim forecast shows that growth trajectories are 
beginning to fan out within the euro area. For example, growth in 2009 has been revised upwards for 
Germany and France, while Italy and Spain recorded downward revisions. As for divergences in current 
accounts, the ongoing housing market correction and its impact on domestic demand is likely to go some 
way towards reducing disparities, a welcome step towards more balanced growth patterns. However, the 
convergence is moderate and is not consistent among the euro area Member States. 
2. IMBALANCES ACCUMULATED IN THE PAST RENDERED 
SOME EURO AREA MEMBER STATES MORE VULNERABLE 
WHEN CRISIS STRUCK 
The crisis shone a spotlight on some pre-crisis imbalances. At a global level, the speed and intensity of 
the contagion from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy came as a surprise. The collapse in demand and 
GDP in some euro area Member States has been just as deep as in other, potentially more exposed, 
economies. While the global, interconnected nature of the banking and financial system largely accounts 
for the contagion, the difficulties experienced by some Member States have underscored a number of 
vulnerabilities within the euro area itself. 
Accumulated intra-euro area imbalances exposed some economies, more than others, to shocks.
Benign macroeconomic conditions characterised by strong macroeconomic growth, low rates of inflation, 
compressed interest rates and low levels of financial market volatility led economic agents to greatly 
1 All the relevant documents regarding the EDP procedure are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/netstartsearch/pdfsearch/pdf.cfm?mode=_m2
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underestimate some of the risks inherent in the financial system at the global level and facilitated the 
expansion of credit worldwide. In some euro area Member States, the same benign economic 
environment also allowed the financing of fast growth at the expense of the accumulation of large current 
account deficits (primarily EL, ES, PT and CY, but also IE, MT, SI, SK), while other Member States ran 
ever-higher current account surpluses (DE, LU, AT, NL, FI). Within the euro area, the dispersion of 
current account balances between these two groups had steadily increased since the mid-1990s and 
reached an all-time high just before the crisis. From a balanced position in 1999, surpluses steadily 
accumulated and reached 7.7% of GDP in 2007, while aggregated deficits rose from 3.5% of GDP in 
1999 to 9.7% in 2007. 
In countries in deficit, the divergence trend reflected the build-up of domestic imbalances. They 
materialised through excessive domestic demand pressures, a surge in house prices and a bloated 
construction sector. This was especially patent in Ireland, Spain and Greece, which consistently recorded 
higher growth and inflation than the rest of the euro area during the decade. High current account deficits 
– and associated foreign capital inflows – are warranted in a catching-up scenario insofar as they enable 
an economy to increase its capital stock and prepare the ground for sustainable medium-term growth 
prospects. However, capital has not always been channelled to its most productive uses in deficit 
countries. As a result, a significant share of the labour force was attracted to high cyclical sectors, such as 
construction, which now requires substantial adjustment. 
Conversely, countries in surplus capitalised on their traditional strengths, with a growth model centred 
on their already-competitive export sector. In these countries the engine of domestic demand never really 
kicked in to take over the export engine. The impact of the crisis revealed the vulnerability of this growth 
model to fluctuations in global demand, with implications for growth in the euro area as a whole. 
Another source of imbalances lay in the rapid growth of the financial sector. Ireland has been a 
textbook case, as the share of the financial sector in total value-added made up 10.6% in 2007, compared 
with only 5% on average in the euro area. Following the crisis, ballooning impaired assets weakened the 
banking sector and put public authorities, acting as the lender of last resort, under pressure. 
Such imbalances explain why the crisis has hit some Member States harder than others. Since the large 
external liabilities increased exposure to financial shocks, deficit countries suffered from reduced risk-
appetite on financial markets. The adjustment of bloated construction sectors has also weighed heavily on 
growth and employment from the very beginning of the crisis. In parallel, countries in surplus were hit 
almost immediately by the fall in global demand and saw growth drop sharply. Countries with larger 
banking sectors are at risk of incurring significant fiscal liabilities. Overall, Member States pursuing 
unbalanced growth models have suffered particularly severe economic contractions. 
The impact of the crisis demonstrates the need for action. While these imbalances and their associated 
risks had been identified for several years, their resolution has been long overdue as policymakers in 
Member States largely ignored these imbalances in good economic times. They should not be ignored any 
longer. 
3. UNFINISHED BUSINESS ALSO HAMPERED THE EURO AREA'S 
CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO THE CRISIS 
Deeper financial integration in the euro area was not matched by a parallel strengthening of 
supervisory arrangements. Existing supervisory arrangements failed to promote a common supervisory 
culture, to apprehend the systemic linkages between financial markets and the real economy and to 
provide a resilient framework for a speedy and co-ordinated response when the crisis started. Initial 
responses were disjointed and largely shaped by domestic considerations. For instance, initiatives on 
deposit guarantee schemes and the emergency de-consolidation of a large cross-border financial 
institution paid testimony to the absence of workable crisis management procedures. The first Eurogroup 
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summit at the level of Heads of State and Government, held in Paris in October 2008, helped to catalyse 
the EU response. 
The Commission has acted effectively to fill this gap. It provided a common framework for the 
implementation of national banking rescue plans, in line with state aid rules, benefitting also from ECB 
support. Since then, following the conclusions of the Larosière Group, the Commission has presented its 
formal legal proposals for new European financial supervision architecture. The proposals aim to 
strengthen the prudential oversight of both individual financial institutions and the financial system as a 
whole. In parallel, the EU is at the forefront of the regulatory reform of financial markets, shaping the 
initiatives and commitments of the G20. 
While the fiscal house was mostly in order when the crisis struck, some Member States had limited 
room to respond to the crisis. After several years of broadly successful fiscal consolidation in line with 
the recommendations of the Stability and Growth Pact, most Member States in the euro area were in a 
much better position to weather the crisis than they were before. Fiscal consolidation was unfinished 
business in some euro area countries, however, despite the good economic times. Public debt levels 
remained high in Greece, Italy and Belgium, while fiscal consolidation was slow and indecisive in 
France, Greece and Portugal. In other countries, public finances became dependant on fiscal revenues 
either from the financial sector or the real estate boom whose slump added to the deterioration of public 
finances and greatly diminished the fiscal room for manoeuvre available to counteract the effects of the 
crisis. Consequently, several Member States had to limit or withhold their contribution to the joint fiscal 
stimulus as laid out in the European Economic Recovery Plan. If consolidation had been achieved, the 
euro area's fiscal response could have been even more decisive. 
Globally, euro area governments did their fair share in the concerted global effort to sustain demand 
within the EU-wide coordinating framework of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). They 
have deployed a broad range of sizable fiscal and structural policy measures. The overall fiscal support 
amounts to about 4.6% of euro area GDP (about 5% for the EU as a whole); it includes the effects from 
automatic stabilisers and the combined discretionary fiscal stimulus of Member States over 2009 and 
2010 in the magnitude of 1.8% of euro area GDP. Of the 590 national measures reported by euro area 
Member States, 22% are geared towards boosting the purchasing power of households, including the most 
vulnerable; 25% buttress investment; 32% provide sectoral or company support; and 21% are earmarked 
to improve the functioning of labour markets. According to the Commission's June 2009 assessment, 
most measures are timely and well-targeted, in line with the EERP principles. However, doubts about the 
reversibility of certain measures are a cause for concern as they may make expansionary policies less 
effective. 
The aggregate impact of the euro area economic policy response could have been faster and perhaps 
stronger if co-ordination had started earlier and been more comprehensive. While co-ordination matters 
for the EU as a whole, it is particularly important for euro area Member States given their close economic 
and financial inter-linkages and the fact that they share a common currency and a single monetary policy. 
Overall, the established mechanism of policy co-ordination within the euro area did not work well in the 
crisis. Working on this evidence, the Eurogroup committed itself to improving the co-ordination of the 
implementation of national recovery measures in order to avoid unintended negative spill over effects and 
to fully implement the surveillance framework defined by the Stability and Growth Pact. More than ever, 
the euro area should exert leadership in these testing times. 
 6 
Communication from the Commission 
4. THE WAY FORWARD: ENSURING EFFICIENT INTERNAL 
ADJUSTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN A 
CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT 
The crisis has clearly demonstrated the urgency for euro area Member States to make rapid progress 
on the EMU@10 reform agenda: broadening and deepening macroeconomic surveillance. A well-
functioning EMU is a major asset for the EU as a whole. In its EMU@10 communication2 in May 2008, 
the Commission proposed a three-pillar agenda to improve the functioning of EMU in the face of a 
rapidly changing global environment, ageing populations and rising concerns about energy and climate 
change. The domestic agenda called for macroeconomic surveillance in EMU to be broadened beyond 
fiscal policy to include macro-financial stability aspects and competitiveness trends, as defined in the 
context of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, and to ensure better integration of structural reform 
in overall policy co-ordination within EMU. It also called for the deepening of fiscal policy co-ordination 
and increased surveillance. The external agenda of EMU@10 argued that the euro area should play a 
more important role in global economic governance. The crisis highlighted the need to forcefully 
implement this reform agenda. 
Broader macroeconomic surveillance is urgently needed to spur a co-ordinated policy response to the 
competitiveness challenge. Resolute and urgent policy actions need to be taken as structural divergences 
have the potential to undermine the cohesiveness of the euro area. Despite repeated warnings, imbalances 
within the euro area were not treated at a time when economic conditions were favourable. Now, the 
crisis is forcing an adjustment of current account balances the hard way, through a collapse in domestic 
demand and sharply rising unemployment. This is most notably - but not exclusively - the case in 
countries in deficit, such as Spain and Ireland. Moreover, the rebalancing of competitiveness trends risks 
being more protracted in view of: (i) the global nature of the crisis, which impairs an export-led strategy; 
(ii) lower potential growth, which limits the room available to rebalance accumulated wage and cost 
divergences; (iii) and the fact that, as the recovery firms up, countries experiencing weak growth may 
face higher real interest rates than the rest of the euro area. In an effort to broaden macroeconomic 
surveillance, the Eurogroup agreed in 2008 to regularly review intra-euro-area competitiveness trends and 
to encourage Member States to take action to adjust. Addressing the underlying causes of harmful 
competitiveness developments in the euro area is a matter of common concern and must be an integral 
part of the area's exit strategy. 
The broadening of surveillance should also incorporate financial market developments in earnest.
Over-indebtedness in the private sector led to unsustainable economic trends. Such financial imbalances 
should be detected and dealt with at an early stage. The EMU@10 communication stressed that 'while 
market integration, particularly in financial services, is beneficial overall for EMU, it can also, if not 
accompanied by appropriate policies, amplify divergences among the participating countries'. The crisis 
demonstrates how fast financial shocks can hit the real economy and how strong feedback loops are. In 
addition to the broadening of macroeconomic surveillance to intra-area competitiveness developments, 
the early detection of asset price booms appears essential to avert costly corrections of fiscal and external 
imbalances at a later stage.
Surveillance should be deepened to ensure sustainable public finances. In the wake of the crisis, the 
combination of low growth and accelerating debt risks putting public finances in a precarious situation, 
just when the impact of ageing is starting to set in. If policies are unchanged, public debt in the euro area 
is projected to reach 100% of GDP in 2014. As part of a deeper fiscal co-ordination in the euro area, a 
firm commitment is needed for a fiscal strategy that can appropriately balance stabilisation and 
sustainability considerations in line with the Stability and Growth Pact. With a view to ensuring a 
consistent set of fiscal policies for the euro area, the euro area Finance Ministers agreed in June 2009 on 
terms of reference to provide orientations towards the formulation of government budgets for 2010 (Mid-
2 'EMU@10: success and challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union' Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Central Bank - COM(2008) 238, 7.5.2008. 
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Term Budgetary Review). Notably, they decided that as soon as the recovery takes hold, and the risks of 
an economic relapse diminish further, the balance of fiscal policies should shift to consolidation. Also, 
they agreed that the pace of fiscal consolidation should be differentiated across countries, taking into 
account not only the pace of the recovery, fiscal positions and debt levels, but also the projected cost of 
ageing, external imbalances and risks in the financial sector. 
Consolidation should also enhance the quality of public finances and stem the debt increase while 
contributing to long-term growth, by consolidating non-productive expenditures and strengthening 
incentives for raising the productive capacity of the economy. In addition, domestic fiscal frameworks 
need to be strengthened and made more conducive to effective consolidation in good times. Overall, a 
lesson from the crisis is that macroeconomic surveillance should consider sustainability as a cornerstone 
for elaborating economic strategies.
Co-ordination across policies and Member States should be enhanced to permit judicious exit 
strategies. Credible and well-coordinated exit strategies are particularly relevant for the euro area to 
ensure sustainable growth and avoid that potential growth trajectories fan out when the economy gains 
strength again. Co-ordination should essentially take the form of common understandings on the 
appropriate timing, pace and sequencing of normalisation of policy settings. Eventual withdrawal of fiscal 
stimulus and business support measures, accompanied by the formulation of credible fiscal consolidation 
and structural reform plans, would improve the outlook for price stability and hence facilitate the conduct 
of monetary policy. Rapid progress on financial repair would be essential to ensure that the banking 
system does not act as a drag on the recovery and the price stability objective of monetary policy does not 
enter into conflict with the financial stability objective. Differentiated policy responses will need to be 
incorporated in national exit strategies so as to achieve the best global output. In line with the Council 
recommendations to the euro area in the context of the Lisbon strategy, progress is needed on the 
implementation of reforms that enhance potential growth and facilitate adjustment to shocks. 
Lessons learned for governance. The crisis underscored the need to reinforce the framework for euro 
area surveillance and governance. In its 2008 EMU@10 communication, the Commission had already 
underlined the need for euro area Member States to show clearer political will and leadership to turn 
common understanding into concerted policy action, calling for true ownership of the Eurogroup by 
Member States as a policy body for frank discussion and determined action. The Lisbon Treaty provides 
the necessary platform for the further improvement of economic governance of the euro area. 
Highlighting the need to develop ever-closer co-ordination of economic policies within the euro area, a 
new Protocol attached to the Lisbon Treaty gives formal recognition to the Eurogroup and its President. 
The Lisbon Treaty also strengthens the role of the Commission in the surveillance of the functioning of 
EMU. 
United, the euro area can influence the global agenda. The emergence of the G20 as the forum of 
choice for the promotion of global economic and financial governance reform raises the stakes for the 
euro area. In the wake of the crisis, the global economy faces the difficult challenge of managing the 
transition towards a more balanced and sustainable pattern of growth across the world's major economies. 
To this end, the enhanced role of global surveillance under the aegis of the IMF is warranted. In this 
context, the euro area should be considered as a single economic entity, which will continue to grow in 
importance as new members progressively join. For the euro area to speak with a strong voice at the 
global level, the EU external representation, particularly within the IMF, needs to be strengthened. Now is 
the moment, while discussions on quota and representation reform are gaining momentum. This is why 
the Commission's stance as conveyed in the EMU@10 one year ago is today more relevant than ever.
Part II 
Annual Report on the Euro Area – 2009 
A REPORT BY THE COMMISSION SERVICES 
SEC(2009) 1313/2 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article15859_en.htm
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This report was prepared in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs under the 
supervision of Marco Buti, Director-General. Executive responsibilities lay with Servaas Deroose, 
Director for the Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU. 
The principal contributors were Lourdes Acedo Montoya, Magnus Astberg, Narcissa Balta, Chris Bosma, 
Anna Corcuera Hotz, Marie Donnay, Roland Eisenberg, Luis Fau, Hans Feddersen, Jonas Fischer, Mauro 
Giorgio Marrano, Joern Griesse, Martin Hradisky, Per Iversen, Paul Kutos, Geraldine Mahieu, Aurora 
Mordonu, Moisés Orellana Peña, Dario Paternoster, Esther Perez Ruiz, Sonia Plecita Ridzikova, Valérie 
Rouxel-Laxton, Andrea Schaechter, Ralph Setzer, Guergana Stanoeva, Michael Thiel, Georges 
Tournemire, Guntram Wolff and Marcin Żogała. Aurora Mordonu, Guergana Stanoeva, Marcin Żogała 
and Guntram Wolff had special responsibility for Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue was 30 June 2009. 
The report benefited from comments by staff of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, including Matthias Mors and João Nogueira Martins. 
Statistical assistance was provided by George-Marian Isbasoiu. 
Secretarial support was provided by Françoise Briard and Elzbieta Kropp. 
Reinhard Felke and Georges Tournemire edited and coordinated the production of the report. 
Comments on the report would be gratefully received and should be sent by mail to the following address: 
Servaas Deroose 
Director – Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Economy of the euro area and EMU 
European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 
or by e-mail to Reinhard.Felke@ec.europa.eu
10 
CONTENTS 
11
Introduction 15
1. Macroeconomic Developments 17
1.1. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 17
1.2. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 21
1.3. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS 26
1.4. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 30
1.5. COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENTS 32
2. Macroeconomic Policies 37
2.1. INTRODUCTION 37
2.2. MONETARY POLICY 39
2.3. FINANCIAL MARKET POLICIES 42
2.4. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN (EERP) 49
2.5. FIRST ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL MEASURES TAKEN UNDER THE EERP 55
3. The External Dimension 63
3.1. THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE CRISIS 63
3.2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO EXCHANGE RATE 67
3.3. GLOBAL IMBALANCES – AN UPDATE 69
3.4. REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 70
3.5. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GLOBAL ROLE OF THE EURO 72
4. Economic Governance In Times Of Crisis 75
4.1. THE EMU@10 REPORT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CRISIS 75
4.2. THE BROADENING AND DEEPENING OF MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE 77
4.3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS GOVERNANCE 78
4.4. THE CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT OF THE EURO AREA 82
LIST OF TABLES 
1.1. Industrial production in the euro area (year-on-year change) 18
2.1. Euro-area public interventions in the banking sector (in % of GDP) 46
2.2. First year GDP effects of fiscal stimulus amounting to 1% of GDP 50
2.3. Total fiscal stimulus over 2009 and 2010 by Member State (in % of GDP) 55
2.4. Overview of structural reform measures relevant to national recovery programmes 56
3.1. GDP growth in major economies 64
3.2. Current account balances of major economies (as % of GDP) 70
CONTENTS 
12 
3.3. Countries and territories with exchange rate regimes linked to the euro (as of 30 June 2009) 73
LIST OF GRAPHS 
1.1. World trade and manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) 17
1.2. GDP losses across recessions, euro area 18
1.3. Contribution to GDP growth, euro area 18
1.4. Euro-area money market rates (1 Oct 2007 to 30 June 2009) 21
1.5. 10-year government bond yields, euro area (1 Jan 2007 to 30 June 2009) 23
1.6. Euro-area yield curve slope (Jan 2007 to June 2009) 23
1.7. Corporate bond spreads per rating, euro area (1 Jan 2007 to 30 June 2009) 23
1.8. Monetary Financial Institutions lending in the euro area (January 2000 to May 2009) 23
1.9. Composite Financing Cost Indicators (CFCI) for the euro area (March 2003 to April 2009) 25
1.10. Stock price index and implied volatility (Stock price: Jan 2007 = 100) 25
1.11. Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), euro area 26
1.12. Breakdown of euro-area HICP inflation 26
1.13. Headline and structural budget balances in the euro area in 2008 28
1.14. Budget balances in the euro area (2007 levels and 2008 changes) 28
1.15. Structural balances in the euro area 28
1.16. Public debt-to-GDP ratios in the euro area 29
1.17. Cumulated change in public balance, euro-area countries (2007-2010) 30
1.18. Cumulated change in public debt, euro-area countries (2007-2010) 30
1.19. Euro-area employment growth and unemployment rate 30
1.20. Contribution of labour productivity and labour supply components to GDP growth, euro 
area 31
1.21. Nominal wage indicators, euro area 31
1.22. Compensation per employee, labour productivity and unit labour costs, euro area 31
1.23. Compensation per employee, labour productivity and unit labour costs by sectors in 2008, 
euro area 32
1.24. Current account positions, euro area, United States and China (1999-2008) 32
1.25. Compensation per employee, labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs (1999-2008) 33
1.26. Changes in intra euro-area Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 34
1.27. Current account positions, euro-area Member States (1999 to 2008) 34
1.28. Net foreign asset positions, euro-area Member States (1995-2007) 34
1.29. Evolution of current account positions, euro-area Member States (2008 to 2010) 35
2.1. Debt-to-GDP ratios of various economic sectors among select advanced economies 37
2.2. ECB interest rates and Eonia 39
2.3. Central banks' policy interest rates 42
2.4. Default risks of euro-area financial institutions 44
2.5. Equity prices in the euro area (January 2008 = 100) 44
2.6. Write-downs and capital injections of main euro-area financial institutions 46
CONTENTS 
13
2.7. Interest rate spreads (OIS over three-month Euribor, Libor in percentage points) 47
2.8. Fiscal policy stance in the euro area 52
2.9. EERP - Measures aimed at supporting household purchasing power in the euro area (fiscal 
stimulus as % of country GDP, 2009-2010) 57
2.10. EERP - Labour market measures in the euro area (fiscal stimulus as % of country GDP, 2009-
2010) 57
2.11. EERP -Measures aimed at stepping up investment expenditure in the euro area (fiscal 
stimulus as % of country GDP, 2009-2010) 58
2.12. EERP- Business support measures in the euro area (fiscal stimulus as % of country GDP, 2009-
2010) 59
3.1. Capital flows to emerging and developing economies, annual flows 63
3.2. World trade and GDP growth (annual average growth rate) 64
3.3. Profiles of GDP growth in major economies (2007-2010) 64
3.4. Changes in EUR cross-rates since 02 Jan 2008 66
3.5. Euro exchange rates (daily data) 68
3.6. Euro real effective exchange rate (41 countries, CPI deflated) 68
3.7. Foreign Exchange Reserves of which currency is known (at constant end-2008 exchange 
rates) 74
3.8. Total international bonds outstanding, broad measure (at constant end-2008 exchange 
rates) 74
LIST OF BOXES 
1.1. The housing correction in the euro area 19
1.2. The crash of the US Investment Bank Lehman Brothers 22
1.3. Recent developments in food prices 24
1.4. How large are the risks of deflation in the euro area? 27
2.1. Banking crisis and growth: historical evidence 40
2.2. Unconventional monetary policy measures 43
2.3. Ongoing work on further bond market integration in the euro area 48
2.4. Government accounts and bank rescue schemes 51
2.5. 2008/2009 council recommendations to the euro area in the context of the Lisbon strategy 53
2.6. The community pillar of the EERP 54
4.1. Activities of the Eurogroup in 2008 and 2009 79
4.2. The three new euro area Member States: Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia 83
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This 2009 issue of the Annual Report on the Euro Area explores in depth the 
global financial and economic crisis that sprang up in the second half of 2008 
and rocked the euro-area economy. The roots of the crisis lay in the gradual 
building-up of macroeconomic imbalances over the past decade. In a context 
of ample liquidity combined with insufficient supervisory oversight, loose 
lending policies laid the groundwork for the emergence of a housing bubble 
in the US and other advanced economies. Its extent and duration was 
prolonged by massive flows of capital from emerging market economies with 
large external surpluses, notably China. Risk became mispriced and leverage 
increased for all sectors of the economy, be they households, companies or 
financial institutions throughout the world. Domestic and global imbalances 
fed each other until breaking point. 
Financial markets were at the epicentre of the crisis. From June 2007 
onwards, interbank interest rates had been tightening considerably. Increasing 
insolvencies in US subprime lending shattered trust in sophisticated 
structured products. Financial institutions became saddled with illiquid 
holdings in their portfolio and were increasingly reluctant to lend to each 
other. The funding of several institutions with risky business models became 
compromised. Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Freddy Mac, monoline insurers, 
and AIG made the headlines in quick succession, while generalised losses 
began percolating into balance sheets through regular quarterly reporting of 
financial institutions. 
On 15 September 2008, the investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for 
protection in the largest US bankruptcy case in history. The Lehman 
bankruptcy saw the collapse of a financial institution deemed 'too big to fail'. 
In the aftermath, interbank markets essentially froze, and banks became 
almost completely reliant on central bank support for short-term financing. 
The European Union and the euro area were not spared, with some large 
financial conglomerates on the verge of default. In October 2008, exceptional 
measures in the EU, spearheaded by euro-area governments, prevented a 
collapse of the banking system. Still, confidence was at an all-time low. 
The real economy bore the brunt of the financial crisis during the fourth 
quarter of 2008. Business surveys, closely followed by hard indicators, such 
as industrial production and external trade, tumbled to historic lows all 
around the world. The spectre of a negative feedback loop between banks and 
the real economy seemed to materialise. It implied that an additional wave of 
loan losses from companies and households hit by the global recession had 
the potential to aggravate the already-stretched situation of banks' balance 
sheets. 
Although the euro area was not at the origin of the current crisis, it has been 
hit hard too. First, euro-area banks had purchased asset classes that eventually 
became subject to impairment. Second, the episode of acute financial stress in 
the euro area in September and October markedly affected consumer 
confidence. Third, euro-area exporters, and especially those of investment 
goods, suffered from the sharp slowdown in world markets. This explains 
why there are few differences between countries most directly affected by the 
financial crisis and the euro area as regards current growth prospects. A 
severe contraction in GDP is projected for 2009, with forecasts pointing to a 
subdued recovery in 2010. 
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Although the economic and financial shock was of unprecedented scope, 
policymakers learnt from the mistakes of the post-1929 period. They quickly 
introduced measures on an unprecedented scale to prevent the recession from 
morphing into a protracted depression and to lay the groundwork for 
economic recovery. 
This Annual Report on the euro area encompasses all key aspects of the 
ongoing economic and financial crisis. Chapter 1 describes how the crisis 
struck and how the economic situation suddenly changed. Chapter 2 explains 
the economic policy response in the euro area to the crisis, with particular 
emphasis laid on the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). Chapter 3 
reviews the reaction of major non-EU economic powers and the emergence 
of the G-20 as the critical forum in global economic governance. Chapter 4 
reflects on euro-area economic governance in a period of crisis. The overall 
aim of this report is to shed light on the complex interconnections that sent 
the world economy into recession and how it affected the euro area. The 
accompanying Annual Statement on the Euro Area contains ensuing policy 
considerations. 
1. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
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1. After almost three years of robust 
growth, economic activity in the euro area 
weakened in the course of 2008, before entering 
in the last quarter its worst recession in decades.
The downturn was characterised by an 
extraordinarily rapid and large fall in world trade 
and industrial output as well as business and 
consumer confidence, amid a rapidly escalating 
financial crisis. The euro area was not spared. This 
first chapter provides an assessment of the
macroeconomic developments that impacted on 
the euro area during 2008 and the economic
outlook. Section 1.1 sets the scene, describing the 
economic situation in 2008 and prospects for 2009 
and 2010. Section 1.2 takes stock of monetary and 
financial developments, while fiscal developments
are covered in Section 1.3. Labour market 
developments in the euro area are outlined in 
Section 1.4. Finally, Section 1.5 analyses 
competitiveness developments within the euro 
area. 
1.1. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
2. A series of adverse events put a brake on 
economic activity in the first half of 2008. During 
the first half of 2008 economic activity in the euro 
area weakened gradually, reflecting an external 
environment characterised by soaring commodity 
prices and a deceleration in world growth and trade
(following vibrant expansion in 2007), as well as 
the first repercussions of the financial turmoil. In 
the second quarter of 2008, output contracted in 
the euro area for the first time since the early 
1990s (-0.3% quarter-on-quarter), in contrast to the 
robust performance in the first quarter (0.7%). 
3. Financial distress materialised in 
September 2008 and sent the global economy into
a tailspin. The financial market turmoil, which 
originated in the US subprime mortgage market in
the summer of 2007, intensified sharply in
September 2008. The main contagion channels to
the real economy were severe deteriorations in
financing conditions and confidence effects. 
Disruptions in money markets led banks to tighten
lending conditions. As a result, access to trade
finance and insurance was curtailed. Pervasive 
risk-aversion shattered confidence and led to a
reversal of international capital flows away from
emerging markets. 
4. The impact of the financial crisis fed
almost instantly into the real economy. During the
fourth quarter of 2008, survey indicators of global
economic activity dropped steeply. The OECD 
leading indicator fell to its lowest level since the 
mid-1970s. This was mirrored by a precipitous
decline in world trade, which dropped by some 6% 
in the last quarter of 2008, a rate not registered
since World War II (Graph 1.1). Industrial 
production was severely affected as well, with
double-digit contractions both in the main
industrialised regions and in many emerging-
market economies. 
Graph 1.1: World trade and manufacturing Purchasing 
Managers Index (PMI) 
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5. With the external environment 
deteriorating significantly, economic activity in
the euro area fell into recession in the second
half of 2008. In the third quarter of 2008 GDP 
contracted for the second consecutive quarter, 
falling by 0.4% quarter-on-quarter. However, the
full impact of the financial crisis began to be felt in
the final quarter of 2008, when GDP dropped by as 
much as 1.8 %. This drop was the steepest in 
quarterly terms since the beginning of Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). For 2008 as a whole, 
GDP expanded by just 0.7% in the euro area, a
marked deceleration from the previous year 
(+2.7%). The carryover for 2009 GDP growth as 
computed at the end of 2008 was strongly negative
(almost 1½ percentage points). Overall, the current
recession outstrips by a wide margin past 
recessions in the euro area (Graphs 1.2 and 1.3). 
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Graph 1.2: GDP losses across recessions, euro area 
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6. Euro-area exports were hard hit by the
global slowdown. They fell by more than 7% in
the fourth quarter of 2008 (-8% for goods only), 
the sharpest quarterly contraction ever (data since 
1970). With the pace of contraction in exports 
exceeding that of imports, the contribution of net 
exports to real GDP became increasingly negative 
in the second half of 2008, reaching almost a full 
percentage point in the fourth quarter. The 
unexpected shock to exports contributed to
sizeable involuntary inventory accumulation and 
translated almost instantly into a steep decline in
industrial production (Table 1.1). 
Graph 1.3: Contribution to GDP growth, euro area 
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7. The ongoing deceleration in 
construction investment was amplified by the 
sudden fall in business investment. Construction 
investment decelerated throughout 2008 in 
response to moderating and, in some cases, falling 
house prices (see Box 1.1). This was amplified by
the slump in business investment in the fourth
quarter. The slump in business investment was the
response of firms to missing demand and 
decreasing profits. Capacity utilisation of
equipment in place fell to 70.5% in April 2009. It 
was the lowest rate since the beginning of EU 
business surveys in 1990. In addition, banks'
tighter lending standards have reduced the
availability of capital. 
8. Private consumption growth also turned
negative, but only mildly so, in the fourth quarter 
of 2008. Consumption was subdued in the first
three quarters of 2008, before falling by 0.4% in
the fourth quarter. While nominal compensation 
remained relatively robust in 2008 (+3.3% year-
on-year), the sharp rise in inflation in the first half 
of the year (peaking at 4% in the euro area in July 
2008) depressed real incomes. The subsequent
sharp fall in commodity prices led to a reversal of 
inflation dynamics and allowed households to
recover some purchasing power during the
summer. However, this was eventually offset by
the deterioration in labour market conditions in the 
latter part of the year. Moreover, households’
assessment of their personal financial situation
deteriorated during 2008 and in early 2009, 
mirroring the poor return on investment in
financial markets. 
Table 1.1: Industrial production in the euro area (year-
on-year change) 
August 2008 May 2009
Euro area -1.9 -17.0
Germany 1.5 -17.9
France -1.9 -13.8
Spain -8.4 -20.5
Italy -3.1 -19.8
Source: Commission services.
9. Activity contracted further during the 
first quarter of 2009. GDP dropped by 2.5% 
quarter-on-quarter, the worst rate of GDP
contraction in the post-war era. The contraction 
was broad-based across euro-area countries.
Investment was again one of the main sources of 
weakness in activity. Gross fixed capital formation 
fell by 4.1% quarter-on-quarter, subtracting almost
one percentage point from GDP growth.
Businesses cut their inventories significantly, 
which reduced growth further by a full percentage
point. By comparison, the contraction in private
consumption was limited to 0.5% quarter-on-
quarter, as both the decline in inflation and 
measures taken by Member States supported the 
purchasing power of households. 
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Box 1.1: The housing correction in the euro area
The housing cycle has turned and most euro-area Member States are experiencing price decreases in real
estate. The ongoing correction follows nearly a decade of buoyant housing markets in which, driven by low
interest rates and –in some cases– dynamic demographics, several EU countries posted double-digit rates of
house price increases in real terms for several years in a row. Among the largest countries, France and Spain
were in that position from the turn of the century, while Ireland stood out among the smaller countries. 
While real house price growth was still positive in the first half of 2008, in the second half it turned negative
in most euro-area Member States. In Ireland, real prices declined by about 11% on a year in 2008. This
compares with an average annual increase of about 7% between 2001 and 2007. A marked reversal in the
dynamics of house prices could be seen also in Spain, Finland and France. Germany is an outlier, given that
real house prices remained on a downward trend for most of the last decade.
In terms of the contribution of housing investment to GDP growth, the correction appears to be particularly
strong in the countries where the downturn in house prices has been most marked in 2008. In Ireland, 
housing investment subtracted as much as 2.1 percentage points from GDP growth in the first half of 2008,
against an annual positive contribution of 0.5 percentage point on average between 2001 and 2007.
Substantial contractions in housing investment in 2008 were also observed in Spain and Finland. In the euro
area as a whole, housing investment subtracted 0.23 percentage point from GDP growth in 2008. 
Graph A: Real house prices, selected countries Graph B: Contribution of housing investment to GDP 
growth, selected countries 
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The extent of the correction in house prices will depend, inter alia, on the degree to which house prices are
considered to be overvalued. This requires an estimate of an equilibrium house price level, on the basis of its
fundamental determinants. Typically such estimates vary depending on the estimation technique used, as
well as on the sample, data sources and time period considered. The IMF estimates the average
overvaluation by the end of 2008 at about 20-30% in Ireland and the UK, and about 10-20% in Spain,
France, Italy and the Netherlands (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2008). However, the extent of the 
correction will also depend on the economic environment, the health of the domestic banking system, and 
economic policy responses. Poor growth prospects and the tightening of credit conditions create a difficult
environment for housing developments in 2009 and 2010. Based on developments in 18 countries over a 
35-year period, an OECD Study1 suggests that the average housing cycle lasts about 10 years. During the
expansion phase (lasting about six years) real house prices increase on average by around 45%. In the
subsequent phase of contraction (lasting around five years), prices correct by about 25%.
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
A more recent study2 shows that in the aftermath of more severe crises real house price declines average 
35% and stretch out over six years. Given that the magnitude of the housing boom in the last years exceeded 
by far what had been observed in past cycles, the ongoing corrections might be more severe and protracted 
than before. 
1 Girouard, N., Kennedy M., van den Noord P. and André C., (2006): 'Recent house price developments: the 
role of fundamentals', OECD Working Paper No. 475, 2006. 
2 Reinhart, M., and Rogoff K. (2008): 'The Aftermath of Financial Crises' American Economic Association
meetings in San Francisco, January 3, 2009. 
10. The Commission services' spring 2009 
economic forecast points to the recession 
continuing through 2009, before growth 
stabilises next year. The GDP forecast for the euro 
area has been revised downward to 4% for 2009. 
The downturn affects all Member States to varying 
degrees (depending on their trade openness, 
exposure to the financial crisis and domestic 
housing-market developments). It also has an 
adverse impact on nearly all demand components, 
with the exception of government consumption 
and public investment. The latter will contribute 
positively to growth in 2009-2010, reflecting in 
part the budgetary stimuli within the framework of 
the European Economic Recovery Plan (see 
Chapter 2). In contrast, exports and investment 
should undergo a marked contraction this year, in 
line with the slump in global demand. While 
private consumption is expected to hold up 
relatively well, deteriorating labour market 
conditions and moderating wage growth are likely 
to dampen real disposable income, though lower 
inflation in 2009 should have some offsetting 
effect. However, as external demand improves and 
measures taken to support the financial system and 
boost aggregate demand gain momentum, the fall 
in GDP should level off towards the end of 2009, 
with modest growth resuming in the course of 
2010. For 2010 as a whole, GDP is forecast to 
broadly stabilise at 0.1%. 
11. Signs of stabilisation emerged in spring 
2009. The Commission services' Economic 
Sentiment Indicator (ESI) for the euro area picked 
up in April (for the first time since May 2007) and 
continued to improve in May and June, although it 
remained well below its historical average. 
Between the first and the second quarter of 2009, 
all components of the ESI improved, except in the 
construction sector. The improvement in the ESI 
was also broad based across euro-area countries, 
with the trough being reached by most countries in 
March or a month earlier. Conversely, the 
quarterly manufacturing survey, carried out in 
April 2009, indicates a further fall in capacity 
utilisation since the last survey in January: it stands 
at 70.5% in the euro area – the lowest since 1990. 
According to the six-monthly industrial investment 
survey which was carried out in March and April, 
managers in most Member States expect real 
investment to drop by 20% in the euro area in 
2009. All in all, difficult financial conditions and 
weak confidence are set to continue to weigh on 
economic activity, but are likely to be gradually 
offset by the impact of expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. 
12. The growth outlook for the euro-area 
economy is, however, characterised by 
exceptional uncertainty. While the ambitious 
policy actions taken by governments and central 
banks since last autumn have prevented a systemic 
financial meltdown, financial markets and 
institutions remain under stress. The world 
economic situation continues to be exceptionally 
uncertain. Risks to the forecast are sizeable and 
remain somewhat skewed to the downside for 
2009, but appear more balanced for 2010. Of 
particular concern is the possibility that the 
negative feedback loop, from the deteriorating real 
economy to the still-fragile financial sector, may 
intensify (e.g. via rising impaired loans or cross-
border contagion effects). This may reinforce the 
deleveraging process, pushing the projected 
recovery in the real economy even further into the 
future. There may also be a risk of abrupt 
exchange-rate movements or the possibility that 
trade-distorting protectionist measures might be 
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put in place. On the other hand, policy measures
may be more effective than anticipated in restoring 
stability and confidence in financial markets, 
thereby supporting economic activity. 
1.2. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENTS 
13. The crisis in financial markets deepened
substantially during 2008. The bankruptcy of the
US investment bank Lehman Brothers in
mid-September 2008 prompted a re-evaluation of
risks embedded in the financial system (Box 1.2).
The global financial system became extremely 
fragile, reflecting the dislocation of several key 
credit markets, notably the markets for interbank
lending. This derived from the fall in investor
confidence, amid pervasive uncertainty about the 
strength of banks' balance sheets. The combination 
of this uncertainty and increased risk aversion led
to a generalised portfolio reallocation towards safe 
assets in the second half of 2008. 
Graph 1.4: Euro-area money market rates (1 Oct 2007 to 
30 June 2009) 
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14. Interbank markets were characterised by
severe liquidity shortages as banks hoarded cash, 
driving up interbank rates. Spreads on euro-area
interbank markets, which had already been
elevated since the start of the financial market
turbulence in summer 2007, remained abnormally 
high throughout 2008 (Graph 1.4). The three-
month interbank spread, measured as the
difference between unsecured money market rates
and risk-free interest rates with similar maturity,
peaked at 196 basis points in mid-October 2008. 
With the interest rate cuts starting in October, 
interbank money market rates fell perceptibly. By 
June 2009, the gap between unsecured and 
collateralised short-term interest rates had 
decreased substantially to less than 50 basis points, 
although it still remained higher than prior to the 
financial crisis. Despite some stabilisation,
investor confidence has not fully recovered, given 
the uncertainties about valuation, counterparty 
risks and the evolution of the deleveraging process. 
15. Long-term interest rates fell in response 
to the escalation of the crisis. The German 
10-year Bund yield increased between January and 
July 2008 by around half a percentage point to
4.66%, amidst growing inflation expectations and
still robust economic indicators. The Bund then
fell sharply to 2.90% in mid-January 2009, its 
lowest level since the introduction of the euro. 
Revisions in respect of growth and inflation as 
well as interest rate cuts weighed on yields. In the 
following months, government bond yields 
increased to 3.72% at the beginning of June owing
to improvement in economic sentiment and 
increasing supply of government debt. Renewed
uncertainties related to the strength of the recovery 
triggered a limited easing of interest rates (3.40%
at the end of June 2009). 
16. Spreads for government bonds within
the euro area widened. The spreads of government 
bond yields compared to the German Bund
benchmark, which were low in the years before 
2007, increased steadily throughout 2008 
(Graph 1.5). At the beginning of 2008, spreads on
10-year government bond yields stood at 17 basis 
points for Ireland and 29 basis points for Greece. 
The widening became significantly more 
pronounced in the fourth quarter of 2008. In early 
2009, spreads peaked at 282 basis points in the
case of Ireland and 302 basis points for Greece. 
The sharp rise in spreads reflected inter alia higher 
perceptions of credit risk against the backdrop of
expectations of higher future borrowing needs, as 
well as the general increase in liquidity premia.
Since then, spreads have narrowed markedly, but 
remain elevated by historical standards. 
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17. The slope of the euro-area yield curve 
steepened, as the sharp drop in short-term 
interest rates dominated the more moderate 
decline at longer maturities. The slope in the 
euro-area yield curve, measured as the difference 
between the three-month Euribor and the ten-year
German Bund yield, increased by almost 400 basis
points between mid-October 2008 and June 2009
(Graph 1.6). The steepening of the yield curve
reflected the lowering of interest rates by the ECB
since October 2008. It also signalled market
expectations of positive economic activity and 
inflation for the future. 
Box 1.2: The crash of the US Investment Bank Lehman Brothers
On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. was filing for bankruptcy. The listing of USD 
639 billion in assets made it the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. Its failure marked a watershed in the
global financial crisis. 
Founded in 1850, Lehman had developed into the fourth-largest US global investment bank and a global 
workforce of about 25,000. Until the nineties, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 separated commercial banks
from investment banks. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 paved the way for Lehman like other
investment banks to expand its business into more complex –and riskier– segments of financial markets. At
the peak of the US housing market in 2007, Lehman had emerged as the biggest underwriter of mortgage-
backed securities. With over USD 600 billion in assets but less than USD 20 billion of common shareholder
equity, Lehman had the highest gross leverage ratio of all US investment banks, except for Bear Stearns. As
the housing market deteriorated, Lehman incurred very substantial losses on its holdings of sub-prime and 
other lower-rated mortgage tranches, which it had retained in the process of securitisation. Market analysts
began to highlight Lehman's high leverage ratio. Even more than other financial institutions, Lehman's share
price came under heavy selling pressure, with its share price declining from about USD 50 at the beginning
of 2008 to about USD 9 at the end of August. On 12 September, Lehman's share price fell by a further 42
percent, when a rating agency warned of a possible downgrade of the bank's credit rating. On 13 September,
the US authorities renewed calls for a private-sector solution to Lehman's financial difficulties, but reiterated 
their reluctance to use government funds to bail out the bank. On 14 September, Barclays and Bank of
America withdrew from negotiations to buy Lehman. By 15 September, Lehman filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. 
The fall of Lehman led to a global reappraisal of risk in financial markets. The market had been previously
counting on the 'too-big-to-fail' presumption. In other terms, very large financial entities could be considered
systemic in the eyes of public authorities. They were supposed to get some form of support at the eleventh
hour that would save them. When Lehman failed, the event sent shockwaves within the financial system.
Counterparty risk became a reality. On 15 September, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down by
4.42%. In the credit default swaps (CDS) market, the cost of insuring corporate debt against the risk of
default rose sharply. Further reflecting an increase in risk aversion, prices of ten-year US government bonds
had their biggest rally in 20 years, pushing yields lower by about 20 basis points to about 3.5%. Central 
banks took stabilising measures on interbank markets. On 15 September, the US Fed increased its
emergency lending programme for investment banks to USD 200 billion and announced a further relaxation 
in the types of collateral that financial institutions can use to obtain loans. Meanwhile, the ECB, the Bank of 
England and the Swiss National Bank all announced measures to ease liquidity strains in their respective
interbank markets. 
As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, it took some time to value Lehman assets and unwind its trading
positions with the relevant counterparties, especially those related to derivatives. About 900,000 derivatives 
contracts involving the bank had to be terminated since the bankruptcy filings. As a consequence to the
Lehman case, regulators looked at ways to better protect investors from counterparty risk, possibly through
recourse to central counterparty clearinghouses. 
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Graph 1.5: 10-year government bond yields, euro area 
(1 Jan 2007 to 30 June 2009) 
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
Jan-07 May-07 Sep-07 Jan-08 May-08 Sep-08 Jan-09 May-09
in 
%
EL
IE
FR
ES
DE
IT
Source: Source: EcoWin. 
18. Spreads of corporate bond yields also
increased during the financial crisis. Gloomier
economic expectations and increasing risk 
discrimination caused markets for corporate bonds 
to dry up in 2008. Credit markets reacted with 
significant increases in corporate bond spreads 
(Graph 1.7). The spread on ten-year bonds issued 
by BBB-rated enterprises stood at 462 basis points 
at the end of 2008, more than 300 basis points 
higher than at the beginning of the year. Since 
then, default expectations for the corporate sector 
have receded notably, but concerns over credit
quality remained. At the end of the review period, 
long-term bonds by BBB-rated companies were 
yielding 5.9%. By contrast, interest rates for the 
best-rated companies declined over 2008, even 
Graph 1.6: Euro-area yield curve slope (Jan 2007 to June 
2009) 
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though the risk premium visibly increased also for 
these issuers.
Graph 1.7: Corporate bond spreads per rating, euro area 
(1 Jan 2007 to 30 June 2009) 
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19. Credit growth decelerated sharply after 
September 2008. Up to the third quarter of 2008, 
the growth rate of credit remained strong, in 
particular to non-financial corporations (Graph
1.8). 
Graph 1.8: Monetary Financial Institutions lending in the 
euro area (January 2000 to May 2009) 
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A significant turnaround took place in the fourth
quarter of 2008. The annual growth rate for loans 
to the private sector decelerated to 1.5% in June
2009, down from 11.1% in December 2007. The
slowdown was mainly influenced by demand
factors such as the moderation of economic
activity and the contracting housing market. 
Nonetheless, supply-side factors have contributed
to the moderation in lending as well, as reported by
the ECB Bank Lending Survey for the euro area.
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Box 1.3: Recent developments in food prices
Recent years witnessed unusually high volatility of food prices with an important impact on overall
consumer price inflation and real incomes. After having declined in real terms over the past thirty years,
global agricultural commodity prices started to soar around the end of 2006 until early 2008: between
September 2006 and March 2008 the Dow Jones Agriculture Index (in USD terms) rose by almost 90%. The 
index remained at a high level until July 2008, after which the initial price rise was more than reversed by a 
50% drop in prices until December. In the first six months of 2009, agricultural commodity prices have
slightly trended upwards without, however, returning to the level of summer 2006. Expressed in euro, the
price volatility, although considerable, was somewhat mitigated by the appreciation of the euro over the
same period.  
On 9 December 2008 the Commission – responding to a request by the June 2008 European Council – 
adopted a Communication entitled 'Food Prices in Europe' (1), in which it presented the results of its analysis
into the causes of the increase in food prices and the differential impact across Member States, as well as an
analysis of the functioning of the food supply chain. On that basis it presented policy recommendations and
set out a roadmap for its further work.  
The surge in agricultural commodity prices in 2006-2008 resulted from a combination of structural and 
temporary factors (2): among the former, global population growth, rising incomes in emerging economies
and the development of new market outlets have contributed to a gradual rise in world demand. Global 
supply was unable to keep pace due to a slowdown in the growth of food crop grain yields and the
characteristics of world agricultural markets which are thin and typically constrained by the seasonality of
production. Moreover, increasing production costs, due inter alia to rising energy prices, spilled over on
agricultural commodity prices. The impact of these structural factors was amplified by large production 
shortfalls resulting from adverse weather conditions and trade restrictions imposed by several exporting
countries. Exchange rate developments, growing speculative activity in the commodity derivative markets,
and the close relationship between agricultural and other commodity markets, such as the oil market, also
affected agricultural commodity price developments. While the global recession has a dampening effect on
world demand, the underlying structural factors remain. 
Against this background, the Commission proposes in its Communication to: 
– Promote the competitiveness of the food-supply chain to increase its resilience to world price shocks.
Specific recommendations have in the meantime been issued by the High Level Group on the
Competitiveness of the Agro-Food Industry (3); 
– Ensure a vigorous and coherent enforcement of competition at EU and national level and target those
practices and restrictions that are particularly harmful;
– Review potentially-restrictive regulations at national and/or EU level. This exercise is ongoing in the
context of the retail market monitoring exercise and the transposition of the Services Directive. Regulations 
that restrict the ability to compete on prices should be examined at national level; 
– Ensure the ability of consumers to better compare prices; 
– Examine together with regulators of commodity markets how to discourage excessive volatility in the
markets that benefits neither producers nor consumers.
(1) COM(2008) 821.
(2) See also Communication COM(2008) 321, Tackling the challenge of rising food prices - Directions for EU action, 20 
May 2008.
(3) Report on the Competitiveness of the European Agro-Food Industry, 17 March 2009.
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
Furthermore, the Communication notes that to keep the balance in the global supply and demand for food,
continued efforts are needed to ensure that agricultural production responds to market signals and to
promote an open trade policy. By agreeing the Health Check of the CAP, the European Union has taken
decisive steps to facilitate farmers' responses to changing market conditions. Moreover, the Doha Round of
WTO trade talks aims to open up agricultural markets to developing countries. Incentives and assistance to 
raise the production potential in developing countries could also contribute to increasing global food
security. 
Graph 1.9: Composite Financing Cost Indicators (CFCI) 
for the euro area (March 2003 to April 2009) 
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20. The overall cost of finance for both
euro-area non-financial corporations and
households climbed during 2008. While this 
increase was mainly driven by higher costs of
equity finance for non-financial corporations, the 
costs of bank loans and market debt increased as 
well (Graph 1.9). For households, as measured by
the Commission services Composite Financing
Cost Indicators (CFCI), the cost was on average
0.35 percentage points higher than in 2007, while 
financing costs for non-financial corporations were 
0.93 percentage points higher. The CFCI for
non-financial corporations and households has 
been declining in the first months of 2009, above
all as bank lending rates were reduced, but also on 
account of lower costs of market-based debt. 
21. Stock market prices decreased 
substantially in 2008 on the back of negative 
prospects for earnings. The Dow Jones Euro
Stoxx 50 declined in several waves, and most
markedly after the above-mentioned failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Graph 1.10).
Graph 1.10: Stock price index and implied volatility (Stock
price: Jan 2007 = 100) 
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From March onwards, stock markets regained
some ground, but volatility remained elevated
reflecting uncertainty about the impact of
economic policy actions. Still, as of end-June
2009, the Euro Stoxx 50 had declined by 45%
compared to end-2007. While the value of some
troubled financial stocks tumbled (especially those
of financial institutions with significant exposure 
to Central and Eastern European countries), the 
decline in equity markets was broad-based across
sectors and countries. 
Price developments 
22. Surprising commodity price rises during 
the first half of 2008 caused upward pressure on
inflation. Headline HICP inflation averaged 3.3%
in 2008, about one percentage point higher than
during the previous year (Graph 1.11).The increase
was chiefly driven by energy and food 
sub-components (Box 1.3). They contributed as
much as 2.4 percentage points to the average 
inflation figure of 3.6% in the first eight months of 
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2008. The contribution had been much weaker in
the same period of 2007 (0.5 percentage point out
of 1.8%). As a result, possible second-round
effects remained under close scrutiny during the
first half of 2008. 
Graph 1.11: Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), 
euro area 
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23. Headline inflation eased considerably 
after September as commodity prices tumbled.
HICP inflation fell from a peak of 4.0% in July 
2008 to -0.1% in June 2009 (Graph 1.12). HICP 
sub-categories food and energy contributed only
1.3 percentage points to the 2.6% average inflation 
figure for the period September-December 2008. 
The contribution of services to headline inflation
remained stable, but at a relatively high level
(around one percentage point in 2008). The 
contribution from non-energy industrial goods to
headline inflation also remained stable in 2008 at a 
low level (around ¼ percentage point). 
24. Core inflation remained contained in 
2008. Though much less pronounced, the pattern 
for core inflation (defined here as HICP inflation
excluding energy and unprocessed food) followed 
the changes observed in headline inflation (Graph 
1.12) (3). It accelerated to 2.4% in 2008 from 2.0%
in 2007 and markedly decelerated in the first 
months of 2009 to reach 1.3% in June 2009. 
(3) Core inflation is a measure of inflation that excludes or
reduces the weight of the more volatile components of 
headline inflation. Different statistical methods are 
available to compute core inflation (i.e. trimmed means,
weighted median and HICP excluding energy and 
unprocessed food).
Graph 1.12: Breakdown of euro-area HICP inflation 
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25. Inflation is expected to remain subdued 
in 2009. Prices are likely to continue declining 
throughout most of 2009 on the back of weakening
economic activity and moderating commodity 
prices. As a result of strong base effects (4) year-
on-year inflation has turned negative in June 2009
(-0.1%), possibly remaining in negative territory 
for a few months. However, the risk of a
deflationary scenario at the euro-area level, i.e. a 
persistent and self-reinforcing decline in a broader
set of prices, appears limited at the current juncture
(see Box 1.4). Inflation expectations remain
anchored at levels consistent with price stability,
whereas wage growth is expected to remain
positive and capacity utilisation is at very low 
levels. According to the Commission services 
spring 2009 forecast, HICP inflation is expected to 
reach 0.5% in 2009. A gradual rebound in inflation 
to around 1¼% can be expected in 2010. 
1.3. FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS 
26. The fiscal situation had benefited from 
years of successful consolidation. By 2007, fiscal 
positions in the euro area had evolved favourably. 
The headline deficit was down to 0.6% of GDP 
while the reduction in the structural deficit was 
somewhat smaller (1¾% from 2½% in 2005). The 
debt ratio had decreased to 66% from 70% in
2005. No euro-area Member States ran an
excessive deficit. 
(4) A base effect occurs when the evolution of a variable's 
annual rate from month t to month t+1 varies because of 
the evolution of the variable's level twelve months before
and not because of the variation of the variable's level 
between month t and month t+1.
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Box 1.4: How large are the risks of deflation in the euro area?
While a reduction in prices – e.g. as a result of competition or efficiency-induced cost-savings – is generally
considered desirable when affecting individual products, it may lead to adverse effects when it is broad-
based. Deflation essentially refers to a decline in prices that is generalised, persistent and expected.
'Generalised' implies that overall price aggregates are falling and that the decline is broad-based across items
and products. Within a currency area, it also implies that the price decline is geographically spread out and 
not restricted to a limited set of Member States.
'Persistent' indicates that the price decline is stretched out over a prolonged period of time. A one-off
downward price adjustment as a result of an external shock (e.g. a sharp drop in oil prices), would thus not 
fall under deflation. There is no agreed definition as to how long prices have to fall in order to technically
qualify as deflation. 
'Expected' means that, as economic agents' inflation expectations turn negative, the perceived relative cost of
future spending with respect to current spending falls. It follows that deflation should be distinguished from
a deceleration in the inflation rate (disinflation), which may also involve spells of negative price changes,
without however causing expectations to turn negative.
All currently-available forecasts do not foresee a prolonged period of negative price growth in the euro area,
and deflation risks appear limited. Several factors contribute to this.
First, the price decline is not generalised since it largely results from price falls in two items: energy and 
food. As shown in Graph A, only 17% of HICP items (at the 4-digit level), accounting for a combined
weight of about 20% in the HICP, recorded negative price growth in May. Items making up about 70% of
the HICP basket registered price growth above 1%.
Second, base effects, mainly explained by energy and food price movements, will contribute positively to 
annual inflation from August 2009 onwards (see Graph B). 
Third, market-based measures of inflation expectations appear to be well-anchored around the ECB price 
stability objective. The ten-year spot break-even inflation rate stands at 2.2% in June 2009. Finally, the
monetary and fiscal policy response to the crisis is likely to have a pre-emptive effect with respect to 
deflation by supporting demand.  
Graph A. HICP items sorted in ascending Graph B. Contribution of base effects to euro area  
growth order (year-on-year change, May 2009) HICP inflation (in percentage points, January 2009 to
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27. The financial crisis hit public finances 
hard and budgetary positions deteriorated for the 
first time in five years in 2008. The euro-area 
average headline deficit reached 1.9% of GDP, up 
by 1.3 percentage point of GDP from 2007 (Graph
1.13). Due to the economic downturn, the
development in the headline deficit was matched 
by a smaller deterioration of the euro-area average
structural balance, i.e. the budget balance net of 
cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary
measures (Graph 1.15). Its deterioration was of the
order of 1% of GDP, thus putting the structural
balance at 2¾% in 2008. The result seems to
suggest that the rise in the headline deficit was 
primarily of a structural nature. However, current
estimates of the structural balance are likely to be
affected by the volatile behaviour of tax revenues. 
While they were exceptionally buoyant in 2007,
tax revenues dropped sharply as a result of the
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph 1.13: Headline and structural budget balances in 
the euro area in 2008
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28. Dispersion in fiscal balances increased 
in 2008. Member States with initial budget 
surpluses exhibited different patterns over 2008
(Graph 1.14). In Ireland a minor surplus turned
into a large deficit of more than 7% of GDP. In 
Spain the public balance swung from surplus 
(2.2%) to deficit (-3.8%). In Cyprus the large 
surplus shrank considerably (from 3.4% in 2007 to
0.9% in 2008). Conversely, the Netherlands 
increased its surplus from 0.3% to 1.0% of GDP.
The large surpluses of Finland and Luxembourg 
were trimmed down, but remained strong in 2008
(respectively 4.2 and 2.2 percentage points). In
Germany, the fiscal position remained almost
unchanged and very close to balance. In countries 
still in deficit in 2007, a further deterioration was 
witnessed, but remained relatively contained,
especially in Portugal and Slovakia. A more
substantial deterioration in numbers was recorded 
in Malta, Italy and France. For France, the deficit 
deteriorated from 2.7% of GDP to 3.4%. On this
basis, in April 2009, the Council decided that
excessive deficits existed in France, Spain and 
Graph 1.14: Budget balances in the euro area (2007 levels 
and 2008 changes) 
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Ireland. For Greece, EDP proceedings were started 
in 2008 on the basis of the 2007 outturn. In July
2009, on the basis of the Commission services'
Spring 2009 Economic Forecast, the Council 
decided that Malta was in excessive deficit. 
Graph 1.15: Structural balances in the euro area 
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29. Progress towards medium-term
budgetary objectives was limited in the first half 
of 2008. At that time, policymakers were still
mainly concerned with individual countries' speed
of structural fiscal adjustment. With a view to
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speeding up adjustment towards the medium-term
budgetary objective (MTO), the Commission
adopted a so-called policy advice on economic and
budgetary policy for France in May 2008. The 
situation changed in the second half of the year, 
when the euro area was hit by the effects of the
financial crisis, which led to a rapid deterioration
in tax revenues. 
30. Government debt bounced back in 2008, 
partly due to public interventions in the financial
system. In the euro area, the debt to GDP ratio rose
by 3.3 percentage points to 69.3% in 2008 (Graph
1.16). Ireland witnessed a particularly steep
increase in its debt level, by 18 percentage points 
in 2008. In Belgium, the government debt ratio
rose in 2008, after having remained on a steady
downward path for almost a decade. Overall, the
increase in debt reflected largely the acquisition of 
financial assets in the framework of financial 
rescue plans, most notably in Ireland (10.5 points
out of a total increase of 18 percentage points), the 
Netherlands (12.6 points out of 15.7 points), 
Luxembourg (10.4 points out of 7.8 points) and 
Belgium (6.8 points out of 5.6 points). 
Graph 1.16: Public debt-to-GDP ratios in the euro area 
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31. Revenue shortfalls explain much of the
budgetary deterioration. In 2008, the observed
deterioration in budgetary positions in the euro
area was largely the result of a lower revenue–to– 
GDP ratio. On the expenditure side, the slight 
increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio was 
mainly due to higher social benefits and transfers,
i.e. automatic stabilisers. On the revenue side, a 
strong negative contribution came from taxes on
income and wealth, the latter not least due to 
rapidly declining corporate income taxes. 
Compared to the plans presented in the 2007 
updates of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes, significant nominal expenditure
overruns came together with large revenue 
shortfalls. 
32. Government revenue decreased 
markedly in 2008. Revenues in the euro area fell 
from 45.5% of GDP in 2007 to 44.8% in 2008. 
Many countries recorded shortfalls due to lower-
than-expected growth (Portugal, Greece, Italy and 
France). The decrease in taxes was especially 
marked in Ireland due to the slump in housing
boom-related taxes. In addition to the impact of
automatic stabilisers, a number of countries took
discretionary fiscal measures in 2008 to reduce
income taxes (Spain) or social contributions
(Austria). By contrast, Slovakia took revenue-
raising discretionary measures in the form of a 
broadening of the corporate and personal income
tax bases and an increase in the maximum ceiling 
of social contributions. Some other countries 
recorded better-than-expected tax revenues
(Finland, Austria and Germany). The Netherlands 
benefited from stronger non-tax gas revenues. 
33. Government expenditure edged up in
2008. Expenditure increased from 46.1% of GDP
in 2007 to 46.6% in 2008. Localised overruns took
place in some countries (Belgium, Slovenia). 
Greece recorded both large expenditure overruns
and higher debt servicing. Higher-than-expected
expenditure in Malta mostly stemmed from
measures related to shipyards. In Italy, a sizeable 
increase in compensation of employees and
intermediate consumption pushed current spending
upwards.
34. Public finances are expected to be hit 
hard by the recession in 2009 and 2010.
According to the Commission services' Spring 
2009 Economic Forecast, the budget deficit is set 
to more than double in the euro area, to the 
equivalent of 5¼% of GDP by 2009 and 6½% in
2010. The rise in deficits, at unchanged policies, is 
again in part due to the impact of the economic 
slowdown, mirroring the importance of automatic 
stabilisers (Graph 1.17). However, it is now also
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Graph 1.17: Cumulated change in public balance, euro-
area countries (2007-2010) 
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linked to the significant discretionary measures
that were introduced in the context of the European
Economic Recovery Plan. In particular, the
expenditure ratio is set to increase by more than 
three percentage points of GDP in 2009 (and by a
further percentage point next year) partly because
of a rise in social benefits and transfers, but also 
due to the decline in nominal GDP. The revenue
ratio is expected to decrease, reflecting inter alia 
the continuing reversal of past revenue windfalls
and the erosion of some tax bases. 
Graph 1.18: Cumulated change in public debt, euro-area 
countries (2007-2010) 
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In addition to the weakened budgetary situation, 
government debt will also be affected by sizeable 
"below-the-line" measures as part of the financial
rescue plans, such as bank recapitalisations.
Overall, gross debt is expected to increase from
69% of GDP in 2008 to close to 84% in 2010
(Graph 1.18).
1.4. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS  
35. Employment has reacted strongly to the 
current downturn, reflecting the severity of the
crisis. Employment still rose by 0.8% in 2008, 
compared to +1.8% in 2007 (Graph 1.19), leading 
to the highest employment ratio in the euro area 
since its inception (66.1%). 
Graph 1.19: Euro-area employment growth and 
unemployment rate 
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Typically, employment reacts with a lag to
economic fluctuations as companies attempt to
hoard labour in uncertain times. In the first half of 
2008, there was still some positive momentum,
with employment growing by 0.5%. However,
employment began edging down during the third
quarter (-0.2%) and fell by 0.4% in the fourth
quarter. The construction sector was particularly
hit and lost 5.4% of its workforce from the fourth
quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008. In 
the manufacturing sector, adjustment took place
mostly in the fourth quarter. Although the 
recession hit manufacturing hard, internal
flexibility in many industries (flexible working-
time arrangements, temporary closures etc.) has
prevented more significant labour shedding so far.
Employment contracted further in the first quarter 
of 2009 (-0.8% quarter-on-quarter). The 
deterioration in employment was especially severe
in Spain (-6.4% year-on-year) and in Ireland
(-3.9% year-on-year), owning mainly to the weight 
of labour-intensive sectors in these countries.
36. A sharp reduction in hours worked has
prevented the unemployment rate from 
increasing faster (Graph 1.20). Euro-area
unemployment stood at 7.5% in 2008, unchanged
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from 2007. The quarterly profile however shows
unemployment rising sharply to 8.0% in the fourth
quarter of 2008 and 8.8% in the first quarter of
2009. Spain (+10.3 percentage points) and Ireland 
(+6.3 percentage points) recorded the largest
increase in unemployment. Temporary agency
work was also particularly hit by the downturn.
Yet unemployment would have worsened in the 
absence of the significant reduction in hours
worked per person employed that many firms 
(sometimes supported by state subsidies) have
been implementing to avoid lay-offs (Graph 1.20). 
Graph 1.20: Contribution of labour productivity and labour 
supply components to GDP growth, euro area 
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37. Wage developments were impacted with 
a lag during 2008. Labour costs continued to grow 
at a fast pace throughout the first three quarters of 
2008 (5) (Graph 1.21). This was largely due to 
tight labour markets as well as to nominal wage
indexation schemes linking wages to past inflation
outcomes in some Member States (Belgium,
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta and Spain).The
annual growth of hourly labour costs even 
accelerated to 4% during the fourth quarter of 2008 
on account of the large reduction in working hours
(5) The Labour Cost Index corrects employment for effects of 
the number of hours worked, such as changes in overtime 
hours and part-time employment. Although it is meant to
give a better estimate of labour costs than compensation
per employee, caution is needed when interpreting it during
the crisis, where a temporary reduction of hours worked 
has led to higher hourly labour costs, even though total 
labour costs as such have remained broadly constant. 
Derived from national accounts data, compensation per 
employee includes wages and salaries and social security 
contributions.
implemented by many firms. However, the annual
growth of compensation per employee fell sharply
from 3.5% in the third quarter to 2.7% in the fourth
quarter of 2008. 
Graph 1.21: Nominal wage indicators, euro area
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Taken together with the deterioration in
employment and the relatively stronger growth in
negotiated wages (6), this suggests that firms were
actively reducing the variable pay component of 
compensation, such as overtime or bonus 
payments. 
Graph 1.22: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs, euro area 
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38. Unit labour costs picked up strongly 
following a contraction in labour productivity.
Productivity growth gradually weakened over the 
(6) Negotiated wages measure the outcome of collective 
bargaining in terms of basic pay or salary (i.e. excluding
bonuses).
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first three quarters of the year, mainly on account 
of the relatively labour-rich growth composition 
(Graph 1.22). Unit labour costs increased strongly 
in the fourth quarter (4.5% year-on-year), owing to 
the cyclical slump in productivity (1.7% year-on-
year). A breakdown by sectors indicates that cost 
pressures were most acute in the industrial sector, 
where measures to keep workers in employment 
helped alleviate the impact of the crisis, but 
resulted inevitably in a fall in labour productivity
in the very short term (Graph 1.23). By contrast, 
labour shedding in the construction sector has
resulted in higher productivity growth and 
relatively contained labour costs pressures in 
response to the crisis. Only in Spain did 
productivity experience a sizeable increase in line
with the sharp drop in employment in construction
as well as the fall in temporary employment
affecting all economic sectors.
Graph 1.23: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs by sectors in 
2008, euro area 
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39. Labour market outlook is poor. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
forecast, the contraction in employment, which 
began in late 2008, is set to accelerate this year to 
around 2.5%. The unemployment rate would
increase to 9.9% in 2009. Further job losses 
(-1.5%) are forecast for 2010. While the slack in 
the labour market should lead to a significant
deceleration in nominal wages (to slightly below 
+2% in 2009 and +1.5% in 2010), very subdued
consumer price growth might imply that real
compensation growth may be the highest in a 
decade in 2009. 
1.5. COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENTS 
40. The external position of the euro area as
a whole has been balanced over the past decade.
The euro area as a whole moved from a nearly 
balanced current account position (0.1% of GDP in 
2007) to a small deficit in 2008 (-0.7% of GDP).
This indicates that the euro area provided a net
demand stimulus to the rest of the world. The euro
area's generally balanced external position over the 
last ten years contrasts sharply with other major
economies (Graph 1.24). 
Graph 1.24: Current account positions, euro area, United 
States and China (1999-2008) 
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41. However, within the euro area, the issue
of persistent differences in competitiveness has 
gained relevance. Some of it can be traced back to 
labour cost developments across euro-area
Member States. Over the past decade, annual 
average nominal unit labour cost growth has
ranged from around zero in Germany to 2.5% or
more in some Member States (Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal, Slovenia) (Graph
1.25). Labour cost developments are important for
the functioning of the competitiveness channel of 
EMU. In the face of a positive asymmetric demand
shock (7), unit labour costs in the country affected 
by the shock should increase faster than in the rest 
of the euro area. The increase in unit labour costs 
(7) Theoretically, above-average demand in a given country 
should push costs and prices upwards.  The deterioration in 
the relative cost situation should then worsen cost and price 
competitiveness for the respective country and slow the 
pace of economic activity towards the euro-area average. 
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implies competitiveness adjustment. However, 
such cost and price increases, if not offset by 
increases in productivity, lead to prolonged 
competitiveness losses and build-up of domestic
imbalances. Evidence shows that in some Member
States wage growth has been outpacing 
productivity growth for some time (Spain, 
Portugal, but also Belgium, Ireland, Italy) (Graph 
1.25). 
Graph 1.25: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and nominal unit labour costs 
(1999-2008) 
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42. Distinguishing between 'benign' and 
'harmful' developments in competitiveness is 
essential for policy intervention. Benign factors
reflect the normal and healthy functioning of the 
euro-area economy, while harmful developments
are related to the build-up of a range of domestic
macroeconomic imbalances in some Member 
States. The harmful factors require policy 
intervention while adjustment to the others should
be left to the market. In the euro area, benign 
factors such as Balassa-Samuelson effects (8),
price convergence or cyclical differences have 
played a relatively minor role in driving the 
divergences in external performance. Differences
in growth and inflation have tended to be
significant and persistent, leading to large changes
in Member States' relative competitive positions, 
(8) The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis predicts that price
levels will increase when relative productivity rises in the
tradable sector. If prices in the tradable sector are fixed and 
if wages equalise across sectors, wages will increase both 
in the tradable sector and in the non-tradable sector. As a 
consequence, the cost of producing non-tradables will rise 
and the general price level will thereby increase. 
notably in terms of price competitiveness but also
in terms of current account imbalances and net
foreign asset positions. Although part of the
current account dispersion within the euro area can 
be seen as a sign of increased financial market 
integration, with the euro acting as catalyst, less
'benign' factors seem to have played a more 
important driving role (9). 
43. Differences in price competitiveness 
have been partly driven by an inappropriate
response of wages to country-specific shocks in
some Member States. Differences in current
accounts reflect not only differences in price and 
cost competitiveness but also the build-up of 
domestic imbalances, mostly linked to excessive
domestic demand pressures. Such pressures 
include high private-sector and external debt, a
surge in house prices and increased vulnerability to
abrupt changes in financial market conditions. 
Although catching-up economies in the euro area 
have benefited from large capital inflows, foreign 
capital has not always been channelled to the most 
productive uses, fuelling primarily consumption or
housing investment. In some Member States, the
deterioration of the current account positions can 
in part be explained by substantial losses in non-
price competitiveness. In other Member States, 
fiscal policy has not always been sufficiently tight 
in the boom period. Graph 1.26 shows the
divergence in price and cost competitiveness as
measured by the real effective exchange rate 
(REER). The indicator shows significant
divergences with Germany gaining 13%
competitiveness and Spain losing almost 20%
since 1998. 
44. Divergence in price competitiveness has 
been associated with a steady widening of current
account differences within the euro area. Some
Member States have registered large current
account surpluses (Germany, Luxembourg, 
Austria,  Netherlands,  Finland), while others have
seen large or very large deficits (primarily Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and Cyprus but also Ireland, Malta,
Slovenia, Slovakia). 
(9) For more details see Quarterly Report on the Euro Area
Vol. 8 N°1 (2009), "Special report: Competitiveness 
developments within the euro area". 
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Graph 1.26: Changes in intra euro-area Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER)
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These positions have mostly built up since the 
launch of the euro (Graph 1.27), although some
countries have entered Stage 3 of EMU with an
already sizeable deficit (Greece and Portugal). A 
few countries have experienced significant drops
in their current account in recent years although 
their balance remains in surplus or in a
comparatively moderate deficit (France, Italy and 
Belgium). 
Graph 1.27: Current account positions, euro-area Member 
States (1999 to 2008)
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45. The build-up of large external liabilities
has increased exposure to financial shocks. The
counterpart of large current account deficits in
some Member States has been the build-up of large  
negative net foreign asset positions (NFA). In
2007, Spain, Portugal and Greece posted net
external liabilities ranging between 80% and 100%
of GDP (Graph 1.28). Slovenia and Slovakia have
also registered a rapid deterioration in their 
negative NFA position in recent years. A few euro-
area countries enjoy comfortable positive NFA 
positions (Belgium, Germany and Netherlands), 
but the orders of magnitude involved (15% to 30% 
of GDP) are, in relative terms, lower than in the 
case of countries with large net external liabilities. 
Moreover, the deterioration of the net external
liabilities position is persistent for some euro-area
Member States (Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Slovenia). In the current downturn, financial
markets have become more responsive to the net
external financial asset position for the euro-area 
countries. Even if to a large extent the net external 
position is related to the private sector, the public 
sector can be affected by private-sector debt in the
form of potential bail-outs and other fiscal 
implications. 
Graph 1.28: Net foreign asset positions, euro-area Member 
States (1995-2007) 
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46. However, the ongoing financial crisis is
speeding up adjustment to external imbalances.
According to the Commission services' spring 
forecast, current account divergence should 
diminish between 2008 and 2010 as the financial
turmoil forces correction of some domestic
imbalances in the credit and housing markets.
However, the convergence in current account
positions is moderate and asymmetric across the 
euro-area Member States (Graph 1.29). 
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Graph 1.29: Evolution of current account positions, euro-
area Member States (2008 to 2010) 
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The highest corrections are expected to take place 
in Spain (the current account deficit is to be 
reduced from -9% in 2008 to -5% in 2010) and 
Germany (the surplus is to diminish from 6.7% in
2008 to 3.4% in 2010). The Commission services' 
spring forecast suggests that the ongoing
adjustments in current account positions are not
primarily driven by price changes. The rebalancing
of relative prices has been limited (Graph 1.26),
and therefore the adjustment might come at high 
cost in terms of unemployment and 
underutilisation of capital. The adjustment will 
probably require a substantial rebalancing of
relative prices within the euro area, although it will 
also imply changes in the domestic part of the 
economy concerned. There will be a need for 
reallocation of demand and productive resources 
between the non-tradable sector and the export
sector, as well as changes in relative prices
between the two sectors. The speed and the cost of 
the adjustment will very much depend both on the 
degree of price and wage flexibility and on the 
ease with which resources can be reallocated 
across sectors in the countries in question.
Evidence shows that competitiveness adjustment
in the euro area is working but could be slow. (10) 
Countries with greater adjustment needs are
generally facing product and labour market
rigidities above the euro-area average, rendering
the process of regaining price competitiveness
more difficult in terms of length and economic 
cost. 
47. This divergence in competitiveness has 
implications both for the functioning of EMU 
and for economic governance. Persistent
divergence in competitiveness is a matter of 
common concern as intra euro-area adjustments to
external imbalances work slowly, are costly and 
can have negative spill-over effects across Member 
States. Effective functioning of EMU calls for 
early detection of these external imbalances in 
order to prompt an adequate and timely policy
response. The macroeconomic framework and the
economic governance aspect related to the
competitiveness dimension are discussed in 
Chapter 4, Section 2. 
(10) European Commission (2006), 'Market adjustment, the 
competitive channel', chapter 4 in 'Dynamic Adjustment in 
the Euro area: Experiences and challenges', EU Economy
Review 2006.
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48. These are testing times for economic
policies. The exceptional character of the current 
economic downturn provides a litmus test as
policy-makers strive to attenuate its impact and to
prepare a sustainable exit strategy. This chapter 
provides an overview and assessment of 
macroeconomic policies. Section 2.1 underlines 
the unique nature and scope of the crisis, justifying
the need for an active and co-ordinated policy 
response. Section 2.2 covers monetary policy
developments while financial market policies are
presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), with
a focus on its budgetary and structural pillars. 
Section 2.5 delivers a first assessment of the
national measures taken under the EERP. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
49. By any standards the current crisis has 
unique features. No region in the world escaped
the fallouts. The turmoil in financial markets 
affected at a breathtaking pace the real economy
during the fourth quarter of 2008. Business 
surveys, closely followed by hard indicators, such
as industrial production and external trade, 
tumbled to historic lows. Two months after the 
demise of Lehman Brothers it was all too clear that
the world was entering its first global recession
since the Great Depression. 
50. The financial sector has been in the eye
of the storm. The banking sector fulfils key
functions for an efficient allocation of financial
resources between lenders and borrowers in time
and space. Banking crises, a major source of 
economic fluctuations in the nineteenth century, 
had long been considered to be a thing of the past
in advanced economies. Macroeconomic models
assumed that the banking sector played a relatively 
neutral role in the transmission of monetary policy
impulses. Models ignored the endogenous 
dynamics of financial innovation, following the
deregulation waves of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Although the boom-bust dynamic led by excessive 
monetary creation was well-identified in the case 
of smaller economies (11), the possibility that 
(11) The larger the size and duration of a credit boom episode, 
the greater the likelihood of a crisis. Borio C., Lowe P. 
'Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring
the nexus' BIS Working Papers No. 114, July 2002.
'sudden stop' patterns could materialise on a global
scale was never envisaged. At the climax of the
financial crisis, liquidity on financial markets 
evaporated overnight and the risk of bank runs
became a looming threat. 
51. Unsustainable debt build-up is at the 
root of the crisis. Ample global liquidity
conditions, combined with irresponsible lending
policies and poor supervisory oversight laid the 
groundwork for the emergence of a housing bubble
in the US and other advanced economies (Graph
2.1).  
Graph 2.1: Debt-to-GDP ratios of various economic 
sectors among select advanced economies 
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Its duration was prolonged by apparently endless
flows of capital from emerging countries with
large external surpluses, notably China. Risk
became mispriced and leverage increased for all 
economic agents, be they households, companies
or financial institutions throughout the world, 
thanks to the enhanced financial
interconnectedness. In the US, personal savings
fell from 7% to below zero in 2005-2006. Private 
debt rose from 188% of GDP in 1997 to 295% in
2008. Domestic and global imbalances fed each 
other until breaking point. 
52. Reducing over-indebtedness takes time 
and generates negative feedback loops. Three
negative spirals can be at work in the current
context. A first negative feedback loop involves
bank losses. Capital losses on foreign financial 
products may force banks to curtail domestic
lending to the real economy. The ensuing 
reduction in working capital for non-financial
companies leads to higher default rates in the 
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economy and eventually more capital losses for 
banks. A second vicious circle arises from 
confidence effects. Households and companies 
save more and downscale their investment plans. 
What seems reasonable at the individual level is 
harmful collectively, amplifying the economic 
downturn at the macroeconomic level. A third 
vicious circle is caused by the debt-deflation 
mechanism (12). A disorderly deleveraging of 
banks and companies puts downward pressure on a 
large range of asset prices to the extent that the real 
value of residual debt increases as a result. All 
feedback loops imply strong negative spillover 
effects deriving from individual uncoordinated 
decisions of economic agents. Consequently, 
successive recessionary waves can hit the economy 
and turn recession into a depression. Indeed, 
historical experience shows that recessions 
triggered by banking crises are deeper and last 
longer than normal recessions (see Box 2.1). The 
economy is in need of a mutually supporting mix 
of financial and economic policies. 
53. Regulatory repair of financial 
supervision is a prerequisite for policy-makers.
Initial policy action took the form of fast 
interventions by central banks to compensate for 
the liquidity shortfall on money markets. This 
necessary immediate action had to be 
complemented by a comprehensive set of 
regulatory reforms to remove sources of pro-
cyclicality in the financial sector (see Section 2.3). 
In addition, the credit channel had to be repaired 
through extensive support schemes for banks, 
ranging from recapitalisations and guarantees to 
asset relief programmes. It is expected that credit 
distribution will bounce back after banks have 
successfully cleaned out their balance sheets. 
54. Sanitised balance sheets will maximise 
the expansionary turn of monetary policies. In all 
advanced economies, monetary policy has become 
strongly expansionary. It is expected that lower 
policy rates will translate over time into lower 
interest rates applied to households and businesses, 
providing major support for recovery. However, 
the effectiveness of monetary policies depends on 
the soundness of the banking system. Even if this 
prerequisite is fulfilled, conventional monetary 
(12) The phenomenon was first identified in 1933. Fischer, I. 
(1933), 'The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions', 
Econometrica, October, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp. 337-57. 
policy is bounded by the fact that nominal interest 
rates cannot go below zero. However, central 
banks may rely on unconventional measures to 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy (see 
Section 2.2). 
55. Fiscal expansion plays a decisive role.
Public spending should help bridge the gap 
between currently credit-constrained economic 
agents and aggregate demand, so that irreversible 
losses in capital and professional skills are limited 
as much as possible. A strong stimulus will sustain 
demand, limit the fall in output and restore 
confidence and private spending. It would also 
defuse risks arising from negative feedback loops, 
boosting credit and confidence among economic 
agents. Finally, such policy would also limit the 
negative impact on potential growth, as private 
investment is set to be depressed in the current 
year and the next. 
56. There is a particular need for 
coordination of fiscal policies within the EU and 
euro area. Given the large trade and financial 
spillovers between Member States the European 
Economic Recovery Plan sets out action at the 
European level. It aims to restore consumer and 
business confidence, restart lending and stimulate 
investment in the EU's economies, create jobs and 
help bring the unemployed back to work (see 
Section 2.4 for details). 
57. Well-conceived exit strategies are crucial 
for long-term fiscal sustainability. The eventual 
removal of discretionary policies through adequate 
exit strategies would maximise the impact of the 
stimulus in the short run. Economic policy support 
must be designed in a sustainable way to be 
effective. If the stimulus is perceived to lead to 
snowballing public debt and rising inflation, the 
private sector might save more to prepare for the 
inevitable increase in taxes. In the euro area, the 
Stability and Growth Pact provides an effective 
framework that combines the short-term flexibility 
required to counter the crisis with a credible 
commitment to fiscal sustainability (see Section 
2.4). This guarantees time-consistent fiscal 
policymaking. 
58. The expansion should be coordinated on 
a global scale. Global crises call for global 
solutions. At the G-20 Summit in London, leaders 
of the world’s largest economies agreed to a 
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combined USD 1.1 trillion package of national 
measures to restore growth and jobs and rebuild
confidence and trust in the financial system (see
Chapter 3). With fiscal stimulus measures that 
countries had already announced, the combined
stimulus would amount to some five trillion dollars
by the end of 2010. This joint endeavour 
effectively averts the risk of beggar-thy-neighbour
policies of a kind that amplified the downturn 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
2.2. MONETARY POLICY  
59. The ECB policy response evolved in 
reaction to the changing challenges. In response
to persistent money market tensions since mid-
2007, the ECB developed a two-pronged approach. 
Liquidity injections catered for bank funding
needs, while key interest rates were assigned to the 
preservation of price stability in a context of 
initially rising inflationary pressures. As the
financial crisis unfolded, causing severe liquidity
shortages in many financial market segments, and
spread quickly to the real economy (Graph 2.2), 
the ECB mustered all available monetary policy
instruments. 
60. Until mid-September 2008, the fight
against inflationary pressures took centre-stage.
The ECB increased its key interest rate by 25 basis 
points to 4.25% in July 2008 amid heightened
upside risks to price stability. Inflationary risks 
were driven mainly by increases in commodity and 
food prices (see Box 1.3). HICP (13) inflation 
reached 4% year-on-year in June and July 2008, 
well above the two-percent reference value for 
price stability. The surge in euro-area inflation 
raised concerns over second-round effects in price- 
and wage-setting, which was reflected in rising
inflation expectations. Incoming data over the first
half of 2008 suggested that euro-area real GDP 
growth would be moderate but remain fairly close 
to its potential both in 2008 and in 2009, 
predominantly driven by domestic demand. The 
ECB also took note that lending to the private 
sector, and in particular to non-financial 
companies, was still growing at a healthy rate. This 
suggested that tensions on financial markets were
(13) Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
not affecting the supply of credit within the euro-
area economy.
Graph 2.2: ECB interest rates and Eonia 
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61. The Lehman bankruptcy opened a new
period of unprecedented market stress and falling 
demand. Central banks responded to the rapidly
changing environment (Graph 2.3). The ECB, in a 
coordinated move with the Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the 
Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank,
lowered its borrowing costs by 50 basis points to 
3.75 percent on 8 October 2008. Before the end of
the year, the Governing Council lowered
borrowing costs by another 50 basis points in
November and 75 basis points in December amid
growing evidence of receding inflationary risks 
and severe fallout from the financial crisis on the 
real economy. Two additional 50 basis point cuts 
followed in January and March 2009, before two
25 basis point reductions in April and May. 
Overall, in the period under review, the ECB
reduced its benchmark policy rate by 325 basis 
points to 1%. 
62. The ECB reacted to strong turbulences 
in money market activity since 2007. Turmoil on
money markets started in June 2007. The ECB was 
the first major central bank to address market 
tensions via enhanced liquidity provision to the 
banking system. From the fall of the US 
investment bank Bear Stearns in mid-March to the 
end of summer 2008, the ECB accommodated 
higher liquidity demand by allocating larger
volumes in its main weekly refinancing operations. 
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Box 2.1: Banking crisis and growth: historical evidence
Historical evidence on recessions combined with banking crises may shed light on the likely impact of the 
current crisis on the economy. Using a sample of major financial crises in history, Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) find that, on average, output falls by 9 percent, real housing prices decline on average by 35 percent,
equity prices decline by 55 percent and unemployment increases by 7 percentage points. While equity prices' 
declines are somewhat shorter-lived, the duration of housing price declines is long-lived, averaging roughly
six years. Banking crises require a painful restructuring of the financial system which weighs heavily on 
public finances: public debt rises on average by 86 percent.
For OECD countries, Haugh et al. (2008) find that recessions that are combined with financial crises have
been, on average, twice as severe as 'normal' recessions (see Table). Moreover, the recovery is muted and 
investment and durables' consumption are disproportionately reduced. While business investment tends to
rebound more strongly in the recovery phase, residential investment remains depressed during a protracted
period of time. Exports play a strong role for the recovery.
Evidence regarding possible effects on potential growth of a banking crisis is mixed. The banking crisis in 
Japan was followed by a deterioration in potential growth partly due to a worsening in productivity
performance, which may be related to the protracted nature of the banking problems and the resulting
misallocation of capital. Following the Nordic banking crises, which were resolved more quickly, there was 
no major deterioration in productivity performance. Notably, Finland used the crisis as an opportunity for a 
fundamental restructuring in particular in the industries marketing information and communication 
technologies.
Table 1: Banking crises and output losses 
R&B R Ratio R&B R Ratio R&B R Ratio
Spain (1980-1987) 28 12 2.3 -10.1 -6.0 1.7 2 4 0.5
USA (1990-1998) 32 13 2.6 -11.4 -6.2 1.8 5 3 2.0
Finland (1989-1998) 28 15 1.9 -40.6 -5.2 7.9 14 5 2.6
Japan (1997-2006) 32 16 2.0 -12.3 -7.3 1.7 3 4 0.8
Sweden (1989-1998) 28 11 2.5 -16.7 -4.3 3.9 7 3 2.3
Norway (1986-1997) 35 9 3.9 -34.8 -6.5 5.4 1 1 1.0
Recovery half-life (2)
(quarters)
Duration of downturn (1)
(quarters)
Cumulative output loss
(% pts of GDP)
Notes: A downturn is defined as a period of at least two years when the cumulative output gap is at least 2% of GDP
and output falls at least 1% below potential output in at least one year.
R&B: recession combined with banking crisis. R: normal recession. (1) Number of consecutive quarters for which
output gap is negative. (2) The recovery half-life is the number of quarters following the though before the though
output gap is halved.
Source: OECD.
The severity of the present recession in the euro area becomes apparent when compared with previous euro-
area "normal" recessions. According to the standard approach – recessions are identified as GDP contracting
for (at least) two consecutive quarters – the euro area has experienced a total of four recessions since
1970 (1). 1974Q1, 1980Q1, 1992Q1 and 2008Q1 mark the peaks of the previous expansion phases and the
turning points in economic activity. As the comparison is made over a common time span of twelve quarters
(three years), data up to the fourth quarter of 2008 is complemented with projections for 2009 and 2010 with
the Commission services' spring forecast.
(1) Data before 1995 do not include Slovakia. 
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
Graph C: Private consumption across
recessions, euro area
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Graph A shows that the first crisis in 1974 was sharp but short-lived. GDP decreased by 2.5% at the bottom 
of the cycle. The recession due to the second oil shock of 1980 was the shallowest (a 0.5% GDP loss at the
trough). However, the upswing was rather sluggish. The 1992 downward trend in growth –linked to the
aftermath of German unification– was comparatively protracted. At its trough, GDP dropped by 1.9% four
quarters after the start of the recession.
Graph A: GDP across recessions, euro area Graph B: Investment across recessions, euro area
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Source: Commission services. Source: Commission services.
The role of investment as a main driver of the GDP fall is pinpointed in Graph B. If forecasts are confirmed,
the current steep decline in investment will have had no equivalent in its scale. By contrast, the recessions of
the mid-1970s and early-1990s were characterized by a resumption of positive investment growth at a
relative early stage of the business cycle and, as a result, the level of investment three years after the start of
the recession was broadly back to the level of its previous peak.
Overall, the weakness of investment in the current
recession is far greater than in previous recessions. This 
might eventually weigh on potential growth. By
contrast, private consumption has always been resilient
in times of recessions. Graph C exhibits different 
patterns. Consumption rebounded strongly in 1974 and
recovered its pre-crisis dynamic trend after two quarters.
The patterns of 1980 and 1992 were markedly different. 
Consumption was initially relatively resilient, but the
upturn materialised only after four quarters.
Haugh, D., Ollivaud P. and Turner D. (2008), 'The
macroeconomic consequences of banking crisis in
OECD countries', OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper, No. 683. Source: Commission services.
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff K. (2009), 'The Aftermath of Financial Crises', NBER Working Papers, No. 14656. 
The ECB also raised the volume allotted in its 
three-month refinancing operations and introduced
six-month refinancing operations, as from April
2008. 
These policies were largely successful in
stabilising money markets, with the differential 
between the Eonia (effective overnight interest 
rate) and the ECB's key policy rate remaining 
close to zero. 
63. The ECB responded decisively to
mounting tensions on the money market. The
ECB decided on 8 October 2008 to carry out its
main weekly operations as fixed-rate tenders with
full allotment. This meant that the ECB satisfied
all liquidity bids at a fixed interest rate. The ECB 
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reduced the width of the corridor around its main
refinancing rate from 200 basis points to 100 basis 
points (14). In addition, on 15 October 2008, the 
ECB expanded the list of collateral eligible for 
refinancing and reduced the minimum rating for
debt securities, except asset-backed securities, 
from A- to BBB-. Debt securities denominated in 
the US dollar, pound sterling and Japanese yen
were also accepted. The provision of liquidity in
foreign currencies, initiated at the end of 2007, was 
substantially amplified after mid-September 2008. 
On 24 June 2009, the ECB allocated EUR
442 billion in its first long-term refinancing 
operation with a maturity of 12 months, carried out 
as a fixed-rate tender with full allotment. 
Graph 2.3: Central banks' policy interest rates 
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Overall, ample liquidity provision and changes
made to the ECB's collateral framework supported 
the continuity and functioning of the euro-area
money market. At the same time, these 
interventions contributed to the growth in the size 
of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet which increased
by around EUR 700 billion (15) since the end of
June 2007 to reach EUR 1.9 trillion by the end of 
June 2009. This figure is equivalent to 22% of the 
nominal GDP of the euro area (16).
64. The ECB recently added unconventional
measures to its policy arsenal. Following its 
Governing Council meeting on 7 May 2009, the
(14) The decision was subsequently reversed in order to 
encourage banks to resume trading in the interbank market 
(15) The Eurosystem's balance sheet consists of the 
consolidated balance sheet of the ECB and the National
Central Banks which are part of the euro area.
(16) At the same time, the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve
System was around USD 2 trillion or 15% of the US
nominal GDP.
ECB agreed to purchase euro-denominated 
covered bonds for a total amount of EUR 
60 billion – a programme of credit easing which is 
similar in kind, although smaller in size, to those 
already implemented by the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of England (see Box 2.2). Direct
financing on capital markets plays a smaller role in 
the euro area than in the US and UK, which called 
for a more measured response (17). On 4 June, the 
ECB announced that the purchases would be
distributed across the euro area from July 2009 and
carried out by means of direct purchases on both
the primary and secondary markets. As a rule, only 
covered bonds which were given a minimum 
rating of AA or equivalent by at least one of the
major rating agencies (and in any case not lower 
than BBB) would be eligible for purchase. 
2.3. FINANCIAL MARKET POLICIES 
65. With the financial sector at the core of 
the crisis, policy repair was urgently needed. In
reaction to the financial crisis, the Commission
launched an ambitious agenda of proposals to
restore a stable financial system. The agenda was
outlined in the Communication 'Driving European
recovery' adopted on 4 March 2009. The
programme was consistent with the ongoing efforts 
at international level coordinated by the G-20. It 
included reform of the EU micro-prudential and
macro-prudential supervisory framework for 
financial services, which was highlighted by the de 
Larosière report (see Section 4.3). Several 
initiatives were taken to improve and remove gaps
in existing legislation (e.g. concerning hedge
funds, private equity and capital requirements for 
banks) to protect consumers and SMEs (e.g.
initiatives to foster responsible lending and 
borrowing), to improve incentives to reduce 
excessive short-term risk-taking (e.g. initiatives on
remuneration in financial services) and to
strengthen sanctions for infringements of the rules.
Since measures in all policy strands required 
action at EU and Member State' level, coordination
between policy makers was essential. This holds in
particular, for euro-area Member States, which 
(17) Outstanding debt securities amounted to 81% of GDP in 
the euro area in 2007 as against 168% in the United States.
By contrast, the stock of outstanding bank loans to the 
private sector amounted to around 145% of GDP in the
euro area, but only 63% in the United States.
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Box 2.2: Unconventional monetary policy measures
In normal times, central banks steer the level of key interest rates in order to manage liquidity conditions in
money markets and pursue their objective of maintaining price stability. When interest rates fall close to 
zero, a central bank exhausts its capacity to provide stimulus to the economy via its conventional policy
tools. The effectiveness of monetary policy is also impaired if the interest rate transmission channel is
compromised. In such circumstances, policy-makers have at their disposal additional tools, such as
quantitative easing, to alleviate financing conditions for the economy.  
Such unconventional measures are generally associated with an increase in the size of central banks' balance 
sheets (see Graph). Through direct quantitative easing measures, the central bank purchases securities 
(usually government bonds) from banks in order to increase their liquidity. 
It is expected that banks will, in turn, use this extra
amount of liquidity to extend lending to the non-
financial sector, as they will hardly earn any
additional income from deposits in a near-zero 
interest rate environment. The expected ensuing
flattening of the yield curve at longer maturity
would also encourage investment. 
A variant of quantitative easing, called direct credit
easing, involves central banks' purchases of private
papers to address liquidity shortages or excessive
spreads in specific financial market segments. An
alternative method, called indirect quantitative
easing, involves lending to banks at longer
maturities against collateral which includes assets
whose markets are temporarily impaired.
Graph: Central banks' balance sheet size
(in % of GDP)
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share highly integrated market segments, for 
instance in wholesale activity. 
The financial crisis and the EU's immediate 
response 
66. The banking sector in the euro area was 
not spared the contagion coming from the US.
Although euro-area banks had not originated risky 
('subprime') US loans, they were exposed to the
consequences of US developments through several
channels: (i) in a bid to enhance nominal returns, 
euro-area banks purchased complex securitised 
financial products on international financial
markets (18). Their exposure to the US housing 
market became a liability after it had sharply 
deteriorated; (ii) the default of Lehman Brothers
put in doubt the viability of even systematically-
(18) Banks purchased them either directly or through complex
sponsored structured investment vehicles (SIV), mostly
located in offshore centres. 
important financial institutions, with a significant
rise in risk premia as a result, which made bank 
funding more difficult and costly; (iii) the 
aforementioned comprehensive reassessment of 
risk led markets to question the viability of highly-
leveraged financial entities and overly ambitious
business models. A number of vulnerable banks
were put under stress as a result. Access to 
liquidity and short-term funding of a number of
banks became difficult. 
At the climax of the financial crisis in October 
2008, banks preferred to park their available 
liquidity with the central bank instead of lending to
other banks; (iv) fees and underwriting activity as
a source of income suffered from the growing 
defiance of investors. As a result, the perception of 
default increased in successive waves, as
evidenced through the prices of credit default 
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swaps (19) and other financial instruments (Graph
2.4). Reduced expectations on banks' profitability
over the medium term became apparent from
September 2008 on, as bank equities 
underperformed the all-equity stock price index 
(Graph 2.5). 
Graph 2.4: Default risks of euro-area financial institutions 
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67. Throughout 2008 the risk of a negative 
spiral on financial markets remained high.
Several structural features of financial markets 
were prone to pro-cyclicality. In other words, they 
amplified rather than cushioned the impact of the 
financial turmoil: (i) rating agencies overlooked 
risks when financial market activity was buoyant;
they downgraded complex products only after it 
had become apparent to all that these products
were not risk-proof; (ii) accounting rules tended to
magnify capital losses on securities held in banks' 
balance sheets; (iii) capital adequacy rules did not
promote provisioning against expected loss for
credit risk over the entire economic cycle.  
In retrospect, capital cushions proved to be
insufficient in comparison to the amount of risk 
borne. The pressure to keep capital adequacy ratios
constant compelled banks to engage in successive 
waves of recapitalisation, a process that became
increasingly difficult as the crisis unfolded. 
(19) A credit default swap (CDS) is a derivate contract between
two counterparties. The protection buyer makes periodic 
payments to the seller, and in return receives a payoff if an 
underlying financial instrument defaults. The price of a
CDS evolves in tune with the probability of default. 
Graph 2.5: Equity prices in the euro area (January 2008 =
100)
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Deleveraging their positions was another option
chosen by financial institutions to relieve their 
capital position. It implied a reduction of financial 
institutions' asset portfolios, which could hamper
the distribution of credit to the economy;  (iv) 
liquidity in many financial market segments
proved to be pro-cyclical, as it dried out 
completely in acute stress conditions, making it
impossible for market participants to reduce their 
overall risk exposure. Tensions reached a climax in 
September 2008 with the demise of Lehman 
Brothers. Faced with the risk of illiquidity of major 
European players on financial markets and the
associated contagion effects national governments 
resolutely embarked on large-scale rescue
measures. 
68. Immediate policy steps targeted the 
provision of liquidity and capital, coverage of 
deposit guarantees schemes and accounting 
relief. On 12 October 2008, an extraordinary 
Eurogroup Summit at the level of Heads of State 
and Government spelled out six principles and
objectives for a coordinated approach to tackle the
crisis: 
(i) Ensure appropriate liquidity conditions; 
(ii) Facilitate longer maturity funding;
(iii) Allow the provision of additional capital; 
(iv) Commit to recapitalise distressed banks; 
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(v) Apply accounting rules more flexibly; 
(vi) Enhance cooperation and information 
exchange. 
These principles were eventually endorsed by the 
European Council for the 27 Member States the 
following week. First concrete steps within this 
framework included the Commission's proposal to 
revise EU rules on deposit guarantee schemes. It 
entailed an increase in deposit guarantee coverage 
to a minimum of EUR 50 000 as of 30 June 2009 
and to EUR 100 000 by end-2010 as well as a 
reduction of the payout period. Improved deposit 
guarantee coverage was aimed at maintaining 
confidence in banks at a critical juncture. Further 
measures covered changes to accounting standards, 
allowing reclassification of financial instruments 
from the trading book to the banking book in an 
effort to avert the threat of a negative price spiral. 
For its part, the ECB counteracted the shortage of 
liquidity by adjusting its operational framework to 
changed market circumstances (for more on 
monetary policy measures, see Section 2.2). 
69. Rescue packages for national banking 
sectors were rapidly set up. They comprised a set 
of national measures aimed at safeguarding 
financial stability, restoring the normal functioning 
of wholesale credit markets and underpinning the 
supply of credit to the real economy. The main 
instruments that had been used were: 
(i) Capital injections to shore up banks' 
capital base, in order to avoid the dual threat of 
disorderly deleveraging and bankruptcy; 
(ii) State-backed guarantees on bank 
liabilities to allow banks to tap private debt 
markets in order to refinance their lending activity; 
(iii) Asset relief schemes in order to relieve 
banks' balance sheets of illiquid assets under 
specific conditionalities; 
(iv) Increased access to liquidity from Central 
Banks (in some cases covered by state guarantees) 
as a means to allow business continuity. 
70. National rescue plans, while guided by 
common principles, conformed to country-
specific conditions. Their features varied along the 
following lines:
(i) Coverage of the schemes both in terms of 
financial instruments/markets and institutions 
considered; 
(ii) Eligibility criteria for both the financial 
instruments/markets and institutions to gain access 
to the schemes; 
(iii) Mechanism for implementing the scheme 
(e.g. creation of a special vehicle, form of the 
capital injection, etc.); and 
(iv) Pricing aspects, conditionality and exit 
strategy. 
71. Rescue packages are subjected to State 
aid control. Although the EC Treaty generally 
prohibits State aid, it leaves room for a number of 
policy objectives for which State aid can be 
considered compatible, for example 'to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State' (Article 87 (3) (b)). On this basis, the 
Commission adopted three major guidance 
documents outlining how State aid rules would be 
applied in the context of the current global 
financial crisis: the Banking Communication of 13 
October 2008, the Recapitalisation 
Communication of 5 December 2008 and the 
Communication on the treatment of impaired 
assets of 25 February 2009. They were 
complemented by recommendations on the pricing 
of recapitalisations and government guarantees for 
bank debt issued by the ECB. These documents 
aimed to ensure legal certainty and a level playing 
field. As of the end of May 2009, the Commission 
had approved 11 schemes in the euro area and ad 
hoc interventions in two other euro-area Member 
States. On 23 July 2009 the Commission agreed a 
Communication explaining its approach to 
assessing restructuring aid given by Member States 
to banks. The approach is based on three 
fundamental principles: i) aided banks must be 
made viable in the long term without further State 
support, ii) aided banks and their owners must 
carry a fair burden of the restructuring costs, and 
iii) measures must be taken to limit distortions of 
competition in the Single Market. 
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Table 2.1: Euro-area public interventions in the banking sector (in % of GDP) 
approved effective approved effective approved effective approved effective approved effective
Austria 5.0 1.7 25.7 5.1 0.4 0.4 1.6 1.5 32.8 8.7
Belgium 5.3 6.1 76.6 16.3 10.1 4.2 NA NR 92.0 26.7
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finland 0.0 0.0 27.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.7 0.0
France 1.2 0.8 16.6 4.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 18.1 5.6
Germany 4.4 1.6 18.6 7.1 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 24.4 9.1
Greece 2.0 1.5 6.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.8 11.4 4.6
Ireland 6.6 4.2 225.2 225.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 231.8 229.4
Italy 1.3 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0
Luxembourg 6.9 7.9 12.4 NR 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 20.2 8.8
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 6.4 6.4 34.3 7.7 3.9 3.9 7.5 7.5 52.0 25.4
Portugal 2.4 0.0 10.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 3.3
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.4 32.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.8 0.4
Spain 0.0 0.0 9.3 3.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 1.8 12.1 5.0
Euro Area 2.7 1.4 20.7 8.7 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.8 25.4 11.5
Memo item
EU-27
12.6
Total
2.6 1.5 24.8 8.1 0.8 0.4 2.9 2.6 31.2
Capital injections
Guarantees on bank
liabilities Relief of impaired asset
Liquidity and bank funding
support
Note: NA - Not available indicates that the amount is not available in the state aid decision. NR - Not reported indicates that
the amount was not reported by the Member State. Approved: Amounts approved in state aid decisions by the Commission 
under State aid rules. Effective: Amounts from schemes effectively implemented, for example capital effectively injected in
banks or State guarantees effectively granted to banks on their issuance of liabilities. Data covers approved measures from
June 2008 to 17 July 2009 and effective measures from June 2008 to mid-May 2009.
Source: Commission services.
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72. Member States allocated sizeable public
means to banking rescue packages. State
guarantees and liquidity support measures were the 
most widely-used measures in the early phase of 
these plans. Member States proceeded rapidly to 
inject capital into weakened institutions (Graph 
2.6). As the impact of the financial crisis continued 
to impair the provision of credit to the economy,
Member States started devising asset relief 
schemes. 
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal
notified guarantee schemes only, while France and
Italy notified guarantee schemes in the first place 
and recapitalisation measures shortly after. 
Slovenia added a liquidity support measure as a 
complement to its guarantee. Another group of 
Member States, which included Austria, Germany 
and Greece, opted for schemes combining several
measures from the start (guarantee, 
recapitalisation, other forms of equity 
interventions, etc). Spain notified a fund for the 
acquisition of financial assets. In addition to
general schemes, several Member States have 
adopted ad hoc individual interventions in favour 
of certain financial institutions. Overall, the global 
sum committed and approved by the Commission 
for the re-capitalisation of banks is about EUR 240
billion (2.7% of the euro-area's GDP, see Table 
2.1). As of mid-May 2009, effective injections
amounted to about EUR 131 billion of this sum
(1.4% of the euro-area's GDP). A sum close to 
EUR 1,870 billion (20.7% of the euro-area's GDP) 
has been committed and approved by the 
Commission to guarantee bank borrowing, of
which an amount of about EUR 788 billion has 
been allocated (8.7% of the euro-area's GDP). 
These impressive figures compare to data on total 
US government support for financial assets and
liabilities announced in 2008 and in the first 
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months of 2009, which amounted to USD 13,900 
billion (20). 
73. These emergency measures averted a 
meltdown of the EU financial sector. Determined
and timely action prevented a run on fragile banks, 
ensured confidence of savers and paved the way
for an orderly return to normal market conditions.
Short-term interbank lending on money markets 
gradually improved, as illustrated by the declining 
spreads between overnight and three-month 
interest rates. These peaked in October 2008 and 
fell steadily thereafter (Graph 2.7). 
Graph 2.7: Interest rate spreads (OIS over three-month 
Euribor, Libor in percentage points) 
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In June 2009 spreads were broadly comparable to
those prevailing before the summer of 2008. 
However, they remained higher than before the
emergence of the first tensions on interbank
markets in 2007. 
74. Still, global banks have incurred
significant losses since the start of the financial
turmoil. According to estimates published in the 
June 2009 ECB Financial Stability Review, by
28 May 2009 the total reduction in net income
attributable to write-downs by global banks since 
the turmoil erupted has amounted to USD 1,042
billion. US, Canadian and Australian banks 
reported the bulk of the income losses – about 56%
of the overall figure. A further 20% was suffered
by UK, Swiss and other non-euro-area European 
banks, and another 20% by euro-area banks. 
(20) Data from 'Supervisory Insights' Vol. 6 Issue 1, Summer 
2009, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
75. Uncertainties related to total losses over 
the full credit cycle remain. In its Financial 
Stability Review of June 2009, the ECB staff 
estimated the total amount of write-downs on
securities and loans of euro-area banks at USD 649
billion over the four-year period 2007-2010.
Losses on securities could amount to USD 218 
billion and losses on loan books to USD 431 
billion. For its part, the IMF estimated in its Global
Financial Stability Report of April that the total 
amount of write-downs of euro-area banks over the 
period 2007-2010 could reach USD 904 billion.
The differing estimates of the write-downs reflect
differences in assumptions made and in the
methods used to calculate potential losses on loan
exposures. 
76. As a result, doubts about the ability of
the banking sector to finance the economy
remained. Most of the credit slowdown was driven 
by demand factors, i.e. related to the economic 
slowdown and housing-market corrections. Banks'
deleveraging proceeded, with the bulk of the
adjustment taken through trimming down external 
assets. Banks' issuance of debt securities 
recovered, yet with a high market share of state-
guaranteed debt. Amid the difficulties in obtaining
equity capital from private investors, public capital 
injections were instrumental in underpinning the 
level of bank capital. However, persistent
uncertainty about the exposure of banks to toxic 
assets and the impact of the economic slowdown
on their credit risk remained. 
The medium-term perspective: regulatory reforms 
77. In October 2007, the Ecofin Council laid 
down a roadmap to tackle the shortcomings of
the existing regulatory framework. It focused on
four main issues – transparency, valuation, 
prudential oversight and the functioning of
markets. The EU could thus promote effectively its
agenda in talks to reform the international financial 
system at the G-20 level and in the relevant
international fora (see Chapter 3). 
78. The work of credit rating agencies 
should be better framed. The possibility to
repackage loans and transfer the full credit risk to
markets was considered as contributing to the rise 
in the volume of Collateral Debt Obligations 
(CDOs), which had been crucial for the build-up of
financial imbalances in the US. Private investors 
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Box 2.3: Ongoing work on further bond market integration in the euro area
In light of the turmoil experienced in sovereign debt markets, national debt managers took steps to improve 
coordination of their bond issuance. In the context of the Economic and Financial Committee Sub-
Committee on EU Bills and Bonds Markets, government debt managers meet on a regular basis to exchange
views and promote further the integration and a better functioning of EU government bond markets. Several 
Member States introduced enhanced flexibility and adaptability in their auction strategies to cope with 
difficulties in accessing the market, including the use of syndications (1). This raised the issue of competing
auctions among euro-area sovereign issuers. Competition for intermediaries and investors implies that
governments face market pressures on prices and spreads. In order to enhance the communication in respect
of issuance intentions, including syndicated issuance, EU debt managers agreed to update on a more regular
basis the issuance calendars as well as to publish them on the Sub-Committee's web-page. 
Most euro-area government debt managers (excluding Germany) agreed on a Harmonised Reporting Format
for their Primary Dealers on their market activities, to be published by the Secretariat of the Economic and 
Financial Committee. Publication would be on a quarterly basis with a three month time lag. Work is further 
under way among government debt managers as regards the harmonisation of auction procedures. 
(1) Syndications are used when governments try to achieve cost-effectiveness by appointing a group of institutions
which, for a negotiated fee, will subscribe to its bond issues and then sell them to other retail or institutional investors.
(i) National supervisory authorities will have
a better overview of the activities of cross-border 
banking groups; 
and financial institutions trusted too readily the 
ratings attributed to these financial instruments by
credit rating agencies. In November 2008, the 
Commission proposed a regulation on credit rating
agencies, setting out a framework for their
authorisation, operation and supervision in the EU. 
79. Smarter rules for bank capital and 
remuneration. At the beginning of 2008, the new
regime for banks' regulatory capital entered fully 
into force (Basel II). While most banks were able 
to keep their capital positions above regulatory 
requirements, they came under stress due to
inherent pro-cyclicality in both investors' strategies 
and regulatory rules. First, investors became more 
risk-averse as the financial crisis unfolded and 
markets tightened their view on sustainable capital 
positions. Banks were then under pressure to
improve the size and quality of their capital 
positions in difficult funding conditions. Second, 
banks were obliged to hold capital in a fixed
minimum ratio to their risk-adjusted assets. In
October 2008, the Commission submitted a 
proposal (adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament in April 2009) to amend the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) introducing 
important changes so that:
(ii) There will be clear EU-wide criteria for 
assessing the quality of bank capital;  
(iii) Rules on securitised debt will be 
tightened.  
The latter will require that firms that re-package 
loans into tradable securities retain some risk 
exposure to these securities. It also imposes strict 
rules on the due diligence that firms must exercise 
before investing in securitisation positions. The 
aim is to ensure that firms fully understand the 
risks involved, including the risk characteristics of
the underlying exposures. On 13 July 2009, the 
Commission adopted a proposal to make further
amendments to the CRD, which would:
(i) impose higher capital requirements for re-
securitisations, and further enforce the required 
due diligence for highly complex re-
securitisations; 
(ii) strengthen the capital requirements for market 
risks in the trading books; 
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(iii) require firms to have remuneration policies 
that are consistent with and promote sound and 
effective risk management, and bring remuneration 
practices within the scope of supervisory review. 
Banking supervisors will be given the power to 
sanction banks whose remuneration policies do not 
comply with the new requirements. 
80. An adequate regulatory framework 
should cover all relevant areas of the financial 
system. Parallel efforts have been undertaken with 
reference to other relevant segments of the 
financial sector: 
(i)  On 3 July 2009, the Commission 
published a Communication that explores ways to 
improve the transparency and stability of 
derivatives markets. 
(ii) The Commission adopted on 29 April 
2009 a proposal for a Directive on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers (AIFM). The proposed 
Directive will plug a significant gap in existing 
legislation related to hedge funds and private 
equity. It will make all fund managers in the EU 
subject to authorisation and ongoing supervision. 
The purpose is to ensure that funds are transparent, 
with appropriate governance standards, and have 
robust systems in place for the management of 
risks, liquidity and conflicts of interest. The 
proposals differentiate between hedge funds and 
private equity, so there will not be a one-size-fits-
all approach. 
(iii) Since pay and bonus systems inside many 
financial institutions tended to encourage 
excessive risk-taking and reward short-termism, 
the Commission adopted on 29 April 2009 a 
Recommendation on remuneration in financial 
services. The Recommendation aimed to link pay 
and incentives to long-term performance and 
prevent excessive risk-taking behaviour. In 
addition, the proposed amendments of the CRD 
which were unveiled in July 2009 would impose 
binding principles for sound remuneration 
practices in banks and investment firms. 
(iv) Finally, the Commission adopted on 29 
April 2009 a Communication concerning investor 
protection in the field of packaged retail 
investment products. 
2.4. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
PLAN (EERP) 
81. The European Economic Recovery Plan 
constitutes Europe's integrated response to the 
crisis. As the financial and economic crisis 
intensified, the Commission presented in its 
Communication of 26 November 2008 a European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) to combat the 
economic downturn. It was later endorsed by the 
European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008. 
The EERP aims at cushioning the blow of the 
recession in the short term by swiftly stimulating 
demand, boosting consumer confidence and 
lessening the human cost of the economic 
downturn. At the same time, the EERP promotes 
measures needed to reinforce Europe's 
competitiveness in the medium and long term 
through structural reforms and smart investment. 
Thus, the EERP is designed to ensure full 
coherence between immediate actions and the EU's 
medium- to longer-term objectives. As a result, 
fiscal policy developments in the euro area have 
been guided by this comprehensive EU response to 
the crisis. 
The fiscal arm of the EERP 
82. The budgetary pillar of the EERP is a 
major injection of purchasing power into the 
economy. Extraordinary circumstances combining 
a financing crisis and a recession justify budgetary 
expansion in the EU and the euro area (see Section 
2.1). Member States and the EU agreed on an 
immediate fiscal impulse amounting to EUR 200 
billion (1.5% of GDP). It consisted of a budgetary 
expansion by Member States of EUR 170 billion 
and EU funding in support of immediate actions of 
the order of EUR 30 billion (see Box 2.6). 
83. The EERP sets out a framework for 
coordinating national budgetary measures. Since 
the EU budget is too small to be used for EU-wide 
economic stabilisation, national governments are 
enacting the bulk of fiscal measures. This 
multiplicity of decision-makers calls for proper 
coordination so that the positive impact of national 
decisions can be mutually supporting. Beggar-thy-
neighbour policies or free-riding on the stimulus 
generated by others would be detrimental to both 
the EU and the euro area as a whole. To ensure 
effectiveness the Commission spelled out three 
conditions for fiscal action to be consistent with 
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the EERP: it should be timely, targeted and
temporary.
84. Timely measures are much-needed to
support demand in the short run. Fiscal policy is
notoriously slow to deliver tangible results, owing
to the need for governments to structure and adopt
measures, and effectively disburse funds. These 
lags explain why the EERP had to be launched 
quickly with a view to steering national
governments towards taking resolute and
coordinated measures. Rapid action would boost
demand, defuse the risk of vicious circles and 
complement other action taken. 
85. Targeted measures must pinpoint
vulnerable populations and sectors and prepare 
for the future. Governments must not repeat the 
mistakes of the 1970s, when wasteful broad-based 
fiscal stimuli had a deleterious effect on fiscal 
positions without much impact on potential 
growth. With necessarily limited resources, 
measures on the expenditure side must target low-
wage earners, small and medium-sized enterprises, 
and economic sectors which are especially hard-hit 
by the recession. Credit-constrained households
are likely to spend most of the additional 
purchasing power, with a fast impact on growth as 
a result. Well-designed financial incentives can 
provide at the same time relief for economic
agents, facilitate the transition to a low-carbon 
economy and improve trend productivity (for
instance, by introducing tax breaks for energy
efficiency investment). 
86. Temporary measures are warranted so
that they can be reversed once the economy
rebounds. The effectiveness of expansionary fiscal 
measures depends crucially on whether market
participants perceive such measures as temporary. 
Calculations with the Commission services' 
QUEST III model show that the fiscal stimulus
would be far less effective if households and
companies were to believe that today's fiscal effort
would be followed by extra taxes or eventually
threaten debt sustainability (Table 2.2) (21). To
avert this threat, commitments to reverse the 
impact of the fiscal stimulus must be taken and
made credible enough to maximise effectiveness. 
(21) Roeger W., in't Veld J. 'Fiscal policy with Credit 
Constrained Households,' European Economy Economic 
Papers 357, January 2009.
Measures must have built-in reversibility features 
so that Member States can switch back to 
consolidation course when economic recovery 
picks up steam. 
Table 2.2: First year GDP effects of fiscal stimulus
amounting to 1% of GDP
Fiscal measure Permanent stimulus
Temporary
stimulus (one 
year)
Temporary with
monetary
accommodation (1)
Investment 
subsidy 0.46 1.37 2.19
Government
investment 0.84 1.07 1.40
Government
consumption 0.36 0.99 1.40
Consumption tax 0.37 0.67 0.99
Government
transfers 0.22 0.55 0.78
Labour tax 0.48 0.53 0.68
Corporate profit 
tax 0.32 0.03 0.05
Notes: The table depicts the GDP percentage difference 
from baseline for global shocks of 1% of (baseline) GDP,
assuming long-run financing through labour tax increases. 
(1) Unchanged national interest rates for one year 
Source: Commission services 
87. However, not all Member States are in a
position to contribute to the overall effort. The
fiscal effort should take account of the starting 
fiscal positions of each Member State. Countries 
which took advantage of good economic times to
achieve more sustainable public finance positions
have more room for manoeuvre. Countries which
were lagging behind have less leeway. Countries 
saddled with high public debt and macroeconomic
external or domestic imbalances should also 
exhibit prudence, since capital markets may 
adversely react to a further deterioration of such
imbalances. These elements are encapsulated in 
the concept of 'fiscal space', that is 'the room in a
government's budget that allows it to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without
jeopardising the sustainability of its financial
position or the stability of the economy' (22).
According to QUEST III simulations, if risk
premia on both sovereign and private debt increase
because the fiscal stimulus is perceived to be non-
credible, the short-term fiscal multiplier is reduced 
to close to zero. Therefore such countries are not 
(22) For more information see European Economy X/2009
'Public finances in EMU – 2009'. 
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Box 2.4: Government accounts and bank rescue schemes
Governments have mobilised substantial public funds in support of the banking sector. This box summarises 
how such government measures in support of the financial sector impact government accounts (in particular 
the government deficit and gross debt) compiled according to the European System of Accounts, which are 
relevant for the Stability and Growth Pact. 
As a general ESA rule, transactions are recorded according to their economic substance, rather than on the 
basis of formal considerations. In 2008, governments in the euro area used four tools to support their 
domestic banking sectors: 
(i) Recapitalisation includes the purchase of new (or existing) shares in quoted and unquoted banks. Most 
cases of purchase of equity are recorded without any direct impact on the government deficit, unless the 
government has paid for the shares more than their market price or fair value, or if the expected rate of 
return is deemed to be insufficient. In all cases, the purchase of equity adds to the government gross debt. 
(ii) Granting a loan has no direct and immediate impact on the government deficit. However, there will be a 
need to record a deficit-increasing transaction in the future, in case of insolvency of the debtor. The debt 
increases in all cases. 
(iii) Asset relief schemes, i.e. the purchase of impaired financial assets previously in the banks’ balance 
sheet, are also neutral for the government deficit provided that the price paid by the government is estimated 
to be a fair value. However, a deficit-increasing capital transfer is booked in case the price paid was in 
excess of the fair value. Government disposal of these assets at maturity or earlier, will lead to holding gains 
or losses. These are usually recorded in the revaluation account and have no direct impact on the 
government deficit. As in the other cases, the debt also increases. 
(iv) Guarantees to banks’ liabilities (bonds or loans) have also been granted by governments. A guarantee is 
a contingent liability that has no direct impact on the public deficit and debt. In case the debtor honours his 
liability, the guarantee is never booked in the government finance statistics. However, in the cases the 
guarantee is called and the liability has to be taken over by the government because the debtor defaults, there 
will be an increase in both government deficit and debt at the time of the debt takeover. Governments 
usually collect some fees when they grant guarantees. These fees are recorded as sales of services and 
reduce the government deficit. 
Most support to the financial sector has been directly provided by the government. However, there are a 
number of cases in relation to which one needs to consider the classification in government or in other 
sectors of the entities providing support. To make economic substance prevail over legal arrangements, a 
transaction in support of the financial sector carried out by a public corporation (e.g. a government-owned 
bank that is classified in the corporate sector) for public policy purposes under government instructions 
rather than for commercial reasons will be recorded in the government accounts. By the same token, support 
provided by privately-owned entities (like bad banks organized as special purpose vehicles established by 
the private sector) does not, in principle, enter government accounts. However, these bad banks often benefit 
from government guarantees; in that case, rules applicable to the treatment of guarantees apply. 
encouraged to engage in net fiscal stimulus, but 
will benefit from the fiscal stimuli of neighbouring 
countries. 
88. Automatic stabilisers will also contribute 
to smoothing out the economic cycle. This effect 
derives from progressive tax systems and social 
and unemployment benefits. Tax revenues 
decrease more than proportionately when GDP 
falls. Similarly, expenditure for social and 
unemployment benefits increases markedly in 
economic bad times. Both effects worsen the fiscal 
position and produce a smoothing countercyclical 
effect. They are called 'automatic' because their 
action does not require discretionary interventions 
by fiscal authorities. Because of the larger 
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government sector in the EU (in 2008 the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the EU was almost 
47% compared to 39% in the US), automatic
stabilisers play a more important role than in the 
US. They explain why fiscal balances are also 
deteriorating in countries with no fiscal space to
enact discretionary measures. 
89. Supporting households' purchasing
power relies both on automatic stabilisers and on
discretionary measures. Against the background
of a decline in private consumption for 2009, 
measures that support household disposable
income and purchasing power help to sustain
consumption and aggregate demand. They also 
provide income support for groups hit hardest by
the downturn. 
90. Bank rescue packages are also a 
component of the overall fiscal stimulus (see 
Section 2.2). Bank guarantees, asset relief schemes 
and capital injections have important
macroeconomic stabilisation functions. They will
weigh substantially on public debt (see Box 2.4 on
the accounting treatment of bank rescue package
measures) and reinforce the need for appropriate 
exit strategies. 
91. The revised Stability and Growth Pact
allows Member States to combine short-term 
fiscal stimulus with medium-term sustainability
considerations. The 2005 revision of the Pact
allows better account to be taken of cyclical 
conditions while strengthening medium- and long-
term fiscal discipline. The resulting framework is
more demanding in good times but affords more 
flexibility in bad times. It functioned broadly well
in 2006-2007, as the general government deficit 
was reduced to 0.7% of GDP in the euro area, 
although its narrow scope meant that not enough
emphasis was laid on growing macroeconomic 
imbalances within a number of EU and euro-area
countries. Most Member States are now running 
deficits above 3% of GDP. But that does not mean
that the functioning of the Stability and Growth
Pact is impaired. Excessive deficit procedures have 
been opened against a number of countries (see
Section 1.3). Member States putting in place 
counter-cyclical measures submitted an updated 
Stability Programme in December 2008, which 
spelled out the measures taken to eventually
reverse the fiscal deterioration and ensure long-
term sustainability. The Commission has assessed 
them against the following objectives, well in line 
with the SGP principles: 
(i) ensuring the reversibility of measures that
increase deficits in the short run; 
(ii) improving budgetary policy-making in 
the medium term, through strengthening of the
national budgetary rules and frameworks;
(iii) ensuring the long-term sustainability of
public finances, in particular through reforms 
curbing the rise in age-related expenditure. 
92. All in all, fiscal policy should provide 
support to the economy in the region of 5% of
GDP over 2009 and 2010. According to 
simulations conducted with the Commission
services' QUEST III model based on announced
national measures, the stimulus measures will have
a positive impact on GDP growth of slightly more
than 0.75 GDP points in 2009 and 0.3 GDP points
in 2010 for the EU as a whole. This shows that the 
EU and the euro area are doing their fair share of
the work to support the global economy, in line 
with the outcome of the G-20 Summits in
Washington and London (see Chapter 3). 
Graph 2.8: Fiscal policy stance in the euro area 
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Note: Commission services' spring forecast for 2009 and 
2010. CAPB: Cyclically-adjusted primary balance.
Source: Commission services.
The structural arm of the EERP 
93. The European Economic Recovery Plan 
calls for 'increased efforts to implement 
structural reforms envisaged in the Lisbon 
strategy'. While the main aim of structural reforms
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Box 2.5: 2008/2009 council recommendations to the euro area in the context of the Lisbon 
strategy
• Ensure timely and consistent implementation of all pending and new EU financial services legislation and
take measures to deepen cooperation among national authorities within the EU in the fields of crisis
prevention, management and resolution. 
• Taking into account the fiscal stimulus injected during the current economic crisis, euro area Member
States should take appropriate measures to secure the sustainability of their public finances in line with the
Stability and Growth Pact. Where appropriate address macroeconomic imbalances, contain persistent 
inflation divergences or trends of unbalanced growth.
• Improve the quality of public finances by reviewing public expenditures and taxation and by modernising
public administration, with the intention to enhance productivity and innovation and to pursue a dynamic 
and competitive single market, thereby contributing to economic growth, employment and fiscal
sustainability. 
• Vigorously implement the EU Common Principles of Flexicurity in accordance with the specific
circumstances of each Member State and fully compatible with sound and sustainable public finances; and
enact measures to promote labour mobility across borders, regions, sectors and occupations; better align 
wage growth with productivity, employment growth and competitiveness at the aggregate, sector, regional 
and occupational level.
• Step up reforms that increase the flexibility and competition in goods and services markets and contribute
to deepen the internal market.
is to tackle longer-term challenges, structural 
policies can immediately contribute to recovery
efforts. A particularly relevant issue to consider is 
the interplay between short-term effectiveness and
the challenge to provide proper incentives for 
employment and growth in the medium and longer
term. Structural reforms improve the resilience of 
economies and contribute to the recovery by 
facilitating the adjustment process, which is all the
more important in a monetary union such as the 
euro area. In addition, engaging in structural 
reforms can have macroeconomic and
distributional effects in the short term that mitigate
the economic and social impact of the downturn. 
Moreover, adherence to ambitious structural
reform agendas can enhance the credibility of
short-term policy responses to the economic
slowdown. In this respect, the country-specific and 
euro-area Member State recommendations under
the Lisbon strategy (see Box 2.5) offer guidance 
for structural reforms with a view to raising the 
growth and jobs potential over the medium term. 
94. Labour market measures should
combine immediate policies reacting to the rapid 
deterioration of employment levels with medium- 
and long-term reforms. Employment decreases
more in countries that are more exposed to the 
boom-bust cycle in construction and finance. The 
slump in employment is expected to be more 
persistent where job-specific skills reduce workers' 
mobility across sectors. A first priority is to avoid
job losses in sectors and firms that were
fundamentally sound prior to the crisis. Policies 
that promote mobility from contracting to 
expanding sectors, adequate unemployment 
insurance and active labour-market programmes
will facilitate the matching process. The 
Commission signalled in its communication to the
Spring European Council that indiscriminate, tax-
funded support for jobs in declining industries or
regions should be avoided, as this could delay
necessary restructuring. 
95. Investment measures have the potential 
to influence trend growth. Private investment has
been hit hard in the current economic climate.
Investment growth is forecast to remain negative
in 2010. Against this background, investment
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Box 2.6: The community pillar of the EERP
EU funds announced in the EERP have supported action in the most critical areas affected by the crisis. 
Funding of the order of EUR 30 billion in support of immediate actions help stem the loss of jobs, protect 
workers, and promote investments to modernize Europe's infrastructures. Progress with the implementation 
of Community measures to support growth and jobs is promising. Importantly, close cooperation between 
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament was established which helped speed up decision-
making and enabled the EU to take swift action. 
Additional EUR 6.3 billion have already been made available for EU Member States in 2009 through the 
frontloading of Structural Funds to help underpin growth and employment and prepare our economies for 
recovery. This frontloading implies more than a doubling of the structural funds advances to Member States 
in 2009 and will support smart investment in growth-enhancing areas for employment and businesses. 
To further lessen the human cost of the economic downturn, the Commission has proposed a renewal of the 
European Globalisation Fund (EGF). The European Parliament recently adopted this proposal. The renewed 
EGF will allow more workers made redundant in the crisis to be helped. In particular, funds will be made 
more easily available through: (i) an increased funding rate from 50% to 65% until the end of 2011; (ii) by 
lowering the eligibility threshold for EGF applications from 1,000 to 500 redundant workers in a sector, 
region or undertaking; and by (iii) extending the duration of EGF support to 24 months (from the current 12 
months) to leave sufficient time for the measures to be effective in re-integrating particularly the most 
vulnerable workers into new jobs. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is playing an important role in enhancing access to finance and in 
particular the financing of the development of new business opportunities. The EIB plans its lending to 
increase to EUR 70 billion in 2009, EUR 25 billion more than originally foreseen. Lending to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and lending from the European clean transport facility loans is being strongly 
increased. The EIB expects to be able to provide almost EUR 7 billion in loans by July for automotive sector 
projects, while initially EUR 4 billion was foreseen. 
Under the Trans-European Network programme (TEN-T) the Commission launched on 31 March a EUR 
500 million call for individual projects. These funds have been brought forward to support works which can 
start in 2009 or 2010 and be largely implemented over this two-year period (or which have already started 
but can be accelerated over 2009 and 2010). 
The Commission's proposal to mobilize EUR 5 billion for trans-european energy interconnections and 
broadband infrastructure projects has been approved by the European Parliament and the Council. This 
allows Europe to get moving immediately on projects that will provide a welcome boost to the European 
economy and make a real contribution to giving Europe more energy security and better availability of high-
speed internet in the future.  
A total of EUR 3.2 billion will be allocated from 2010 to 2013 for research projects through three public-
private-partnership (PPP) initiatives with half of the funds coming from industry and half from the 
Community budget. The "Factories of the Future" PPP initiative (EUR 1.2 billion) aims at helping EU 
manufacturing enterprises, in particular SMEs, to adapt to global competitive pressures by increasing their 
knowledge and use of the technologies of the future. The objective of the "Energy-efficient Buildings" PPP 
initiative (EUR 1 billion) is to deliver, implement and optimise building concepts that have the potential to 
drastically reduce energy consumption and decrease CO² emissions, both in relation to new buildings and to 
the renovation of existing buildings. The "Green Cars" PPP initiative (EUR 1 billion) focuses on the 
development of renewable and non-polluting energy sources, safety and traffic fluidity in the automotive 
field. 
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measures lay the groundwork for a stronger
recovery for two reasons. Firstly, economic growth
would be positively influenced in the short run,
given the relatively large multiplier effects 
associated with increased investment. Secondly, 
over the longer run, higher investment can remove
various impediments to growth and enable faster 
recovery when conditions improve. From a 
competitiveness perspective, well-designed 
investment policies help to raise trend productivity
and strengthen competitiveness. Conversely, a
sustained fall in investment may have significant 
implications for future productivity growth rates. 
Such a contraction in physical investments would
also be at odds with the need to adapt the 
infrastructure to climate and energy challenges. 
96. In the short run business support 
measures can help counter unnecessary labour
shedding and the exit of otherwise viable and 
sound companies. These take the form of three
main types of action: i) measures to ease financing 
constraints on businesses; ii) sector-specific 
support, and iii) non-financial support measures. 
These measures can contain the negative effects of 
the crisis on potential output by preventing a 
permanent loss of knowledge and skills and a
reduction of productive capacity. However, a 
trade-off exists between the desirable short-term
aim and potentially adverse distorting effects over
the medium term. In order to limit risks to
competition and preserve a level playing field 
within the Single Market, the EERP underlines the 
critical importance of the temporary character – for
the duration of the crisis – of business support
measures. 
2.5. FIRST ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL 
MEASURES TAKEN UNDER THE EERP 
97. Most Member States have drawn up
national recovery plans in response to the EERP 
and they are now being implemented. On the 
basis of a preliminary assessment, the Commission 
reported to the 2009 Spring European Council that 
the agreed level for a co-ordinated fiscal stimulus
(1.5% of EU GDP) had been met. In response to
worsening economic conditions, several Member 
States have announced additional discretionary
fiscal measures on top of their national recovery 
programmes announced before the 2009 Spring
European Council. As a result, in the euro area, the 
size of the announced discretionary financial
stimulus over 2009 and 2010 has reached 1.8% of 
the euro-area GDP to date. This brings the total 
euro-area budgetary support to underpin growth
and employment, which includes the support from 
automatic stabilisers, to 4.6% of the euro-area 
GDP (5% of GDP for the EU as a whole). 
98. The scale of the measures varies greatly
from one Member State to another. In 2009 the 
largest fiscal stimulus in the euro area is being run 
in Spain (2.3% of GDP). Other sizeable stimuli are
being undertaken by Austria (1.8%), Finland
(1.7%), Malta (1.6%), Germany (1.4%) and
Luxembourg (1.2%). Given their limited room for 
fiscal manoeuvre, some Member States make little
or no contribution to the EERP. This category
comprises Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
Slovakia. Overall, in structural terms, i.e. net of
cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary
measures, the projected deterioration in the euro 
area in 2009 (1% of GDP) is smaller than that of
the headline deficit, but still significant given that
many Member States support their economies with 
discretionary measures under the EERP (Table 2.3 
and Graph 2.8). The fiscal stimulus is expected to 
be around 0.8% in 2010. 
Table 2.3: Total fiscal stimulus over 2009 and 2010 by
Member State (in % of GDP) 
Total Expenditure Revenues
AT 3.6 0.8 2.8
BE 0.8 0.5 0.3
CY 0.1 0.0 0.0
DE 3.3 1.2 2.1
EL 0.0 0.0 0.0
ES 2.9 1.6 1.3
FI 3.8 1.0 2.8
FR 1.0 0.7 0.3
IE 1.0 0.6 0.4
IT(1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
LU 2.6 0.1 2.5
MT 3.2 2.7 0.5
NL 1.9 0.8 1.1
PT 1.0 1.0 0.0
SI 1.1 0.9 0.2
SK 0.1 0.0 0.1
Euro Area 1.8 0.8 1.0
2009-2010
Note:  Italy has adopted fiscal measures in response to the
downturn, but their net impact is either neutral or deficit-
reducing.
Source: Commission services 
99. The funds allocated to the economy
could be broken down in four categories. Out of
the 590 national measures reported by euro-area
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Member States to the Commission: (i) 22% are
supporting households' purchasing power; (ii) 25% 
are buttressing investment activity; (iii) 32% are in
support of industrial sectors, businesses and 
companies; (iv) 21% should improve the 
functioning of labour markets. In volume terms,
support to household purchasing power absorbs 
most of the additional budgetary resources over 
2009–2010 (0.9 percentage points of GDP). These 
are followed by investment-related measures
(0.5% of GDP) and measures aimed at companies 
(0.3% of GDP). Labour market measures make up
a rather small part (0.1 percentage points of GDP) 
of total measures adopted so far. It should be
noted, however, that some measures are of a cross-
cutting nature as they can affect both household
income and labour markets (for example measures
in the field of tax and social contributions). The
following paragraphs look at these four categories
of measures. 
Support to households' purchasing power 
100. Support to households' purchasing
power accounts for the lion's share of national
measures. Most measures relate to changes in 
income tax rates, tax bands or thresholds and to
some extent also social contributions. Some
measures are directed at alleviating mortgage 
payments for those hardest hit by the crisis. Some
Member States have temporarily lowered VAT on
selected consumer goods. 
101. General changes in income tax schemes 
have been implemented in several Member States.
Non-negligible reductions in effective income tax
rates have been implemented in Germany and
Finland, while other countries have made more 
limited changes to tax bands or other parametric
changes (Luxembourg, Spain and Malta). On the 
one hand, general income tax reductions have the
advantage of being transparent, easily 
implemented and unbiased towards specific 
sectors. They also tend to increase incentives to 
work. On the other hand, depending on the design
of the tax cuts, high-income earners often benefit
more (in absolute tax reductions), which may
reduce the impact on aggregate consumption, 
given their relatively low propensity to consume. 
These measures are also often costly and liable to 
become permanent, which may explain their 
limited scope in many Member States. Several
countries have also adjusted social security 
contributions paid by employees (for example 
Germany and the Netherlands). 
Table 2.4: Overview of structural reform measures 
relevant to national recovery programmes 
Supporting 
household
purchasing
power
Supporting
investment 
activity
Supporting
industrial sectors,
businesses and 
companies
Supporting the good
functioning of
labour markets
AT 17 14 18 8
BE 11 9 16 17
CY 6 7 5 5
DE 12 14 13 8
EL 5 6 5 9
ES 17 11 36 14
FI 6 6 4 12
FR 18 12 21 12
IE 3 6 2 3
IT 9 10 8 7
LU 8 7 8 2
MT 1 3 5 2
NL 3 17 14 7
PT 8 7 16 6
SI 0 10 9 5
SK 4 6 12 8
EA 128 145 192 125
In % 22% 25% 32% 21%
Breakdown of measures by category
(number of measures)
Note: In some cases, a measure can be relevantly classified 
under two policy type headings or contribute to multiple
policy objectives. In other cases, measures needing 
clarification are not included in the statistics of the table
Source: Commission services.
102. Specific support is provided to the most
vulnerable group of citizens. The focus of these 
measures is mostly on low-income households but
also pensioners and families with children. Such
measures are applied for example in Belgium,
Spain, Germany and the Netherlands, although 
targeted measures are often of a limited overall 
size in terms of budget impact. Support is ensured 
through targeted tax cuts and benefits' increase. 
Finally, there are also measures that subsidise 
household consumption of certain goods and
services. By focusing on groups with relatively 
high propensity to consume, such measures may be 
more cost-efficient than more general ones. While 
in some cases arguments could be raised as regards
negative incentives to work, this may overall be
less of a concern in a context of high,
crisis-induced, unemployment. 
Labour market measures 
103. The financial crisis and the ensuing 
global downturn are beginning to impact
significantly on labour markets. Recent data 
confirm that unemployment is now rising steeply, 
and projections indicate that employment will 
decline in absolute terms over the next two years 
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leading to a further steep rise in unemployment,
which, on unchanged policies and labour market 
Graph 2.9: EERP - Measures aimed at supporting 
household purchasing power in the euro area
(fiscal stimulus as % of country GDP, 2009-
2010) 
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behaviour, is set to exceed 11% in 2010. Overall, 
labour market measures represent a small 
proportion of the total discretionary fiscal impulse 
(Graph 2.10) but can be quite cost-effective in the 
present circumstances. 
104. Flexible working time arrangements are 
being adopted in several Member States.
Temporary working time reductions, temporary
closures of factories and other forms of short-time
work implemented by firms to prevent mass 
layoffs are underpinned by public support
schemes. Many euro-area countries have either 
introduced new forms of public support for 
flexible working time or temporary unemployment 
(Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia), or extended the 
duration or the level of existing public support
schemes (Austria, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy). Some Member 
States provide incentives for using the reduced 
hours for training activities (Austria, Belgium and
Germany) in order to maximise the employability
of workers on short-time arrangements. The
experience so far with such measures is positive.  
105. Training and active labour market
policies should ensure that structural 
unemployment does not increase. Almost all 
Member States are endeavouring to support and 
ease the re-integration into the labour market of 
recently laid-off workers. Training opportunities 
and incentives have been expanded in Austria,
Greece, Finland, France, Portugal and Slovenia. 
Overall, it is too early to judge whether the 
measures taken are adequate and will thus reduce 
the risk of a detrimental increase in long-term
unemployment. 
Graph 2.10: EERP - Labour market measures in the euro 
area (fiscal stimulus as % of country GDP, 
2009-2010) 
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106. Other measures attempt to boost labour 
demand through reductions in social security 
contributions. Measures such as reductions in
social security contributions, cutting income taxes 
or changes in wage setting can influence –directly
or indirectly– labour costs, depending on whether 
the measures are temporary or not. Rebates on 
social security contributions to boost labour
demand have been applied in a number of euro-
area Member States and have typically been made 
conditional on job creation (in Belgium, Spain, 
France, Portugal and Slovakia). Lowering labour 
costs for both employers and employees is already 
a feature of some medium-term national reform 
programmes and has gained additional relevance in 
the framework of the crisis (Belgium, France and 
Germany). Increased competitiveness has been 
sought in the Netherlands, where wage moderation
over the medium term is traded against cuts in 
social security contributions for both employers
and employees. In the same vein, Belgium has 
extended the inter-sectoral structural wage
adjustment system, which is a scheme consisting 
of a reduction of wage costs and taking the form of
a partial exemption from the withholding tax on
wages. However, in countries with a deteriorated 
competitiveness position, such policy actions are 
less prominent. 
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107. Improving the incentives to work 
embedded in the tax and benefit system is in line 
with long-term economic goals. Apart from some
countries where the tax pressure on labour was 
reduced, especially for low-wage earners (Finland 
and Malta), most measures appear to be temporary
and contingent on the economic crisis. Income
supplements and targeted in-work tax credits have
been reinforced (Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Slovakia). Commuters' tax allowances have been
increased (Austria and Slovakia) and the design of
unemployment insurance has been modified so as
to increase work attractiveness (Spain and Italy). 
Newly implemented social assistance schemes are
conditional upon availability to work (France). A 
few measures were also taken to support female
labour market participation (in Malta and the 
Netherlands). 
Investment policies 
108. Nearly all euro-area Member States
have announced measures aimed at supporting
investment in physical infrastructure. The 
prominence attached to public investment in
recovery efforts varies considerably across
Member States, with the largest increases in 
spending as a percentage point of GDP observed in
Germany, Cyprus, Spain, Malta, the Netherlands 
and Slovenia (Graph 2.11). By type of physical
infrastructure, a majority of the measures aim at 
supporting investment in transport infrastructure. 
The bulk of these investments is related to the road 
and railway sectors. The information available 
suggests that investment in transport infrastructure 
is focused on traditional infrastructure with few 
measures geared to innovative solutions (such as
modernisation of air traffic control infrastructure 
as in Slovenia). 
109. The second biggest group of investment 
expenditure relates to the construction sector. 
Many are focused on education facilities or other 
social infrastructure. Implementation is mostly
planned for 2009 or 2010 but in practice projects 
often lag behind schedule. In this perspective,
investment in maintenance tends to be timelier
(especially for measures to renovate existing 
buildings in Austria, Spain, France and Portugal). 
A significant number of measures provide support 
to the building sector without being linked to
energy efficiency improvements. In cases where
the housing market has experienced a bubble such 
measures may implicitly contribute to postponing
the necessary restructuring of the oversized 
construction sector and thus lead to lower long-
term productivity. 
Graph 2.11: EERP -Measures aimed at stepping up 
investment expenditure in the euro area 
(fiscal stimulus as % of country GDP, 2009-
2010) 
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110. Supporting energy-efficiency investment 
will mitigate the impact of the downturn while
contributing to achieving long-term objectives.
Speeding up the shift towards a low-carbon 
economy allows the EU to implement its climate
change policy and reduce dependence on imported 
energy. Examples of specific measures include
grants to small-scale energy-efficiency renovations
(Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), public
procurement for low-carbon or highly energy-
efficient public buildings (France, Austria), tax and
other financial incentives, etc. Such investments 
have the potential to stimulate job- and innovation-
rich sustainable construction and renewable energy 
markets and are in line with long-term objectives. 
They will help minimise insolvencies of 
companies in the eco-innovation sector, which is
expected to be dynamic and highly competitive
when the economy starts recovering. Measures to 
support energy-efficiency investment focus on
reducing the energy consumption of buildings, 
which account for over 40% of the EU's final 
energy consumption. Countries like Austria, 
Germany and Finland have reinforced guarantees 
and agreements with national public financial 
institutions to provide loans and other financial
risk-covering instruments. The European 
Investment Bank has also announced a substantial 
increase in its lending in 2009 and 2010 for low-
carbon and energy-saving infrastructure projects. 
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111. Research and Development (R&D)
measures can increase productivity growth and 
competitiveness. R&D measures generally account
for a small share of investment measures. 
Recovery measures mostly aim at helping R&D 
funding at a time when financial institutions tend
to be more risk-averse. A significant proportion of
R&D measures are targeted at SMEs. Firms'
support takes the form of loans (Germany,
Austria), R&D tax credits (Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands), depreciation rule (France 
and Germany) and direct subsidies (Austria,
Germany, Finland). The preliminary assessment of
recovery measures suggests that some countries 
are more successful in aligning their short-term
actions with their medium- and long-term needs:
for instance, Germany with detailed measures 
aimed at SMEs; Slovenia with measures aimed at 
fostering private R&D; Belgium and Spain, with 
fiscal incentives aimed at attracting researchers, as
well as the Netherlands, reinforcing support 
instruments to stimulate private R&D. The EERP 
encourages Member States to conduct research on 
green technologies. Among the countries in the 
euro area, plans to invest in green technologies can 
be found in Spain, France, Italy and Germany. 
There might be a risk, however, that the crisis may 
widen the R&D gap between 'innovation leaders'
and 'moderate innovators' and 'catching-up
countries' (23).
Business support measures 
112. The overall response to the crisis in 
terms of business support measures is strong. 
Business support measures comprise: (i) the easing 
of financing constraints; (ii) sector support; and 
(iii) non-financial business support. The strong
recourse to such measures can be explained by the 
fact that the crisis has severely affected European
businesses and industries, firstly through 
tightening financial conditions, and secondly 
through a generalised contraction of global
demand associated with a widespread loss of 
confidence among both consumers and businesses
across the world. For an overview of business
support measures at the individual country level, 
see Graph 2.12. 
(23) This terminology is taken from the European Innovation
Scoreboard.
Graph 2.12: EERP- Business support measures in the euro 
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Easing financing constraints 
113. Almost all euro-area countries have 
moved to counteract the drying-up of credit for 
businesses. Examples of relevant policies are the 
extension of credit guarantees, including export 
credit, particularly for SMEs; the increase in the
capital of public development banks to bring this
about; easing conditions for access to and 
repayment of loans; temporary tax reductions and
exemptions; and changes in depreciation rules 
favouring SMEs. These measures are for the most 
part horizontal in nature and are considered to be 
effective in the short term without major risks, as 
long as their temporariness is ensured.
114. Corporate taxation has been adjusted to 
improve the fiscal environment for businesses. In
the euro area corporate taxes have been lowered on
a permanent basis in some euro-area countries 
(France, Luxembourg and Slovenia) and on a more 
temporary basis in others (the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Greece and Spain). Already in 2008, 
Germany implemented a corporate tax reform that 
reduced the corporate tax rate from 25% to 15%,
which is providing substantial relief for 
corporations over the period 2008-2012. 
115. Other financial measures were also 
undertaken. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, 
France and Finland indicated changes in the rules 
governing capital depreciation; the Netherlands, 
Spain and France adopted measures such as VAT
acceleration payments, and Portugal, the
Netherlands and Belgium sped up government 
bills. Some Member States have also moved to
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ensure that financial sector problems do not 
undermine financing and insurance of foreign 
trade. 
Sector support  
116. Sectors receiving support account for a 
large and variable share in the economies. All 
measures supporting specific sectors have an 
inherent potential to distort competition or hinder 
the process of economic restructuring within the 
EU. Most Member States have put in place 
horizontal frameworks that allow policy support to 
be given to sectors that are most affected by the 
crisis (e.g. cars, tourism, construction). Most 
measures seem temporary, targeted and timely. 
However, while the most affected sectors are 
broadly the same in all Member States, there is a 
considerable variation across Member States in 
terms of support actually provided – both in terms 
of sectoral composition and regarding the mix 
between supply- and demand-side measures. 
Therefore, even if schemes are consistent with 
internal market and state aid rules, they could 
nevertheless have an effect on the internal market 
through their differential impact on corporations 
depending on the Member State in which they are 
located. 
117. Sector-specific measures focused on the 
automotive industry. Ten euro-area countries 
(Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal and 
Slovakia) have implemented car-scrapping 
schemes to support demand. These measures are 
temporary and make support conditional on the 
purchase of new or nearly new vehicles that should 
be less polluting. Most of the scrapping schemes 
were helping to generate additional car sales at the 
beginning of 2009, thus stimulating short-term 
demand. New passenger car registration increased 
in Germany, France and Slovakia by a significant 
amount (+40% on a year in Germany in June 
2009). 
118. Measures in the automotive industry 
have also been taken on the supply side. The 
automotive sector is being supported in France 
('Pacte Automobile' proposed in February 2009), 
Italy and Spain (Competitiveness automobile plan 
proposed in March 2009), Austria and Portugal. In 
addition, companies receive support through other 
schemes: greening of products (Germany, Spain 
and France) or subsidised loans (France). The 
environmental challenge to which the car sector is 
exposed makes it the main beneficiary of the 
greening schemes. 
Non-financial business support 
119. Non-financial business support includes 
reduction of administrative burdens and 
implementation of regulatory reforms. This set of 
measures is warranted where fiscal constraints may 
limit recourse to other options to enhance the 
business environment. Also, where such measures 
are already at an advanced stage, they can 
contribute to accelerating the adjustment process 
of the eventual recovery through an improved 
business environment, especially in countries 
where doing business was less easy before. 
Significant improvements in the business 
environment can be expected from a rapid and 
thorough implementation of the Services Directive 
and reforms in services going beyond the 
Directive.  
120. Most of the measures undertaken in this 
area relate to the reduction in administrative 
burdens for businesses. Such measures are being 
taken in Italy, the Netherlands and Malta. Others 
aim at stimulating entrepreneurship and SME 
activities, improving the conditions for starting up 
new businesses (Belgium and Spain). In 2008, 
prior to the crisis, structural reforms were 
implemented in the French services sector, 
especially in retail, where various constraints on 
opening new shops were lifted. Spain committed to 
accelerate the implementation of the Service 
Directive. The reform of professional services 
should also create positive effects. Finally, 
improvement of the administrative implementation 
of Structural Funds has been put on the agenda in 
Slovakia. 
Overall assessment of national economic 
recovery measures 
121. The preliminary findings are 
encouraging. Member States’ recovery 
programmes constitute a robust response to the 
crisis and are broadly in line with the principles 
enunciated in the EERP, encompassing financial 
rescue packages, fiscal stimuli, temporary support 
to hard hit sectors and targeted support to 
vulnerable groups. Most measures seem 
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temporary, targeted and timely, although there are 
some questions relating to the reversibility of a 
number of policies. The stimulus package - 
alongside significant monetary easing and 
important bank rescue plans - has arguably put a 
“floor” to the collapse of economic activity in the 
EU and the euro area. Importantly, there are no 
obvious cases of rolling back past reform 
measures. 
122. As regards progress with recovery 
measures in specific areas, the following insights 
can be drawn: 
Labour market policies in many Member States, 
notably through innovative short-term working 
measures and common guidance developed at EU 
level, have to date been rather effective in stopping 
unemployment from shooting up. Overall, 
however, labour market measures only represent a 
small proportion of the total discretionary fiscal 
impulse. Given the sharp projected rise in 
unemployment, and the large economic and social 
costs of long-term unemployment or withdrawal 
from the labour force, more emphasis is now 
needed on policies to support the unemployed. 
There is considerable variation across Member 
States in the composition of their labour market 
response by types of measures, and consequently 
there seems to be scope for policy learning 
between Member States. 
123. As regards investment, a welcome finding 
is that new or accelerated spending on public 
investments forms a significant share of fiscal 
stimuli in line with the EERP. As the focus is 
mostly on projects already in the pipeline, most 
actions will support economic activity in 2009 and 
2010. Moreover, there is a degree of focus on 
energy efficiency, although at the aggregate level 
there are few indications of a substantial shift 
towards green investment. Going forward, a key 
policy issue is whether the observed fall in private 
investment will have significant adverse 
repercussions on R&D spending, and in turn be 
detrimental to potential growth. 
124. As regards business support measures, 
most Member States have put in place horizontal 
frameworks that allow temporary policy support to 
be given to sectors that are most affected by the 
crisis (e.g. automobile, tourism, construction). 
However, there is considerable variation across 
Member States in terms of support actually 
provided and the effectiveness of national schemes 
for industries that operate across the whole of the 
internal market could be somewhat limited. Risks 
remain that recovery measures adopted shortly 
after the outbreak of the crisis deepen rather than 
reduce intra-euro area macroeconomic divergences 
(see Section 1.5). 
125. Overall, the preliminary analysis 
indicates that Member States have adopted a 
wide-ranging policy response to the economic 
crisis in line with the approach indicated in the 
EERP. The effectiveness and adequacy of 
measures will need to be continuously monitored 
in terms of the evolving economic situation. An 
exchange of best practices can help to improve 
mutual learning and enhance the effectiveness of 
measures in order to use the potential of the single 
market to the full. Devising detailed exit strategies 
would complement existing national frameworks 
and ensure the sustainable nature of the recovery. 
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126. The international financial crisis has 
pushed the world economy in its first global
recession in post-war history. This chapter looks 
at how the external environment of the euro area
evolved over the last year. Section 3.1 starts by
investigating how the shocks spread over the world 
economy and what measures policymakers of 
major economies took to alleviate the impact of the 
crisis. Section 3.2 goes on to describe the recent 
developments in the exchange rate of the euro. 
Section 3.3 looks at the impact of the crisis on
global imbalances. Section 3.4 presents recent 
efforts by world leaders to reform the international 
financial system. Section 3.5 explores the impact 
of the crisis on the international position of the 
euro. 
3.1. THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE CRISIS 
127. The financial crisis started in the 
advanced economies… After the bursting of the 
US sub-prime bubble the crisis spread rapidly
through financial channels to other advanced
economies. Tightening financing conditions
caused economic activity to slow down and
advanced economies fell into recession in the 
fourth quarter of 2008.
128. …and spread to emerging markets
afterwards. Emerging markets seemed to be 
initially sheltered from the financial turbulence 
thanks to their limited exposure to US subprime
loans. However, the situation changed with the 
intensification of the financial crisis in autumn
2008. Sudden re-pricing of risk and flight to 
quality triggered massive withdrawal of funds 
from emerging markets. Funding provided to 
emerging markets by foreign banks dried up on the 
back of financing problems in their home 
countries. Internal imbalances in some emerging
markets, veiled previously by favourable financing
conditions, became exposed, adding to investors' 
risk aversion.
129. World trade suffered heavily. At the end 
of 2008, trade collapsed as a result of the
synchronised fall in demand in all parts of the 
world economy. World trade fell at an annualised 
rate of 24% in the last quarter of 2008. The scale
of this drop was unprecedented and illustrated the 
depth of international trade linkages due to the 
rapid extension of global production chains during
the last two decades (24). These developments had 
severe consequences for the export-oriented Asian 
economies, where exports contracted at double-
digit rates. In addition to the slump in demand,
increasing difficulties in obtaining trade credit and
insurance also played a role. 
Graph 3.1: Capital flows to emerging and developing 
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130. No economic area seemed to be spared. 
With the exception of China and India, where the
slowdown was nevertheless marked, growth is
expected to be negative in most of the world's
economies in 2009. Going by the past experience 
of financial and banking crises, world growth will 
be sub-par also in 2010. According to the 
Commission services' spring forecast, world 
growth is set to decrease by 1.4% in 2009 and to
increase by 1.9% in 2010. World trade is expected 
to contract by 11% in 2009, and edge up (+¾%) in
2010. This outlook for global activity and trade is 
the bleakest since World War II. Emerging 
markets are likely to recover somewhat faster from
economic doldrums as they might benefit more 
from the expected gradual recovery in trade.
131. The US economy entered a severe 
recession in the second half of 2008. The bursting
of the real estate bubble and the ensuing 
breakdown of the sub-prime mortgage market had 
acute consequences for the real economy.
Tightened financial conditions and large capital 
losses depressed consumer confidence and 
consumption. Savings, which had been on a
(24) The largest quarterly decrease recorded thus far was
-11.1% in the first quarter of 1975.
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declining path for two decades, rose sharply. In the
face of the slump in demand, businesses cut 
production, employment and investment. Exports
fell rapidly on the back of the collapse in external 
demand. Growth tumbled at an annual rate of 5.4%
during the fourth quarter of 2008 and 6.4% during
the first quarter of 2009. Growth decreased at a 
slower annual pace –1.0 percent– in the second 
quarter of 2009. A return to positive growth
numbers is only projected for the second half of
2009. The magnitude of the contraction in 2008/09
is likely to exceed the decline in output during all
previous recessions since the Second World War. 
Macroeconomic policy measures, a possible 
stabilisation of the housing market in the second
half of 2009 and the downward adjustment in
business inventories should translate into annual
GDP growth of -2.9% in 2009 and +0.9% in 2010. 
Graph 3.2: World trade and GDP growth (annual average
growth rate) 
-12
-9
-6
-3
0
3
6
9
12
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
in 
%
Trade volume of goods and services
GDP, constant prices
Source: Commission services, IMF.
132. The Japanese economy was hit hard by
the collapse in external demand. Initially
Japanese banks and financial institutions seemed
relatively shielded from the fallout of the US 
subprime crisis because they had adopted cautious 
investment strategies following the banking sector
crisis of the 1990s. Yet the Japanese economy was
severely affected by the crisis. Due to its 
dependence on exports, the economy went into
recession in mid-2008 as demand from the EU and 
US collapsed. The recession intensified and 
broadened to all sectors of the economy. Corporate
profits were eroded, financial conditions
deteriorated, and a negative feed-back loop 
between the real and the financial sectors 
materialised. The downturn affected the labour 
market, and unemployment surged to levels not
seen since the Asian financial crisis. In 2009, the 
Japanese economy is expected to contract by 
-5.3% (after -0.7% in 2008) and to stagnate in 
2010. 
Graph 3.3: Profiles of GDP growth in major economies 
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133. The Chinese economy slowed down 
rapidly, but growth remained robust. China fared
better than many other economies thanks to its
limited reliance on external financing. However,
after the crisis spread worldwide, China's exports
fell sharply, affecting private investment and
consumption. After growing at an annual rate of 
13% in 2007, GDP decelerated to 6.8% year-on-
year in 2008Q4 and 6.1% in 2009Q1. Growth then
accelerated again to 7.9% year-on-year during the
second quarter, as a large fiscal stimulus 
programme unfolded. 
Table 3.1: GDP growth in major economies 
2008 2009 2010
World 3.1 -1.4 1.9
USA 1.1 -2.9 0.9
Japan -0.7 -5.3 0.1
China 9.0 6.1 7.8
Russia 5.6 -3.8 1.5
Note: Data for 2009 and 2010 from the Commission services' 
spring forecast.
Source: Commission services.
134. After a decade of robust growth, Russia
is expected to fall into recession in 2009. Similar
to the situation in other emerging economies, the 
crisis became visible only in the second half of 
2008. Hit by a dual shock of drying sources of
external finance and dropping commodity prices,
the economy stalled towards the end of 2008. In
2009, real GDP is forecast to contract by -3.8%,
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and to recover only slowly in 2010. The large 
fiscal surplus that had been built up thanks to high 
commodity prices and robust growth is expected to 
turn into a deficit on the back of an expansionary 
fiscal policy. 
Policy measures to sustain growth  
135. The crisis triggered energetic policy 
responses to support growth. International 
coordination of policy stimuli was crucial in order 
to ensure effective policy action. In an open 
economy parts of the national demand stimulus 
spills over across the borders thus limiting the 
growth impulse for the domestic economy. G-20 
Summits were instrumental in fostering a 
worldwide coordinated approach to policy 
stimulus (see Section 3.4). As a consequence, in 
most large economies (advanced and emerging 
alike), policy actions were taken to support 
demand. 
136. The US authorities made massive use of 
fiscal measures to combat the crisis. Two large 
stimulus packages were adopted. The Economic 
Stimulus Act of February 2008 consisted mainly of 
rebates in personal income taxes and had a total 
budgetary cost of USD 168 billion (1.2% of 2008 
GDP). Households seemed to have spent up to 
about half of the tax rebates received. It supported 
GDP growth temporarily in the middle of 2008. A 
second and much larger stimulus package (the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) was 
adopted in February 2009. Its total budgetary cost 
was estimated at USD 787 billion (5.5% of 2008 
GDP). Almost three quarters of this sum is 
foreseen to increase public spending: infrastructure 
projects, assistance to state and local governments, 
extension of unemployment insurance benefits and 
additional funding for other existing social 
programmes. The rest of the stimulus has financed 
cuts in personal income tax. Measures estimated to 
cost 2.1% of GDP were apportioned to 2009 and 
most of the remainder to 2010. This second 
stimulus package is expected to provide significant 
support to economic activity in the second and 
third quarters of 2009, but with a fading effect 
thereafter.  
137. US monetary policy was loosened 
aggressively. Continuing the cycle of interest rate 
cuts from the preceding year, the Federal Reserve 
gradually reduced the federal funds target rate 
from 4.25% at the beginning of 2008 to a range 
between 0 and 0.25% in December. This 
exceptionally low level was to be maintained for 
an 'extended period'. However, due to credit 
market disruptions, the effectiveness of interest-
rate policy was reduced. Consequently, since the 
autumn of 2008, the Federal Reserve has been 
taking unconventional measures to ease 
inappropriately tight financial conditions. In 
particular, it resorted to 'quantitative easing' (see 
Section 2.2 for a definition), which involved a 
large increase in its balance sheet through the 
introduction or expansion of lending facilities, the 
purchase of vast amounts of agency (Government-
Sponsored Enterprises) debt and mortgage-backed 
securities. In March 2009, the Federal Reserve 
started to purchase longer-term Treasury securities, 
thereby partially monetising the government 
deficit. Also in March 2009, the Federal Reserve 
launched the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Lending Facility (TALF) – a USD 1 trillion 
programme aimed at restarting the securitisation 
process by providing low-cost funding to investors 
who purchase asset-backed securities. 
138. The US authorities provided direct 
support to the financial sector. Most prominently, 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was 
launched in October 2008. TARP received a total 
budget of USD 700 billion. The initial amount 
proved insufficient in the face of the losses in the 
financial sector. In February/March 2009, it was 
modified to more effectively relieve the financial 
system of impaired assets and to unfreeze credit 
markets. A Public-Private Investment Program was 
introduced and could eventually expand to USD 1 
trillion in the process of removing impaired assets 
from the balance sheets of private banks. To assess 
the vulnerability of the banking system, US 
regulators carried out 'stress tests' to gauge the 
health of the 19 biggest US banks. This revealed 
that banks might require more reserves in the event 
of a further deterioration in the economic outlook. 
Ten out of the 19 banks were found to be in need 
of a combined USD 74.6 billion of extra funds to 
boost their reserves. 
139. Japan adopted the highest-ever fiscal 
stimulus in spite of limited room for manoeuvre. 
One of the lessons from the Japanese entrenched 
crisis in the 1990s was that policy reaction, in 
order to be effective, must be swift and decisive. In 
view of the severity of the situation, the Japanese 
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government announced a first policy package
responding to the crisis in August 2008. Because 
of the worsening economic situation, another
stimulus package, equivalent to 3% of GDP, was
adopted in April 2009. These packages represent
the biggest stimulus ever adopted in Japan. The
measures focus on direct cash payments to 
households, tax cuts, investment support and 
subsidies. The government also decided to inject
public funds into firms (including banks) that had
become undercapitalised and were unable to secure
financing because of the financial crisis. Other
measures were designed to provide credit
guarantees, in particular to SMEs and exporters. 
However, the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among
OECD countries (almost 170% in 2007) limits the 
room for manoeuvre. The authorities' medium-
term fiscal consolidation programme involves 
reaching primary surplus by financial year 2011 
and a progressive reduction in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio afterwards. However, due to the sharp 
deterioration of the economic situation, the 
primary deficit is now projected to exceed 2% of
GDP in Fiscal Year 2011, and debt is forecast to 
progressively approach 200% of GDP. 
140. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) cut interest
rates to virtually zero. As interest rates had already 
been very low before the crisis, the BoJ adopted a 
wide range of unconventional monetary measures
to support growth and counteract tightening 
financing conditions. The BoJ increased liquidity 
provision and broadened the range of eligible
collateral. To support corporate financing and
financial institutions, the BoJ has been buying 
commercial paper and corporate bonds, while 
providing long-term loans to banks at 0.1%
interest. 
141. The arsenal of policy instruments 
available to Chinese authorities is wider and 
deeper. China can rely on many assets: (i) foreign 
reserves reached USD 1.95 trillion at the end of
2008; (ii) its debt level is low (18% of GDP); (iii) 
its fiscal position is relatively sound; and (iv)
China's monetary policy still has room for 
manoeuvre. For these reasons China is in a better 
position to counter the negative consequences of
the turmoil in the international economy than most
other emerging economies. In the run-up to the 
G-20 summit in November 2008, the Chinese 
authorities announced a very large fiscal stimulus
package amounting to RMB 4 trillion (around 13% 
of GDP). As a result, growth in the second quarter 
of 2009 benefited from the stimulus package.
While investment in fixed assets is likely to remain
buoyant, a stronger performance of private 
consumption is unlikely due to uncertainties for
employment prospects. 
142. The bulk of the fiscal stimulus was 
allocated to infrastructure and construction 
projects. The net additional spending was much 
lower than the headline figure of RMB 4 trillion,
as the programme incorporated expenditure which 
had already been earmarked (e.g. reconstruction 
efforts following the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan 
province). Given that the central government is 
directly in charge of only RMB 1.2 trillion, the 
final impact of the package depends, to a large
extent, on lower levels of government, which
usually promote investment in fixed assets. A 
relatively small part of the stimulus was dedicated
to social security schemes, in particular to the 
health sector, where reforms could help spur 
domestic consumption. As a result, China's trade
and current account surpluses are likely to remain 
high in 2009 and in the following years. 
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143. After a long period of tightening,
monetary policy was loosened in the second half 
of 2008. Faced with a real estate bubble, stock
market exuberance, and inflationary pressures, 
monetary policy was further tightened in the first
half of 2008. The financial crisis put a temporary
end to these threats, and the strong decline in
global commodity prices drove consumer prices
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down. Therefore monetary policy was assigned to 
growth stimulation. The People's Bank of China 
(PBoC) reduced the benchmark lending rate from 
7.47% in summer 2008 to 5.31% in April 2009. 
The reserve requirement ratio (RRR) was lowered 
from 17.5% to 15% for most banks over the same 
period of time. Equally important for easing 
monetary conditions was the lifting of limits on 
credit growth and the end of moral suasion on 
banks not to lend, which had been employed 
earlier to avoid overheating. This policy delivered 
results in the first months of 2009. Increased bank 
lending amounted to RMB 7.5 trillion in the first 
seven months of 2009. 
144. In Russia, policymakers enacted an 
extensive set of policy measures on the fiscal 
side... The combined value of all the measures 
taken as a response to the crisis was estimated at 
14% of Russian GDP, spread throughout 2008-
2010. Measures in the fiscal package ranged from 
cuts in oil export duties, reduced corporate income 
tax to increased unemployment benefits. 
Responding to fears of banks' insolvency, bank 
deposit insurance was extended. The State started 
buying unsold real estate on the market to prevent 
a collapse in prices. Short-selling of stocks was 
prohibited, and caps were set for currency swaps 
and foreign assets of banks. The authorities re-
capitalised several banks and encouraged further 
consolidation of the banking system. 
145. … as well as on the monetary side. To 
provide liquidity and support of stock markets, the 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and the Ministry of 
Finance resorted to frequent direct short-term 
injections of liquidity. The CBR provided loans to 
banks without any collateral. Banks could also be 
compensated for losses incurred on the interbank 
lending market and benefited from a long-term 
credit facility of RUR 950 billion (USD 36 billion) 
in the form of subordinated loans with a ten-year 
maturity. Banks with lower credit ratings were able 
to borrow on a repurchase agreement basis from 
the CBR. Companies and banks could obtain re-
financing for maturing external debt. Moreover, 
exchange-rate policy has been used actively to 
encourage depreciation of the currency. 
3.2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO 
EXCHANGE RATE 
146. The financial crisis increased exchange 
rate volatility and triggered sudden trend 
reversals. In the wake of the financial crisis, 
foreign exchange markets were largely driven by 
portfolio shifts and changes in risk perception. In 
particular, in the second half of 2008, the 
increasing tensions in the global financial markets 
as well as the rapid global economic downturn led 
to diminished demand for risky assets. As a result, 
large and liquid currencies served as 'safe havens', 
while smaller currency areas saw waning demand 
and capital flight. The coordinated central bank 
actions, together with fiscal stimulus packages, 
eventually mitigated risk aversion and led to some 
exchange-rate stabilisation worldwide. 
147. Since January 2008, the euro has 
depreciated by around 4% against the US dollar 
amid significant volatility. In the first half of 2008, 
the euro strengthened against the dollar reaching a 
record high in nominal terms, slightly above USD 
1.60 in mid-July 2008. The appreciation was 
driven by hopes that the euro area could decouple 
from the downturn in the US. The significant 
widening of the euro area-US interest rate 
differential also played a role. The ensuing 
reassessment of the outlook for growth and interest 
rates as well as precautionary flows into dollar 
assets led to a depreciation of the euro to USD 
1.25 by the end of October 2008. The euro 
strengthened temporarily at the end of 2008 as the 
Federal Reserve embarked on a zero-interest-rate 
policy. However, rate cuts by the ECB and 
concerns over public finances in some euro-area 
Member States as well as worries about prospects 
for euro-area banks with Eastern European 
subsidiaries, pushed the euro lower again in early 
2009. The euro started gaining ground again in 
mid-March on the back of the Federal Reserve's 
decision to enhance its quantitative easing policy 
and to directly buy government securities. On 30 
June 2009 the euro stood at USD 1.41, some 4% 
below its January 2008 level (Graph 3.4). 
148. The euro weakened substantially against 
the yen. Owing to the large interest rate 
differential, the euro appreciated strongly against 
the yen in the first half of 2008, reaching JPY 170 
in July 2008, the highest level in the euro's history. 
In the subsequent months, the intensifying tensions 
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in financial markets led to a significant increase in 
risk aversion among investors. In addition, interest
rate differentials between Japan and the euro area
began to narrow. These factors led to portfolio
shifts by Japanese enterprises and households and 
to the unwinding of carry trades (25). As a result, 
the euro depreciated sharply against the yen to JPY 
116 in mid-January 2009. Since then, the euro has
been recovering as the downturn in the Japanese 
economy intensified and the trade surplus fell. At
the end of June 2009 the euro-yen exchange rate
stood at JPY 135, which corresponds to a fall of 
17.3% compared to the beginning of 2008.  
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149. The British pound has been hit hard by
the global deleveraging. The pound sterling has
been one of the currencies most negatively
affected since the onset of the financial market 
crisis. After a sharp depreciation of the pound in
December 2008, the euro reached a record high of 
0.98 against the pound at the end of 2008. It 
amounted to a 34% appreciation over one year,
half of which took place in December alone. The 
fall in the pound was the result of a change in 
market sentiment attributable to concerns about the 
UK's twin deficit (a large trade deficit coupled 
with a growing budget deficit and large contingent
liabilities) and sharp interest rate cuts by the Bank
of England at the end of 2008. There were also 
widespread fears that the recession in the UK 
would be deeper than in other advanced economies 
due to its dependence on financial services and to
the bursting of the house price bubble. In 2009,
(25) Carry trades consist of borrowing in currency at low
interest rates (e.g. Japanese yen) in order to invest in a
currency offering high interest rates (e.g. the euro). 
this perception of divergence faded somewhat as 
growth forecasts in the euro area were also revised 
downwards. As a result, the pound regained some
of the ground lost against the euro and stood at
0.85 at the end of June. 
150. Other European currencies have also 
recorded significant depreciation against the 
euro. These include the Swedish Crown and the
currencies of the new EU Member States with 
flexible exchange rate regimes (the Czech koruna, 
the Polish zloty, the Romanian leu and the 
Hungarian forint), as well as non-EU currencies 
such as the Russian rouble. Increased risk aversion 
and the 'flight to quality' constituted the common
factor behind these exchange rate moves. In times 
of elevated uncertainty investors seek the safety 
and liquidity of large international currencies. In 
some cases, however, a correction of the strong
past appreciation experienced before the financial
turmoil was part of the explanation.
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151. Overall, the euro appreciated in effective 
terms. Weighting the bilateral exchange-rate 
movements by trade flows with its 41 most 
important partners, the euro stood about 3% higher
in June 2009 than at the beginning of 2008. In real
effective terms, i.e. taking into account the
differences in consumer price inflation between the 
euro area and its trading partners, the euro 
appreciated by 2.6% over the same time span. 
However, volatility within this period was high. 
Two rounds of considerable appreciation (in early
2008 and since November 2008) contrast with a 
significant depreciation in the period from April to
November 2008. 
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3.3. GLOBAL IMBALANCES – AN UPDATE 
152. Global imbalances – a cause for global 
concern. The term 'global imbalances' refers here 
to the pattern of current account deficits and 
surpluses that have been building up in the world 
economy since the late 1990s (26). The United 
States and some other countries developed large 
current account deficits, while other systematically 
important economies developed large surpluses 
(notably China, Japan, and oil exporting 
countries). There are two reasons to be worried 
about these asymmetries in external positions. 
First, correcting the imbalances to sustainable 
levels may require large exchange rate adjustments 
with possible disruptive effects on global financial 
markets and economic activity. Second, as the 
experience of the financial crisis shows, large 
global imbalances can contribute to the creation of 
excess global liquidity, the reinvestment of which 
can exacerbate asset price booms and sow the 
seeds of future global instability. 
153. The crisis has so far led to some 
correction of the imbalances. It is mainly due to 
the marked declines in domestic demand in the key 
deficit countries – the US and the UK, which 
together account for 60% of the total world current 
account deficit – and the fall in oil prices since 
August 2008. Table 3.2 shows that in 2008 current 
account imbalances narrowed in the US, the UK, 
Japan and China. The surpluses widened in 2008 
in most of the oil-exporting countries on the back 
of the steep increase in oil prices in the first half of 
the year. Nevertheless, the annual data mask a 
marked reduction in the surpluses in the second 
half of the year. In China, the surplus increased in 
dollar terms despite falling as a percentage of 
GDP. 
154. The US has led the reduction in current 
account deficits. Reflecting the sharp deceleration 
in domestic demand and the effect of the dollar 
depreciation between 2002 and mid-2008, the US 
current account deficit narrowed from the peak of 
(26) The current account of the balance of payments keeps a 
record of all current transactions (such as exports and 
imports, tourist expenditure, dividend and interest income) 
between a country and the rest of the world. The difference 
between exports and imports of goods and services (i.e. 
trade balance) usually constitutes the largest part of the 
current account. An economy posting current account 
deficits (surpluses) can be characterised as having a level 
of consumption higher (lower) than its production. 
6.0% of GDP in 2006 to 4.7% of GDP in 2008. 
The correction was briefly interrupted in the first 
half of 2008 due to the sharp increase in oil prices, 
but resumed in the second half of 2008 due to the 
weakness of US domestic demand and the marked 
fall in oil prices. The US income balance (27) 
improved and the surplus increased from 0.4% of 
GDP in 2006 to 0.9% of GDP in 2008. The decline 
in interest rates, which has been more pronounced 
in the US, resulted in a sharper decrease in income 
payments on foreign-owned assets in the US than 
in income receipts on US-owned assets abroad. As 
this phenomenon is temporary, this source of 
improvement in the US income balance is unlikely 
to last. 
155. The UK also reduced its current account 
deficit. The current account deficit narrowed from 
2.9% of GDP in 2007 to 1.7% of GDP in 2008. 
This follows a period of gradual increase in the 
deficit between 1997 and 2006, which resulted in a 
peak of 3.4% of GDP in 2006. The main factor 
explaining the recent improvement in the UK's 
current account deficit is the sharp increase in the 
UK's surplus on the income account, which 
primarily records investment income flows, 
including losses from asset write-downs. In 2008, 
the income surplus reached its highest value (2.3% 
of GDP) since records began in 1955. Much of this 
improvement is linked to the impact of the 
financial crisis on write-downs on UK assets held 
abroad and foreign assets held domestically. It 
seems that the losses of foreign investors holding 
UK assets have been higher than the losses of UK 
investors holding foreign assets. In the second half 
of 2008, the trade deficit showed an improving 
trend, reflecting the relatively deep and early 
downturn in the UK and the strong depreciation of 
the pound (see Section 3.2). Recently, however, 
the trend in the UK’s trade balance has been 
broadly flat. 
156. Surpluses narrowed in Japan and China 
as a percentage of GDP. Japan's current account 
surplus fell from 4.8% of GDP in 2007 to 3.2% of 
GDP in 2008, mainly driven by the decline in the 
trade surplus. Japan's trade balance turned into a 
slight deficit (0.1%) in 2008Q4 for the first time 
since records began in 1985. The marked decline 
(27) The income balance is a subcomponent of the current 
account balance. It traces net income deriving from direct 
investments, portfolio investments and other investments. 
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in global demand for Japanese exports and the
lagged effects of the appreciation of the yen that 
had occurred between 2007 and 2008 seemed to be
the main factors explaining the deterioration in
Japan's trade balance. In addition, the income
account – which had previously been stable – 
recorded a significant fall in its surplus on the back 
of falling overseas investment receipts (they 
declined from 3.1% of GDP in Q3 to 2.1% of GDP 
in Q4). In China, the current account surplus 
increased from USD 372 billion in 2007 to USD 
426 billion in 2008 but fell as a percentage of GDP 
from 11% to 10.5%. Exports declined sharply in
the second half of 2008 as a result of the 
contraction in global demand. Imports, however,
fell even more sharply in value terms due to lower 
oil and other commodity prices. As a result, the 
trade surplus increased. 
Table 3.2: Current account balances of major 
economies (as % of GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008
USA -5.9 -6.0 -5.3 -4.7
Japan 3.6 3.9 4.8 3.2
Euro area 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.7
UK -2.6 -3.4 -2.9 -1.7
China 7.2 9.5 11.0 10.5
GCC 
countries 27.4 28.7 25.1 27.2
Russia 11.0 9.5 5.9 6.1
Note: GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council.
Source: IMF Spring 2009 World Economic Outlook and 
China's State Administration of foreign exchange.
157. Surpluses of most oil-exporting 
countries widened in 2008. The increase in 
surpluses was mainly due to the steep rise in oil 
prices in the first half of the year. Current account
data for Russia and trade data for the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries (GCC) showed that
the increase in surpluses in the first half of the year 
was partially reversed in the second half due to the
sharp fall in oil and other commodity prices.
158. Despite some rebalancing, global
imbalances have remained large and should stay 
on the policy agenda. There is the risk that some
of the recent improvements may unwind when the 
global recovery takes hold and international
commodity prices increase again. In the medium
term, the continuing reduction of global
imbalances and a move towards a more balanced 
global growth path will be essential to limit the
risks of another crisis in the future. IMF 
multilateral consultations in 2007 concluded that
major economies should take bold policy measures
over the medium term. In the US, measures should
aim at increasing domestic savings (both public
and private). In China, the share of private
consumption in China’s GDP should increase
(facilitated by an orderly appreciation of the
renminbi), while higher potential growth should be
sought in the euro area and Japan. 
3.4. REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
159. The global financial crisis exposed
shortcomings in the international financial 
architecture. Fragmented supervision of global
financial market players and lack of macro-
prudential oversight prevented early detection of 
the mounting financial problems and delayed
remedies (see Section 2.3). Favourable
macroeconomic conditions provided a fertile 
breeding ground for asset price bubbles and 
current account imbalances. In particular, overly
accomodative monetary policy in some developed 
economies and insufficiently flexible exchange 
rate policies in some key emerging market
economies contributed to the build-up of global 
macroeconomic imbalances and asset price 
inflation. 
160. The global nature of the crisis
underlined the need for truly global action. After
the intensification of the financial crisis in
September 2008, there was a growing consensus
among world leaders on the urgent need for joint
action on a global scale. Against this background, 
the leaders of the Group of Twenty (28) (G-20) met 
for the first time in Washington on 15 November 
2008. European heads of state and government 
played a key role in launching the G-20 summit.
The EU Presidency, the President of the European
Commission and the ECB represented the EU in
the G-20 process. The Washington summit set out 
broad principles for reform, as well as some
specific short- and medium-term actions in 
response to the crisis. 
(28) The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors was established in 1999 and brings together the 
19 biggest world economies plus the European Union,
represented by the EU Presidency and the ECB. The 
countries are represented by the respective Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank governors. The Washington 
meeting was the first one on the level of state leaders. 
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161. As the economic situation was 
worsening, G-20 leaders further coordinated 
their responses. As the economic situation 
deteriorated further, the leaders of the G-20 met 
for the second time on 2 April 2009 in London. 
They hammered out further details of the 
collective action necessary to stabilise the world 
economy, to reform global financial regulation and 
supervision, and to strengthen the international 
financial institutions. World leaders showed their 
determination to work together to overcome the 
crisis and restore confidence. The EU contributed 
actively and substantively to the G-20 process, 
insisting on the importance of financial regulatory 
and supervisory reform, facilitating the 
coordination of positions among EU Member 
States and contributing financial resources to 
Summit agreements. Measures taken were aimed 
at: (i) restoring growth; (ii) improving financial 
regulation and supervision; and (iii) strengthening 
international financial institutions. 
Restoring economic growth 
162. Faced with an unprecedented downturn, 
the G-20 agreed on an unparalleled joint policy 
action. Overall, the leaders pledged an additional 
USD 1.1 trillion of resources aimed at fighting 
various facets of the crisis. These funds will 
finance a comprehensive programme by 
international institutions with the aim of 
supporting credit, growth and jobs in the world 
economy (29). 
163. Decisive measures at national level 
contribute to mitigating the severity of the global 
downturn. Leaders agreed to deliver the sustained 
fiscal effort necessary to restore world economic 
growth, within the constraints of ensuring 
medium-term fiscal sustainability. Central banks, 
fighting the crisis in the front line since its 
beginnings, pledged to maintain expansionary 
monetary policy and to use the full range of 
available instruments, while maintaining price 
stability. However, these actions could not be fully 
effective until domestic lending and international 
capital flows were restored. Therefore, repairing 
the credit channel and dealing with financial 
institutions' impaired assets were given high 
priority. Once the crisis was over and policy 
(29) See the Communiqué from the London Summit on 
www.g20.org 
measures had served their purpose, the stimulus 
provided would have to be gradually withdrawn by 
both fiscal and monetary authorities. 
164. Open markets, trade and free 
competition are part of the solution. Leaders 
reaffirmed their commitment to open markets, free 
trade and investment and called for an urgent 
conclusion of the WTO's Doha Round. Rapidly 
falling world trade raised concerns in many 
countries as trade had long been a source of 
growth, in particular in developing countries. As a 
lack of trade finance was one of the causes of the 
steep fall in trade activity, the G-20 agreed to make 
available USD 250 billion for trade finance over 
the next two years. 
Financial regulation and supervision 
165. The London Summit agreed on an 
ambitious plan to reshape global financial 
regulation. In the future, all markets, instruments 
and institutions are expected to be subject to 
appropriate regulation and oversight. The EU has 
long called for such a step. This implies the 
elimination of existing supervisory 'blind spots'. 
Global colleges of supervisors for all large cross-
border banks will be established. In addition, the 
Financial Stability Forum, renamed 'Financial 
Stability Board' (FSB), has been enlarged to 
include all G-20 members, plus Spain and the 
European Commission. Its mandate has been 
broadened to promote financial stability. Jointly 
with the IMF, the FSB will devise an early 
warning system designed to identify global 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities. 
166. The problem of tax havens and offshore 
financial centres has been addressed. Action 
against non-cooperative jurisdictions in regard to 
anti-money laundering, tax information exchange 
and prudential matters was agreed. The political 
pressure exerted on non-cooperative jurisdictions 
since the outbreak of the crisis had already induced 
several of them to subscribe to international 
standards on the exchange of tax information 
before the London summit. The G-20 announced 
that it would monitor the situation and stand ready 
to deploy sanctions, if needed. Along with the 
FSB's new principles on executive pay and 
bonuses in financial institutions, which G-20 
leaders endorsed, these measures represent 
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progress towards global regulatory convergence 
and stronger supervision. 
International financial institutions 
167.  The resources of the IMF will see a 
threefold increase. G-20 leaders agreed to triple 
IMF lendable resources to USD 750 billion, 
initially through bilateral loans from member 
countries and later through expanded and more 
flexible New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). 
This expansion of resources will ensure that the 
IMF has the funds at its disposal to help countries 
with financing problems. EU Member States have 
done their fair share in offering financial support. 
They pledged to provide EUR 75 billion to the 
IMF (approximately USD 100 billion) via bilateral 
agreements. Leaders also supported a new 
allocation of Special Drawing Rights of USD 250 
billion, which would provide low-income countries 
with an extra USD 19 billion. In addition, the 
IMF's ability to help emerging markets and low-
income countries will be supported by using part 
of agreed sales of IMF gold for concessional 
lending and the possibility to borrow funds directly 
on the market, if necessary. In parallel, the IMF 
has created a new lending instrument that will help 
to prevent the withdrawal of external capital rather 
than to remedy its consequences. With its new 
Flexible Credit Line, the IMF makes available 
financial resources to its member countries with a 
good policy track record ('ex ante conditionality'). 
The resources can be used unconditionally when 
needed. 
168.  Multilateral Development Banks will 
increase lending and other forms of finance. The 
G-20 stressed the need to ensure that the 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) were 
adequately financed to contribute to the resolution 
of the crisis. MDB lending is set to increase by 
50% to USD 300 billion over the next three years. 
For this purpose, MDBs have been encouraged to 
extend their balance sheets and to use other 
financial tools to leverage private capital more 
effectively. Moreover, the capital of the Asian 
Development Bank will be increased threefold and 
the corresponding needs of other MDBs will be 
reviewed. 
169. Further coordination is warranted. The 
decisions taken by G-20 leaders have to be 
implemented. To ensure continued coordination 
and monitor progress, the leaders agreed to meet 
again on 24-25 September 2009 in Pittsburgh. The 
EU will drive the reform process forward both 
domestically, by implementing the G-20 
agreements on all fronts, and internationally, by 
playing an active leadership role in the G-20. 
3.5. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GLOBAL 
ROLE OF THE EURO 
170. The euro’s role as the second most 
important international currency remains firmly 
established. Since its introduction in 1999 the euro 
has quickly become an important international 
currency, surpassing the combined international 
status of its legacy currencies. The share of the 
euro in foreign exchange reserves stood at 25.9% 
at the end of the first quarter of 2009, 4.6 
percentage points higher than at the end of the first 
quarter of 1999, albeit below the peak of 28.4% 
that it reached in 2003 (30). In the first quarter of 
2009, the dollar remained well ahead, with 65% of 
total reserves. As for international debt securities, 
evolutions differ depending on the measurement 
chosen (31). The broad measure, based on BIS 
data, consists of all bonds targeted at the 
international market, i.e. those placed by a 
syndicate of financial institutions in which at least 
one institution does not share the borrower's 
residency. According to this measure at constant 
exchange rates, the euro's share was 46.7% at the 
end of the first quarter of 2009 (-0.6 percentage 
point on a year), compared with 37.5% for the US 
dollar. By contrast, the narrow measure strips out 
from the broad measure all those debt securities 
that are issued in the currency of the issuer, thus 
counting only debt securities issued in a currency 
that is different from the issuer's home currency. 
Under this definition, the euro remains second 
(30) Data on the currency composition of foreign exchange 
reserves at the global level come from the IMF. The IMF 
database covers around two thirds of total official reserves 
but does not include assets managed by sovereign wealth 
funds. 
(31) Conceptually, an international debt security can be 
understood as a bond denominated in a currency that is 
either not the issuer's or not the buyer's home currency, or 
both. In practice, the identity (and hence residency) of the 
buyer is often unknown, which explains why several 
practical definitions might be used to approximate the 
concept. The broad measure might overstate the euro's 
share in the international bond market. The narrow measure 
might understate it. 
72 
3. The External Dimension 
Table 3.3: Countries and territories with exchange rate regimes linked to the euro (as of 30 June 2009) 
Candidate and potential candidate countries
European Union (non-euro area)
Others
Euroisation authorised by a monetary arrangement
Peg arrangements and managed floats based on the SDR and 
other currency baskets involving the euro
Unilateral euroisation
Euro-based currency board
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Botswana, Fiji,
Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Russian Federation,
Samoa, Seychelles, Syria, Tonga, Tunisia,
Vanuatu
Managed floating with euro as reference currency (de facto
pegs)
Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Managed floating with euro as reference currency Serbia
Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City, French
territorial communities (2)
Euroisation without monetary arrangement Andorra
Peg arrangements based on the euro CFA franc zone (3), French overseas territories(4), Cape Verde, Comoros
Kosovo (1), Montenegro
Euro-based currency boards Bosnia and Herzegovina
Inflation targeting, but officially with a managed floating 
system with the euro as reference currency Czech Republic, Romania
Bulgaria
R on Exch e rate re es Countries/territories
ERM II Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Notes: (1) The euro replaced the Deutsche Mark, which was introduced by UNMIK in 1999. (2) Mayotte, Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon. (3) WAEMU (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and CAEMC
(Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon). (4) French Polynesia, New
Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna.
Source: ECB, Commission services.
3.3). It is
used in this way mainly by countries in
aph
However, most variables posted only a modest rise 
after the US dollar, with 32.2% and 44.7% 
respectively at the end of 2008. 
The share of the euro according to this narrow 
definition rose by about one percentage point
between end-2007 and end-2008 at constant 
exchange rates (32). In global foreign exchange
markets, the euro-dollar currency pair is the most
actively traded one, accounting for more than a
quarter of global turnover, but third currencies are
traded substantially more against the dollar than
against the euro (approximately 90% of foreign 
exchange transactions involve the US dollar; 
around 41% involve the euro). The euro is widely
used as a reference currency for managed 
exchange-rate regimes, sometimes as part of a 
larger basket of currencies (see Table 
geogr ical proximity or with some historical or 
institutional ties to euro-area countries. 
171. The financial crisis has so far had only 
limited impact on the relative positions of 
currencies in the world economy. Over the course 
of 2008 the euro's share increased in many 
dimensions – including official reserves, debt
securities, cross-border loans and deposits, foreign 
exchange trading and cross-border invoicing of
those countries for which data are available. 
es have declined 
in the wake of the crisis, the currency composition 
ma
dollar to maintain its
position as the most important international 
(32) See the ECB's Annual Review of the International Role of 
the Euro (July 2009), available on the ECB website.
over 2008. While in many market segments overall
market size and transaction volum
has re ined broadly unchanged. 
172. This relative stability challenged certain 
views on prospects for international currencies. 
Before the current financial crisis and in its early 
stages, there was widespread debate on whether 
the large global imbalances in current account
positions would trigger a decline in the 
international use of the US dollar. However, the 
trend appreciation of the US dollar at the height of
the financial crisis was reminiscent of the flight-to-
quality phenomenon, as capital was repatriated
from markets perceived as risky (in particular
emerging markets). This safe-haven status may 
also have helped the US 
currency through the crisis. 
173. The euro meets many of the criteria of 
an international currency. The credible stability-
oriented framework of EMU has helped to build
confidence that the euro is a reliable store of value
for households, businesses and investors. The euro
area also comprises countries with stable political
systems. In economic terms, the euro area is large 
enough for its currency to be attractive for the rest 
of the world. Measured at current exchange rates, 
the euro area accounts for about 22% of world 
GDP and more than 18% of world trade. The
future entry of other EU Member States into the 
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urities is markedly better 
than that of the Pound Sterling (50%) or the
Graph 3.7: xchange Reserves of which currency 
euro area will increase its weight in the global 
economy further. At the same time, financial
market integration as part of the EU's single
market has achieved a lot in terms of making euro-
area capital markets larger, more liquid and more
efficient. However, the euro still lags the US dollar 
in this respect; according to the 2008 RBS Reserve
Management Trends Survey, whereas all Central
Bank reserve managers rank US government bonds
as 'highly liquid', only 74% have a similar opinion 
of euro-denominated ones. Still, the assessment of
euro-denominated sec
The process stretched over decades and included a 
period of coexistence of the pound sterling and the 
US dollar as international currencies.  
175. It is too early to assess with certainty
how the global financial crisis will impact on the 
international monetary system and the role of the 
euro within it. The significance of small short-
term shifts in currency shares should not be
overstated, in particular as the available data only 
cover a limited period since the intensification of
the crisis in the autumn of 2008. However, the 
crisis has prompted some initiatives and proposals 
for reforms of the international monetary system.  Japanese Yen (48%). 
Foreign E
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174. Even with the euro being an attractive 
currency in many respects, the development of its 
international role will be a long-term process.
Inertia generally supports the incumbent currency. 
More specifically, network externalities, including 
simple convenience, favour the permanent use of
just one currency for certain purposes, such as 
commodity price quotations. Furthermore,
historical precedents underline the gradual nature 
of currency internationalisation (33). For instance, 
the erosion of the pound sterling as leading 
international currency throughout the 20th century 
was caused by a series of momentous events, 
including the two World Wars, but took place at
Graph 3.8: Total international bonds outstanding, broad 
measure (at constant end-2008 exchange 
rates) 
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Note: The broad measure consists of all bonds targeted at 
the international market, i.e. those placed by a syndicate of 
financial institutions in which at least one institution does not
share the borrower's residency 
Source: BIS.
On 23 March 2009, the governor of China's 
Central Bank called for a greater role for the IMF's 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) in global reserve
holdings (34). Since then, the IMF has started to 
prepare an allocation of USD 250 billion (as 
supported by the G-20 summit in London, see 
Section 3.4) and the issuance of SDR-denominated 
notes, which Brazil, Russia and China have 
announced they would purchase. 
 a 
much lower speed than the effective weight of the 
UK in the world economy would have implied.  
(34) The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the 
IMF in 1969 to supplement the existing official reserves of
IMF member countries. SDRs are allocated to IMF 
member countries in proportion to their IMF quotas. The 
SDR also serves as the unit of account of the IMF and 
some other international organisations. Its value is based on
a basket of key international currencies (euro, Japanese
Yen, pound sterling and US dollar). The SDR is neither a 
currency, nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is a potential 
claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. 
(33) See B. Eichengreen: 'Sterling's past, Dollar's future: 
Historical Perspectives on Reserve Currency Competition',
NBER Working Paper No. 11336, May 2005.
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176. Recent economic events have put the 
conclusions of the EMU@10 Report to the test. 
To mark the tenth anniversary of the euro, the 
European Commission presented in May 2008 a 
Communication and an accompanying Report to 
review the experience of the first decade and to 
look to the future (35). Since the report had been 
released, the global economic situation has 
deteriorated dramatically. The global crisis is 
putting the Economic and Monetary Union to the 
test and underscores the need to improve its 
governance along the lines indicated in the 
EMU@10 Report. This chapter recalls its main 
conclusions and recommendations and highlights 
follow-up work in the light of the current 
economic and financial turmoil. Section 4.1 
stresses how recent events have enhanced the 
relevance of the Commission's EMU@10 Report. 
Section 4.2 reviews the work carried out in 2008 
regarding the broadening and deepening of 
macroeconomic surveillance. Section 4.3 looks at 
the recent substantial developments in financial 
governance. Finally, Section 4.4 highlights the 
continuing enlargement of the euro area since 
2007. 
4.1. THE EMU@10 REPORT IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
CRISIS 
177. To address the challenges facing the 
euro area, the Commission proposed a three-
pillar agenda in the EMU@10 Report. First, the 
domestic agenda sought to deepen fiscal policy co-
ordination and surveillance, to broaden 
macroeconomic surveillance in EMU beyond 
fiscal policy and to better integrate structural 
reform in overall policy co-ordination within 
EMU. Second, the external agenda aimed to 
enhance the euro area's role in global economic 
governance. Third, both agendas required a more 
effective system of economic governance. 
178.  The recommendations set out in the 
EMU@10 Report more than a year ago are more 
relevant than ever. The manifold successes of the 
euro in the first decade were a blessing in disguise. 
The euro delivered macroeconomic stability 
through a consistent single monetary policy and 
(35) COM (2008) 238 final, 7 mai 2008, 'EMU@10: successes 
and challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary 
Union'. 
improved fiscal behaviour in Member States. It 
fostered a decade of low inflation and interest 
rates, bringing substantial savings for consumers 
and business. It underpinned the Single Market, 
serving as a major catalyst for trade and 
investment and deepened financial integration. 
Economically and politically, the single currency 
has become the symbol of the European 
integration process. At the same time, the 
achievements have blunted the willingness of 
policy-makers to address the remaining challenges 
facing the euro area. Now, though, the crisis has 
brought those challenges fully into focus. 
179. Deepening macroeconomic surveillance 
will prove essential to foster an orderly return to 
more sustainable fiscal positions. The EMU@10 
Report stressed the importance of securing the 
sustainability of public finances for the benefit of 
future generations. In response to the crisis, most 
euro-area Member States have engaged resolutely 
in fiscal stimuli to stabilise the economy. Bank 
rescue packages have inflated substantially public 
debt outstanding and increased contingent 
liabilities. Against this background, sustainability 
considerations have become more relevant than 
ever. Coordinated surveillance benefits 
considerably from the sound functioning of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, which provides a frame, 
an anchor and directions for deeper surveillance. 
180. Broadening macroeconomic surveillance 
should address imbalances at an early stage. The 
surveillance of fiscal policies has delivered 
immense benefits to the euro-area economy. 
However, economic imbalances can originate from 
other quarters. Over-indebtedness in the private 
sector could trigger unsustainable economic trends 
that should be detected and dealt with at an early 
stage. Macroeconomic surveillance should be 
broadened in this perspective. The EMU@10 
Report stressed that 'while market integration, 
particularly in financial services, is beneficial 
overall for EMU, it can also, if not accompanied 
by appropriate policies, amplify divergences 
among the participating countries'. The crisis 
demonstrated eloquently how fast the successive 
financial shocks hit the rest of the economy and 
how strong the feedback loops were. It also 
revealed that the resolution of financial crises 
might prove very costly in fiscal terms. Early 
detection of asset price booms and busts is 
European Commission 
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essential to avert costly corrections of fiscal and 
external imbalances at a later stage. Therefore 
surveillance should incorporate in earnest financial 
market developments and their interplay with the 
real economy. From a more operational 
perspective, the crisis showed that a gap existed 
between financial market watch on the one hand, 
and macroeconomic watch based on traditional 
national accounts data on the other hand. This gap 
should be bridged without delay by an all-
encompassing macro-financial analysis (see 
Section 4.3). 
181. Global crisis resolution accentuated the 
external policy agenda laid down in the 
EMU@10 Report. Global macroeconomic 
imbalances lay at the root of the crisis. Although 
the euro area enjoyed balanced economic 
fundamentals, it was struck with considerable 
force by the global crisis fallout. The euro area 
cannot afford to be a bystander. It has to express 
itself more forcefully on the international scene to 
help solve global issues. The G-20 process, which 
the EU has successfully promoted, offers an 
opportunity to consolidate the representation of the 
euro area. In this respect, the EMU@10 Report 
stressed that 'the euro area must build an 
international strategy commensurate with the 
international status of its currency'. This issue was 
to some extent considered to be of a medium-term 
nature. The crisis acted as a wake-up call and 
urgent steps are needed in the short run instead. To 
be more influential in the ongoing overhaul of 
global governance, the euro area should rapidly 
consolidate its external representation and speak 
with one voice in international fora. 
182. EMU's system of economic governance 
has been tested in times of crisis. The EMU@10 
Report stressed that the Eurogroup and the 
Commission should play a more active role in 
coordinating euro-area economic policies within 
the scope defined by the Treaty. The design and 
implementation of consistent response to the crisis 
has been challenging (see Section 4.3). More than 
ever, euro-area Member States should take the lead 
in driving policy action to combat the current crisis 
and contribute to the overall recovery of the EU 
economy. 
183. As a follow-up to the EMU@10 Report, 
the Commission succeeded in triggering a deeper 
dialogue concerning EMU among the EU 
institutions and with the public at large. The 
dialogue increased awareness of the significant 
benefits of the euro, such as its role as a protective 
shield during the current financial turmoil. The 
discussions highlighted the need for closer 
economic policy coordination as well as broader 
and deeper surveillance and governance. 
184. The European Parliament's resolution 
on the first ten years of the euro constitutes an 
important contribution to the discussion of this 
subject. Adopted in November 2008, the bipartisan 
Report from MEPs Pervenche Bères and Werner 
Langen affirms the consensus achieved on 
fundamental questions pertaining to the EMU (36).  
It highlights the success of the euro and supports 
the Commission's intention to strengthen the 
influence of the euro area in international financial 
institutions. Furthermore, the resolution sketches 
out an ambitious agenda for strengthening 
economic governance in the euro area. In 
particular, the Parliament supports the 
strengthening of the preventive arm of the SGP 
and a closer involvement of national Parliaments 
in the revision of the Lisbon Integrated Guidelines. 
It has put forward proposals for revising the 
existing banking and financial supervisory 
architecture and called on the Commission to 
examine the creation of European bonds and 
develop a long-term strategy on this issue. 
185. The European Central Bank highlighted 
the achievements and responsibilities of the euro 
area. The ECB published a special edition of its 
monthly bulletin in May 2008 that looked back at 
the ECB’s work over the past ten years. It also 
reviewed the challenges that the ECB and the euro 
area faced as they entered their second decade. In a 
speech at the January ceremony of the European 
Parliament marking the tenth anniversary of the 
euro, the ECB President mentioned some of these 
challenges (37). First, the euro area should 
overcome successfully the financial crisis by 
playing an active part in the global efforts to 
address the weaknesses in the global financial 
system and to redesign the regulatory and 
institutional framework. Second, the euro area 
(36) Report from the European Parliament A6-0420/2008 of 
28.10.2008. 
(37) 'The euro@10: achievements and responsibilities' Remarks 
by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, at the 
ceremony of the European Parliament to mark the 10th
anniversary of the euro, Strasbourg, 13 January 2009. 
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should implement the Stability and Growth Pact in 
a firm and credible way and make efforts to render 
the economies of the Union more productive, 
innovative and dynamic, and avoid major 
competitive divergences within the euro area. 
Third, the handling of enlargement would be an 
inspiring and demanding challenge for all 
Institutions. 
186. At its meeting of 24 March 2009, the 
European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC) adopted an opinion on the EMU@10 
Report, which highlighted the successes of the 
euro in terms of price stability. The opinion (38) 
stressed the need for better representation of EU 
institutions on the international scene. The EESC 
also noted the remaining challenges regarding the 
integration of goods and services markets and 
financial supervision, for which clear rules should 
be put in place. In particular, and in relation to the 
current crisis, the EESC called on all economic 
and monetary authorities to learn from the US 
subprime crisis and to thoroughly overhaul the 
policies underpinning the operation of the financial 
markets. 
4.2. THE BROADENING AND DEEPENING OF 
MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE 
Overall, the dialogue with major stakeholders 
underlines the need for European policymakers to 
step up surveillance of the economies of euro-area 
Member States. This ought to include taking a 
closer look at competitiveness developments and 
paying more attention to the quality of public 
finances. 
Broadening surveillance to cover competitiveness 
developments 
187. Competitiveness developments warrant 
broader surveillance. Since the launch of the euro, 
differences in growth and inflation have tended to 
be significant and persistent, leading to large 
changes in Member States' relative competitive 
positions, notably in terms of price 
competitiveness but also in terms of current 
account imbalances and net foreign asset positions. 
As a result, some Member States have recorded 
diverging current account positions since 1999. 
(38) Opinion CESE 633/2009 of 24 March 2009. 
188. Intra euro-area divergences matter for 
the functioning of EMU. It is a matter of common 
concern as intra euro-area adjustments to external 
imbalances work slowly and may have negative 
spill-over effects across Member States. Effective 
functioning of EMU calls for an early detection of 
these external imbalances in order to prompt an 
adequate and timely policy response. While some 
of the divergence is a sign of increased financial 
market integration, with the euro acting as catalyst, 
and normal convergence processes, less 'benign' 
factors have played a more important driving role. 
For instance, housing bubbles and credit-financed 
consumption have fuelled the divergence in some 
Member States (see Section 1.5 for details) (39). 
189. Euro-area Member States have agreed to 
set up a framework for early detection of external 
imbalances. The Eurogroup agreed to conduct a 
surveillance exercise -in the spirit of the Mid-Term 
Budgetary Review regularly carried out for public 
finances- on macroeconomic imbalances and 
competitiveness divergences. It would be held 
within the Eurogroup at the end of the year 2009. 
Moreover, as agreed by the Ecofin Council in 
October 2008, the analysis of competitiveness 
developments should also be extended to non euro-
area Member States. The findings would feed into 
both the Lisbon process and the assessment of 
Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
Paying more attention to the Quality of Public 
Finances (QPF) 
190. While QPF featured explicitly in the 
revised Stability and Growth Pact and the re-
launched Lisbon strategy from 2005, its practical 
implementation under the EU's surveillance 
framework evolved recently. First, in response to 
uneven reporting by Member States on QPF issues 
in the past, the Ecofin Council conclusions of May 
2009 underlined the need for consistent data. This 
includes providing information on measures to 
improve expenditure control, tax reforms and 
value-for-money initiatives as well as detailed 
information on changes in Member States' fiscal 
governance, such as national fiscal rules, 
independent fiscal institutions and medium-term 
budgetary frameworks. Second, in the 
(39) For more details see Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 
Vol. 8 N°1 (2009), 'Special report: competitiveness 
developments within the euro area'. 
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Commission's assessment of the 2009 Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, QPF issues were more 
systematically addressed. In particular, the Council 
Opinions included a section focusing on key 
aspects of QPF and issued policy invitations to 
Member States. While the focus was largely on 
fiscal governance, other aspects such as the 
efficiency of public spending and revenue systems 
were to some extent covered. Third, progress was 
achieved in getting Member States to provide 
datasets on government expenditure by 
classification of functions of government (COFOG 
II). Such data are important for analysing trends in 
the composition of public expenditure and possibly 
identifying efficiency gaps. In its May 2009 
conclusions, the Ecofin Council recommended that 
some selected COFOG II data should become 
mandatory to ensure further progress. 
4.3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS GOVERNANCE 
191. The crisis tested the capability of 
European economic and financial governance to 
deliver swiftly. Financial contagion between 
markets and institutions, the threat of bank runs 
and the interplay between financial and economic 
variables called for a swift and coordinated 
response at the European level. 
192. Initial crisis responses of national 
governments lacked clear EU and euro-area 
perspective. In the early stages of the financial 
crisis, in the absence of a coherent pan-European 
crisis management framework, assistance to 
distressed financial institutions was conducted on 
an ad hoc basis in each country, sometimes leading 
to a reversal of past pan-European consolidation in 
the banking sector. These hesitant and rather 
disjointed early actions contrasted with the 
efficient and consistent handling of the situation on 
interbank markets by the ECB. On 4 October 2008, 
the EU G8 Members (France, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom) met, together with the President 
of the Commission, the President of the Eurogroup 
and the President of the ECB. At its regular 
meeting in Luxembourg on 7 October, the Ecofin 
Council agreed on 'conclusions on a coordinated 
EU response to the economic slowdown'. 
However, operational details on how to tackle the 
banking crisis remained evasive.  
193. Euro-area governments eventually put 
up a united front. On 12 October 2008, the French 
Presidency organised the first Summit of the 
Eurogroup at the Heads of State and Government 
level. The British Prime Minister attended the 
meeting. They issued a common framework for the 
implementation of national banking rescue plans, 
which was affirmed by the European Council for 
the EU as a whole on 15-16 October. The 
European Council also announced the 
establishment of a 'crisis cell', aimed at improving 
crisis management among EU Member States 
through measures including informal warnings, 
information exchange and an evaluation 
mechanism. 
194. The Commission reacted speedily to the 
evolving situation. On 29 October 2008, the 
Commission issued a communication paving the 
way for a coordinated European recovery action 
plan. The Commission initiative called for a new 
EU architecture for financial markets, efforts to 
create jobs and drive growth, and a global response 
to the financial market crisis (40). As the economic 
situation was deteriorating, the Commission issued 
its European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) on 
26 November. It aimed at cushioning the impact of 
the financial crisis on the real economy (see 
Section 2.3). In January 2009, Commission 
services brought forward by a month their interim 
forecast to assess the magnitude of the slowdown 
and provide timely information to policymakers. In 
its contribution to the Spring European Council of 
19-20 March 2009, the Commission drew a first 
tentative assessment of the effectiveness of 
financial plans and stressed the need for greater co-
ordination in the implementation of measures 
decided under the EERP umbrella (41). The 
Eurogroup also monitored the economic situation 
throughout this period and regularly shared its 
assessment with the Ecofin Council. 
(40) Commission communication COM (2008)706 'From 
financial crisis to recovery' of 29 October 2008. 
(41) Commission communication COM (2009)114 'Driving 
European recovery' of 4 March 2009. 
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195. The financial crisis has highlighted the 
weaknesses in the EU's supervisory framework.
Supervision remains fragmented along national
lines despite substantial progress achieved in
financial market integration and the ever-growing 
importance of cross-border entities. Around 70% 
Box 4.1: Activities of the Eurogroup in 2008 and 2009
The Eurogroup is a corner-stone of euro area economic governance. It regularly gathers Ministers of Finance
of the euro area on an informal basis. Over the last decade, the Eurogroup's responsibilities for the economic
governance of EMU have grown markedly.
Table 1: Activities of the Eurogroup during the year 2008 and the first months of 2009
January The EG assessed the introduction of the Euro in Cyprus and Malta. In addition, Ministers discussedguidelines within the Lisbon Treaty framework, with special emphasis given to the euro-area chapter.
February The EG invited euro-area Member States to benefit from good economic times to consolidate publicfinances so as to reach a balanced financial stance  by 2010.
April
The EG expressed concern on the high level of inflation within the euro area. The EG called for
moderation in the adjustment of administered prices and prudence when rearticulating indirect
taxation.
May The EG discussed compensation schemes in the corporate sector.
September The EG elected for a new mandate Jean-Claude Juncker at the head of the Eurogroup. 
October Summit of the Eurogroup Heads of State and Governments in Paris. A declaration on a coordinatedaction plan to fight the banking crisis is adopted.
November
Based on the autumn forecast of the European Commission, the EG discussed the resulting financial
and budgetary consequences of the deterioration in economic activity. With respect to public
investment in different Member States of the euro-area, Ministers exchanged views on the necessary
coordination for efficient use of investment at the current juncture. 
December The EG discussed the Commission's European Economic Recovery Plan. It also decided to allowautomatic stabilisers to work fully in 2008 and 2009. 
January
The EG examined the economic stimulus packages of different Member States. It concluded that these
stimulus packages correspond to the level of action required by the European Council in December
2008. 
February The EG expressed concerns about credit distribution to the real economy and affirmed its willingnessto monitor closely the situation.
March
The EG approved Terms of Reference regarding the European Monetary System II, as a preliminary
condition to an eventual adoption of the euro by non euro-area member states. It also prepared the
discussion on specific recommendations to the euro area with respect to the "de Larosière report" on
financial stability.
April The EG reviewed the financial and budgetary situation of different euro-area member states. It calledon Greece to take resolute measures, a position that Greek authorities shared.
May The EG stressed the need to assess first the effectiveness of current stimulus packages beforecontemplating further action.
Given the severity of the crisis in Ireland and the measures already taken by the Irish government, the
EG agreed to grant Ireland an additional delay to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact. The
public deficit should come below the 3% reference value by 2013 instead of 2012.
2008
2009
Source: Commission services 
This reflects the growing political importance of the Eurogroup but also the increased number of items on its
agenda, with the economic situation, inflation and euro-area responsibilities under the Stability and Growth
Pact and Lisbon Strategy being among the topics that are regularly discussed within the Eurogroup. The
appointment of its President for a two-year term from January 2005 added to the visibility of the Eurogroup.
On 12 September 2008, Jean Claude Juncker was re-appointed for a third term. 
Since the Eurogroup is an informal body, its deliberations are confidential and it does not release public
statements. The table 1 in this box is based on regular press releases of the Ministry of Finance from
Luxembourg and does not necessarily cover all the items that were discussed. 
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of EU banking assets are held by 43 cross-border 
banking groups. In particular, increasingly 
sophisticated financial products are increasingly 
dealt with on a pan-European basis. The 
Lamfalussy approach, started in 2001, largely 
succeeded on the regulatory side, by speeding up 
the adoption of EU financial service law, but 
progress was slow and uneven on the supervisory 
side. For instance, no common reporting formats 
for banks were agreed, while persistent 
divergences resulted in slow progress on standards 
for clearing and settlement.  
196. Macro-prudential risks, both at the 
national and EU level, were not emphasised 
enough. One of the most serious challenges 
highlighted by the crisis is the fact that the present 
EU arrangements –like arrangements at national 
and global level– placed too much emphasis on the 
supervision of individual firms, and too little on 
risks to the stability of the financial system as a 
whole. Analyses were fragmented and performed 
by different authorities at different levels. In so far 
as risks were identified there was no EU 
mechanism to ensure that this assessment of risks 
translated into action. Information did not flow 
well between national supervisors, something that 
was compounded by the lack of consistent powers 
among Member States' supervisors. In particular, 
the so-called Level-3 Committees of the 
Lamfalussy process (Committee of European 
Securities Regulators, Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors, Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors) 
were designed as advisory committees for the 
Commission. They had neither the legal basis nor 
adequate resources to properly engage in crisis 
prevention and resolution. These shortcomings 
were laid bare in the current financial turmoil. 
Most notably, it resulted in the emergency 'de-
consolidation' of several large financial institutions 
and their restructuring along national lines. Based 
on this widely-shared diagnostic, the Commission 
saw the need for new impetus in this area. 
197. The de Larosière Group set out a 
comprehensive action plan. In October 2008, 
President Barroso took the initiative to give a 
mandate to a High-Level Group to make proposals 
to strengthen European supervisory arrangements. 
The Group, chaired by former IMF Managing 
Director Jacques de Larosière, released its report 
on 25 February 2009. In its conclusions, the 
European Council of 19/20 March 2009 agreed to 
the de Larosière report as 'the basis for action'. 
198. Macro-prudential concerns should be 
effectively catered for. The de Larosière Group 
suggested establishing a new body – the European 
Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) – that would pool 
and analyse all information pertaining to 
macroeconomic conditions that is relevant for 
financial stability. The ESRC would be composed 
of the members of the General Council of the 
ECB, the Chairpersons of the three Level-3 
Committees as well as one Member of the 
Commission. The ESRC would issue risk warnings 
to relevant bodies, including national supervisors, 
the EFC and the IMF depending on the nature of 
the threat. The ESRC may appeal to the Economic 
and Financial Committee if it feels that a 
supervisor has not responded in an adequate 
manner. 
199. Micro-prudential aspects would be 
handled by a European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS). The ESFS would be a 
decentralised network, still relying on national 
supervisors for day-to-day supervision. However, 
three new European Authorities would be set up, 
replacing the Level-3 Lamfalussy Committees. 
They would coordinate the application of 
supervisory standards and guarantee strong 
cooperation between national supervisors, 
including recourse to binding and proportionate 
mediation in case of conflicts. 
200. A two-stage approach to implementation 
would combine harmonisation of rules and 
powers and supervisory reforms. The de Larosière 
Group sketched out a roadmap for the 
implementation of its recommendations. The 
competences and powers of supervisors should be 
aligned with the most comprehensive systems in 
the EU, while regulation should be streamlined in 
order to get a consistent set of core rules. Colleges 
of supervisors should be set up for all systemically 
important financial institutions, both in the EU and 
internationally. These steps would pave the way 
for the establishment of the European System of 
Financial Supervision and the three Authorities. 
They should be independent and accountable to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission. In addition, a review clause after 
three years would examine the possibility of 
merging banking and insurance authorities. 
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201. The Commission endorsed the de 
Larosière approach and laid the ground for a 
two-pillar framework for European Financial 
Supervision. The Commission capitalised on the 
findings of the report in its May Communication 
with a view to first decisions at the June 2009 
European Council (42). The Communication set out 
a detailed proposal for the functioning and 
composition of the ESRC and the ESFS. It 
affirmed the leading role of central banks in 
macro-prudential supervision through the 
participation of the heads of the ECB and of all EU 
National Central Banks in the European Systemic 
Risk Council (43). The ECB would provide 
administrative support as well as technical 
expertise to the ESRC. Decisions of the ESRC 
should be taken by a simple majority. 
Proposed financial governance arrangements 
according to the recommendations of the De 
Larosière Group:  
European Systemic Risk
Council (ESRC)
European 
Banking 
Authority
European 
Insurance and 
Occupational 
Pensions 
Authority
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)
Early risk warning
Information on micro-
prudential developments
European 
Securities and 
Markets 
Authority
National 
Banking 
Supervisors
National 
Insurance 
Supervisors
National 
Securities 
Supervisors
Source: Commission services. 
(42) Commission communication COM (2009)252 'European 
financial supervision' of 27 May 2009. 
(43) The three Chairpersons of the European Supervisory 
Authorities and a Member of the European Commission 
will be members with voting rights as well. The Members 
without voting rights would be one high-level 
representative per Member State of the competent national 
supervisory authorities and the President of the Economic 
and Financial Committee. 
The three existing committees of supervisors 
would be replaced by three new Authorities, each 
of which would have legal personality in order to 
contribute to the development of a single set of 
harmonised rules, improve the supervision of 
cross-border institutions by developing common 
supervisory approaches and help settle possible 
disputes between national supervisors. Each new 
independent Authority would have a Board of 
supervisors comprised of the highest-level 
representatives from the appropriate national 
supervisory authorities. The chairperson would be 
nominated after an open competition and 
confirmed by the European Parliament. In order to 
foster accountability, the ESRC and the three 
Authorities would report to the Council and the 
European Parliament on a frequent basis. 
202. The European Council, in its 
conclusions of 19 June 2009, supported the 
creation of a European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) (44) and a European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS). However, given the potential 
or contingent liabilities that may be involved for 
Member States, the European Council stressed that 
decisions taken by the newly-created European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which are the 
mainstay of the ESFS, should not impinge in any 
way on the fiscal responsibilities of Member 
States. It agreed that the European System of 
Financial Supervisors should have binding and 
proportionate decision-making powers in respect 
of whether supervisors are meeting their 
requirements under a single rule book and relevant 
Community law and in the case of disagreement 
between the home and host state supervisors, 
including within colleges of supervisors. ESAs 
should also have supervisory powers for credit 
rating agencies. The European Council finally 
stressed that the new framework, comprising both 
macro-prudential and micro-prudential 
components, should be fully in place in the course 
of 2010. 
203. The Commission adopted operational 
arrangements for the establishment of the ESRB 
and the ESFS. On 23 September 2009, the 
Commission adopted a package of legal texts 
underpinning the new framework. The package 
comprises: 
(44) The name was eventually chosen in lieu of ESRC. 
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(i) A proposal for a regulation on 
Community macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system and establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board (45). The regulation defines 
the mission and tasks of the ESRB, lays out its 
organisation and governance, and sets procedures 
for the ESRB to issue warnings and 
recommendations. 
(ii) A proposal for a Council Decision 
entrusting the ECB with specific tasks concerning 
the functioning of the ESRB (46). It lays out the 
modalities of the ECB's analytical, statistical, 
administrative and logistical support to the ESRB. 
(iii) Proposals for three regulations 
establishing, respectively, a European Banking 
Authority (EBA) (47), a European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) (48) and 
a European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) (49). The new Authorities will take over 
all of the functions of the Lamfalussy Level-3 
committees. In addition, it will have certain extra 
competences, including the following: 
(a) developing proposals for technical standards, 
respecting better regulation principles; 
(b) resolving cases of disagreement between 
national supervisors, where legislation requires 
them to co-operate or to agree; (c) contributing to 
ensuring consistent application of technical 
Community rules (including through peer 
reviews); (d) the European Securities and Markets 
Authority will exercise direct supervisory powers 
for Credit Rating Agencies; (e) a co-ordination 
role in emergency situations. 
4.4. THE CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
EURO AREA 
204. From 2008 to 2009, the euro area has 
welcomed three new members. The euro area grew 
from thirteen to sixteen Member States as Cyprus 
and Malta (in 2008) and Slovakia (in 2009) joined 
the group. The entry of these countries was the 
result of a successful convergence process, 
fostered by stability-oriented policies and 
structural reforms (see Box 4.2). With the 
(45) COM(2009)499. 
(46) COM(2009)500. 
(47) COM(2009)501. 
(48) COM(2009)502. 
(49) COM(2009)503. 
successful entry of Slovakia into the euro area on 1 
January 2009, 328.6 million people out of the EU's 
499.7 million now share the single currency. 
205. The recent introduction of the euro in 
Slovakia was managed successfully. It did not 
lead to significant price increases. Thanks to 
detailed preparatory work, the technical aspects of 
the transition went well and almost all Slovak 
shops were giving change in euro as of the first 
days of January 2009. According to a European 
Commission Flash Eurobarometer survey 
conducted in January 2009, 90% of Slovaks felt 
well-informed about the euro. As a result, 
perceptions of changeover-related inflationary 
pressures were limited. 
206. The next regular assessment of fulfilling 
the conditions for euro adoption will take place in 
the first half of 2010. Major differences remain 
between non euro-area Member States with respect 
to their progress with nominal convergence. 
Pursuing nominal convergence faces additional 
challenges in the current financial crisis 
environment. While inflation is decelerating 
rapidly in most new Member States, their fiscal 
balances, exchange rates and long-term interest 
rates as well as their ability to borrow on financial 
markets have been negatively affected by the 
financial crisis. 
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Box 4.2: The three new euro area Member States: Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia
The entry of Cyprus and Malta in January 2008 and Slovakia in January 2009 into the euro-area has been
the result of a successful process of nominal convergence towards the euro-area. In recent years, inflation
in Cyprus and Malta has been close to the euro-area average, standing at 2.9% in Cyprus and 2.7% in Malta
on average in 2006-2008. Slovakia experienced more volatile and at times high inflation, reflecting the
impact of external factors and adjustment of administrative prices. Developments of underlying inflation were
on the whole favourable and HICP inflation averaged 3.4% in 2006-2008.  
Before joining the euro area, interest rate convergence was largely achieved in the three countries, with
spreads vis-à-vis the euro area for short-term and long-term interest rates having almost disappeared several
months before euro adoption. The general government deficit has declined to below 3% since 2007 in
Slovakia and since 2006 in Cyprus and Malta, but in the latter the deficit widened above the 3% threshold in
2008. In the three countries, the public debt as a share of GDP declined significantly in recent years. It
amounted in 2008 to 49.1% in Cyprus, 64.1% in Malta and 27.6% in Slovakia.  
Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia have also rapidly converged to the euro area in real terms. In 2008, their GDP
per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) reached respectively 82.9%, 73.4% and 65.4% of the euro-
area level. Their real GDP growth has been strong in the last decade, averaging 4.1% in Cyprus, 2.8% in
Malta and 8.4% in Slovakia in 2006-2008. While the labour market situation in Cyprus compares well vis-à-
vis the euro-area, with an unemployment rate of 3.8% in 2008 and a high employment rate (70.3%), the
picture is less rosy in Malta and Slovakia with a relatively low employment rate (55.8% in Malta; 57.5% in
Slovakia) and a higher unemployment rate (5.9% in Malta; 9.5% in Slovakia). 
Graph: Convergence to the euro area: GDP in PPS Table: Recent macroeconomic performance
(euro area=100) (annual percentage change) 
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Cyprus
Malta
Slovakia
2006 2007 2008
GDP 4.1 4.4 3.7
Inflation 2.2 2.2 4.4
General government
balance (as % of GDP) -1.2 3.4 0.9
GDP 3.2 3.6 1.6
Inflation 2.6 0.7 4.7
General government
balance (as % of GDP) -2.6 -2.2 -4.7
GDP 8.5 10.4 6.4
Inflation 4.3 1.9 3.9
General government
balance (as % of GDP) -3.5 -1.9 -2.2
Cyprus
Malta
Slovakia
Source: Commission services Source: Commission services 
These countries are small open economies, highly integrated in terms of trade and finance to the euro
area. Malta and Cyprus are the two smallest economies in the euro area, contributing respectively 0.06% and
0.18% to euro-area GDP, and 0.13% and 0.24% to its population. Slovakia accounts for 0.73% of the euro-
area GDP and 1.65% of its population. Trade with the euro-area represents about 53% of total trade of Cyprus
and about 45% in Malta and Slovakia. In addition, a large share of foreign direct investments comes from the
euro-area (42% for Cyprus, 43% in Malta and 74% in Slovakia in 2007).
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